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Abstract 
While medical informed consent documents have received much attention in literature 
and throughout varying North American legal jurisdictions, the competence needed to be 
able to provide informed consent is often overlooked. This is especially apparent in the 
medical research field where clinical trials are done with terminally ill human subjects. 
However, analyzing competence is crucial for the protection of subjects’ autonomy. If 
informed consent is to be truly considered an expression of autonomous action, then it is 
necessary that the decision-maker be sufficiently competent to provide that informed 
consent. Given the vital role that competence plays in proper autonomous decision-
making, the following will first engage in an examination of the concept of competence 
and second the requisite competence needed for terminally ill subjects to be able to 
provide informed consent to research participation. Since there is still some disagreement 
regarding the components of competence, first a proper description of competence will be 
provided. This will involve depicting competence as being comprised of four sub-
abilities, specifically understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness. With the 
proper depiction of competence, the remainder of this work will contend that current 
approaches to determine competency requirements are flawed, that the medical research 
context ought to require more stringent competency requirements than the medical 
practice context for the terminally ill, and that a Subject Rights Advocate (SRA), 
unaffiliated with the research study, should be employed to bolster/enhance and evaluate 
the competence of terminally ill potential subjects, as well as solicit the final informed 
consent. It will additionally be argued that the method the SRA ought to use in achieving 
such aims should be based on a conversational approach. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Competence, Consent, Autonomy and the Medical 
Research Context 
 
 We, often without any conscious recognition, make determinations of others’ 
competence on a daily basis. Every time we respect the decision of a friend or co-worker 
we have implicitly assumed that he/she possesses a certain level of competence. Our 
reactive behaviours and attitudes towards others are determined by these types of 
assumptions. We may accept and endorse the decision or behaviour of another, or reject it 
outright based on what level of mental capacity we think he possesses. While some might 
suggest that this is an overstatement of the extent to which we make competence 
assumptions regarding others and the extent to which such assumptions influence our 
behaviour, we may posit various hypothetical, yet not uncommon scenarios, to see that it 
is indeed not an exaggeration.   
 Imagine a friend, we may call him Bob, informs you that he is about to go 
purchase a ring and propose to his girlfriend of one year. Your immediate reaction might 
be one of jubilation for him, and you will likely even congratulate him. It is possible that 
you may even offer your assistance, by perhaps accompanying him to the jewelers in 
order to provide advice regarding which ring to purchase.  
 However, if we modify the scenario slightly, a different reaction might seem more 
plausible. Instead imagine that you find yourself in the exact same situation, except in 
this second scenario, you know that Bob is fairly inebriated. You realize that his mental 
abilities are likely far too impaired to make such a decision, and instead of congratulating 
and encouraging him, you reject his idea to propose and perhaps even attempt to prevent 
him from carrying out his plan to fruition.  
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 What has changed? In one instance you respect your friend’s decision, accept it as 
a legitimate one and even endorse it. However, in the second scenario, your knowledge of 
Bob’s level of intoxication, which may prevent him from deliberating properly, had you 
second-guessing his decision. In scenario 2, you second-guessed whether he was 
sufficiently competent to decide for himself.  
 This example demonstrates that even in common situations, assumptions of 
competence are being made. This remains true for many other serious decisions that you 
see others make from day to day, whether that involves moving to a different location, 
changing careers, or embarking on certain investment opportunities. Our reactions to a 
myriad of decisions made by others are in part determined by a presumption of their 
competence, for if we thought otherwise and had reason to think that they had a 
diminished mental capacity, there is a good chance that we would behave differently, and 
as with the proposal example, perhaps second-guess their decision.       
 Determinations of mental incompetence are crucially important, in both day to 
day interactions and particularly in the law. Depending on a person’s mental capacity, she 
may or may not have certain decision making rights. An individual in an advanced stage 
of Alzheimer’s or dementia for example, will likely lack the competence needed to be 
permitted to purchase or operate a vehicle. The implications of competence assessments 
are extensive and have particular importance for our laws. Many of our legal rights can 
be usurped due to a finding of incompetence. Even our ability to stand trial for example, 
is something that requires a certain level of competence; an issue that has received more 
attention in American and Canadian societies in recent decades. “Earlier estimates place 
the number of competence-to-stand-trial evaluations performed each year in the United 
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States at around 20,000, with more recent statistics citing 60,000, making such 
evaluations a significant focus of mental health inquiry in the criminal justice system.”1     
 While the claim that a person’s mental capacity is directly correlated with the acts 
or decisions she may or may not be permitted to perform should not be considered 
contentious or unethical, the topic of competence remains shrouded in controversy and 
ethical quandaries. What should the threshold level of competence be for a particular 
action? By what process should we determine another’s mental capacity? How much 
evidence of a person’s competence is required before making a competency 
determination? Given the importance of autonomy,
2
 being able to navigate through these 
types of questions is a necessity. Mistakenly assessing one as incompetent when she 
actually has a great level of mental capacity may constitute a serious infringement on the 
rights of a citizen as this person would have her autonomy undermined. Thus, 
discovering solutions to these types of questions is paramount, especially in western 
cultures where autonomy is treasured as a foundational value.
3
 
 While it may prove difficult to actually solve some of these issues, it can 
furthermore become especially controversial in the realm of medicine. In the medical 
field, patients considering certain treatments and subjects of research are often faced with 
complicated, risky, and in many cases life altering decisions. We generally assume that 
before a patient makes a decision to accept or reject a particular treatment, or before a 
                                                 
1
 Debra A. Pinals, Chad E. Tillbrook, and Denise L. Mumley. “Practical Application of the MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) in a Public Sector Forensic Setting” J 
Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 34(2), pp. 179-188, June 2006, p.179. 
2
 The concepts of autonomy and competence are related and will be further clarified later in this chapter, 
but for now a brief pragmatic definition should suffice. Autonomy refers to the state of being self-
determining or self-governing, while competence may be thought of as “the ability to be autonomous” 
(Stephen Wear. “Patient Autonomy, Paternalism, and the Conscientious Physician” Theoretical Medicine, 
Vol. 4, pp. 253-274, 1983, p. 266).  
3
 Many, for example, have suggested that autonomy constitutes a necessary element of human dignity. See: 
James Griffin. On Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp.149-158. 
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subject consents to participate in a medical research trial, that this person is competent 
enough to make these autonomous decisions. However this is not always the case. While 
much scholarship has been dedicated to the issue of the mental capacity of patients,
4
 the 
matter that requires more attention and will be explored presently will involve the level of 
mental capacity which can enable an autonomous and ethical informed consent to 
medical research participation. More specifically, further consideration and analysis must 
be given to the matter of competence regarding terminally ill
5
 individuals who find 
themselves considering participation as subjects in medical research. The decision to 
participate in research for these patients is often incredibly complex and difficult to make, 
as can be highlighted by the following case: A patient has recently been diagnosed with 
advanced pancreatic cancer and told he has at most six months to live. Surgery is not an 
option and the benefits of radiation therapy are marginal. Chemotherapy with Mitomycin is 
thought to offer him the best chance of living out the year. The patient is frightened and 
                                                 
4
 See, for example: Paul Appelbaum. “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment” The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 357, pp. 1834-1840, 2007; Thomas Grisso, and Paul S. 
Appelbaum. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for Physicians and Other Health 
Care Professionals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Paul S. Appelbaum, and Thomas Grisso. 
“Capacities of Hospitalized, Medically Ill Patients to Consent to Treatment” Psychosomatics, Vol. 38(2), 
pp. 119-125, 1997; Irwin Kleinman. “The Right to Refuse Treatment: ethical considerations for the 
competent patient” Can Med ASSOC J, Vol. 144(10), pp. 1219-1222, 1991; Paul S. Appelbaum and 
Thomas Grisso. “The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence to 
Consent to Treatment” Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 19(2), pp. 105-126, 1995; Lainie Friedman Ross. 
“Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is it in their best interest?” In Health Care Ethics in Canada, 
Francoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie, Barry Hoffmaster, & Susan Sherwin, eds. (Toronto: Nelson Ltd., 2004); 
and Alec Buchanan. “Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment” Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, Vol. 97, pp. 415-420, 2004. 
5
 What specifically constitutes a terminal illness may be a question that elicits some disagreement. 
Generally though, a terminal illness is thought to be a disease that cannot be cured or sufficiently treated 
and is likely to result in a patient’s death. Certain types of cancer have become paradigmatic examples of 
terminal illness. We may proceed forward applying an often used definition in many North American 
jurisdictions. More specifically, a terminal illness refers to “an incurable and irreversible disease that has 
been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months” 
(Oregon Health Authority, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Oregon Revised Statutes, 1994, last 
accessed Jan. 2015: <http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/ 
DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/ors.aspx>). It should be noted however, that some diagnosed with a terminal 
illness live long past the six month life expectancy time period. 
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desperate to beat the odds. He has heard of a high risk clinical trial that is testing a new anti-
cancer drug. At this stage, the experimental drug is not a validated medical treatment and its 
therapeutic potential is still uncertain. If the patient is enrolled in the experimental arm of the 
trial he will forego the limited benefits of the best available validated treatment for 
pancreatic cancer. Even so, the patient wishes to enroll in the trial and is hopeful that this 
may be the miraculous cure he needs. 
 This case highlights some of the ethical concerns that should prompt investigation 
into the nature and level of competence needed for terminally ill persons to consent to 
participate in medical research. Does for example the patient understand the difference 
between the aims of research and standard medical practice? Does the patient’s state of 
desperation constitute duress, and if not does it make him more vulnerable to other undue 
pressures? Is the level of mental capacity needed for this patient to consent to treatment 
adequate for him to consent to participate in research? These types of questions require 
some examination. In what follows, it will firstly be contended that a greater level of 
mental capacity is needed for terminally ill individuals to provide consent for research 
participation, than would be needed to consent to treatment for the condition under study. 
Exactly how great a level of competence, and how best to evaluate whether an individual 
possesses that level of competence, are two other issues that will also be addressed. 
 It should be noted though that an assumption has been made that there exists a 
real and morally relevant distinction between medical therapeutic practice and medical 
research. The distinction is of vital importance. Whether a particular intervention 
constitutes therapy or research, will determine to what types of moral standards and 
ethical guidelines it will be subjected, and this distinction will further have serious legal 
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implications since the two activities are governed by different laws. “Should a proposed 
course of conduct fit under the rubric of treatment [for example], an IRB
6
 has no mandate 
or authority to review or comment upon its provisions.”7 The Belmont Report provides a 
concise description of the distinction between therapeutic practice and medical research, 
asserting that: 
 ‘practice’ refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-
 being of an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of 
 success. The purpose of medical or behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, 
 preventive treatment, or therapy to particular individuals. By contrast, the term 
 ‘research’ designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit 
 conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable 
 knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, principles, and statements of 
 relationships). Research is usually described in a formal protocol that sets forth an 
 objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective.
8
 
 
 While the difference between the two may seem intuitive, this distinction is not 
without its own controversy. For even with a seemingly unambiguous definition as the 
one provided by The Belmont Report, certain scenarios tend to blur this distinction. Two 
of these types of cases are often referred to as therapeutic research and experimental 
treatment. The term “therapeutic research” refers to research that is carried out where the 
research offers some potential for therapeutic benefit and may actually be performed in 
                                                 
6
 An IRB is an institutional review board, whose function, according to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (hereafter FDA), is to review and “approve every clinical trial taking place within their 
jurisdiction--usually a hospital. [More specifically] the purpose of an IRB review is to ensure that 
appropriate steps are taken to protect the rights and welfare of participants as subjects of research. If the 
risks to participants are found to be too great, the IRB will not approve the research, or it will specify 
changes that must be made before the research can be done” (U.S. Department of Health And Human 
Services, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People” 
Last Updated: June 2014, <http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143531.htm>). 
In Canada, the term research ethics board (REB) is used as opposed to IRB for the particular body 
responsible for reviewing and approving clinical trials with human subjects. 
7
 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Robert A. Crouch, John D. Arras, Jonathan D. Moreno, and Christine Grady. Ethical 
and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) p. 95. 
8
 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1979), Section A Boundaries Between 
Practice and Research. 
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combination with standard medical care. The term “experimental treatment” describes a 
situation wherein a physician may attempt an uncertain non-validated procedure because 
he believes that it is the only recourse left in order to benefit the patient.
9
 It should be 
noted that the use of these terms has elicited some controversy, especially the term 
“therapeutic research”.10 Nonetheless, despite the potential controversy surrounding the 
use of this term, it does denote a distinct type of research scenario where an individual 
might be receiving an already validated therapeutic treatment that he would otherwise be 
receiving for his particular ailment and the physician is also documenting the results for 
the purposes of research and contributing to generalizable knowledge in the field. Thus 
while the term used to define such a case might be controversial, this and the 
experimental treatment case are both scenarios that may represent some difficulty for the 
therapy/research distinction, and will thus be given further attention in Chapter Three.  
 Setting these blurry cases momentarily aside, it still appears that even if a strong 
distinction between research and therapy is maintained, determining the ethical level of 
mental capacity required for a terminally ill research subject to be able to provide 
informed consent for research participation remains a very broad and lofty order, and will 
thus require further narrowing. For example, prior to embarking on this endeavor, it is 
imperative that the different stages of clinical research trials be explicated.  
                                                 
9
 “For example, consider the case of Baby Fae, an infant born with a defective heart who received a baboon 
heart when no human hearts were available… Or consider the birth of Louise Brown, the world’s first test 
tube baby, in 1978. No one had performed in vitro fertilization in human beings before she was conceived. 
An obstetrician, Patrick Steptoe, performed this procedure in order to benefit his patient, Lesley Brown, 
who was suffering from fertility problems” (Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik. Responsible Conduct of 
Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 250).  
10
 See Robert J. Levine. Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research 2
nd
 edition (Baltimore: Urban & 
Schwarzenberg, Inc., 1986) pp. 8-10; and Robert J. Levine. “Clarifying the Concepts of Research Ethics” 
Hastings Center Report, Vol. 9(3), pp. 21-26, 1979. Some of the controversial issues surrounding such 
terminology usage will be explored subsequently in Chapter Three. 
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 Health Canada and the FDA have a four category classification scheme for the 
different phases of clinical studies. We shall proceed by briefly examining each one in 
turn. 
 
Phases of Clinical Trials
11
 
 Phase I trials, representing “the earliest-stage clinical trials for studying an 
experimental intervention in humans, are small (typically fewer than 100 participants) 
and aim to determine the toxicity and maximum safe dose of a new drug.”12 More 
specifically “in phase I drug studies, investigators are measuring the pharmacological and 
toxicological effects of a drug to estimate a maximum tolerable dose.”13 While many 
Phase I clinical trials often involve paid healthy subjects who receive no therapeutic 
benefits from participation, some are conducted on severely and/or terminally ill 
patients.
14
 Terminally ill cancer patients, for example, might be used in Phase I cancer 
trials. “The reason for this is that most anticancer agents, whether cytotoxic 
chemotherapies or other more targeted non-cytotoxic agents, commonly have toxic 
                                                 
11
 It should also be noted that prior to Phase I trials, preclinical studies are conducted in a laboratory setting 
and often on animals. The preliminary data obtained through these trials is used to support a request to the 
appropriate body (Health Canada or the FDA for example) to begin testing the non-validated procedure on 
humans.   
12
 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), Ethical and Policy Issues in International Research: 
Clinical Trials in Developing Countries Vol. I: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission, (Bethesda, Maryland: 2001) p. 21. 
13
 Shamoo and Resnik, 2009, p. 248.  
14
 See, for example: Robin Fretwell Wilson. “The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence 
of Money and Prestige in Human Research” American Journal of Law & Medicine, Vol. 36, pp. 295-325, 
2010.  The Jesse Gelsinger case is a fairly recent example that ended in scandal. “Jesse had a rare disease, a 
liver deficiency called ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency (“OTCD”) that made it difficult for his liver 
to process proteins” (Wilson, 2010, p. 298). He participated in a Phase I gene- therapy trial, and due to 
various unethical practices, including a lack of proper disclosure, being exposed to a considerably higher 
dosage of the treatment than was considered appropriate, being given the non-validated treatment despite 
the fact that “his ammonia levels fell outside the protocol’s safety limit” (Wilson, 2010, p. 300), and an 
overarching conflict of interest, he subsequently died.  
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effects in normal tissues at doses that are likely to be effective.”15 Since Phase I trials are 
the first time that the non-validated procedure is tested on humans, there are a myriad of 
observations that researchers can record. However, though there are certain secondary 
observations made in a Phase I trial, which may include determining the 
pharmacokinetics (PK)
16
 of the experimental drug, assessing the pharmacodynamics 
(PD),
17
 and sometimes even documenting any obvious potentially therapeutic activity of 
the experimental drug, such as recording anti-tumor effects, it is crucial to realize that the 
primary aim of a Phase I trial is “to determine [the] recommended dose of the new agent 
for further study,”18 which is often the maximum tolerable dose (MTD).19 Insofar as 
determining the PK and PD are necessary for recommending further dose scheduling of 
the experimental drug, they may be considered primary observations necessary in a Phase 
I trial, however any possible observations concerning the therapeutic potential of the non-
validated drug/intervention may be properly considered secondary observations, and are 
often left to later trial phases.   
                                                 
15
 Elizabeth A Eisenhauer, Chris Twelves, and Marc Buyse. Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials: a practical 
guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 42. 
16
 Pharmacokinetics involves studying the bodily absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion of the 
experimental agent.  
17
 These are the “pharmacologic effects of the drug on the body (eg, nadir neutrophil or platelet count, 
nonhematologic toxicity, molecular correlates, imaging endpoints)” (Christophe Le Tourneau, J. Jack Lee, 
and Lillian L. Siu. “Dose Escalation Methods in Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials” J Natl Cancer Inst, Vol. 
101(10), pp. 708-720, 2009, p. 709). 
18
 Eisenhauer et al., 2006, p. 41, table 3.1. 
19
 More specifically Phase I trials involve an escalation of the administration of the drug until the MTD is 
discovered. The trial design functions by applying the concept of dose-limiting toxicity (DLT) which is 
defined as the “toxic effects that are presumably related to the drugs that are considered unacceptable 
(because of their severity and/or irreversibility) and that limit further dose escalation” (Tourneau et al., 
2009, p. 709). “Generally two patients out of a minimum of three or six must experience DLT for 
escalation to cease. The dose level at which DLT is seen in the minimum number of patients required to 
halt further escalation is termed the maximum tolerated dose (MTD)” (Eisenhauer et al., 2006, p. 54). 
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 Phase II studies are conducted on a slightly larger group of subjects (typically 
between 100 and 300). This is the first instance where controlled clinical trials
20
 are used 
to determine the effectiveness of the non-validated drug/intervention. While determining 
the relative safety continues to be an important goal in this phase, at this stage the main 
emphasis is placed on beginning initial therapeutic exploration. “Additional objectives of 
clinical trials conducted in Phase II may include evaluation of potential study endpoints, 
therapeutic regimens (including concomitant medication) and target populations (e.g. 
mild versus severe disease) for further study in Phase II or III.”21 The subjects of these 
studies are often chosen by fairly narrow criteria, are those who are afflicted with the 
disease or condition for which the experimental drug or procedure was produced, and are 
monitored very closely. 
 Provided that adequate results from the Phase II study are obtained, a Phase III 
trial may commence with the non-validated drug/procedure. “Phase III trials are large, 
frequently multi-institution studies, and typically involve from a hundred to thousands of 
participants. Approximately 25 percent of all drugs tested in clinical trials successfully 
complete Phase III testing.”22 A Phase III trial’s main aim is to acquire additional 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of the non-validated intervention. While Phase II 
trials are sometimes labeled therapeutic exploratory, Phase III trials are sometimes 
                                                 
20
 A controlled clinical trial is designed in order to establish a standard against which a non-validated 
drug/procedure may be properly evaluated. This often involves two groups of subjects whereby one group 
receives the non-validated drug/procedure, while the other group receives either standard validated 
treatment or in some cases a placebo. One common type of controlled clinical trial is the randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) wherein the subjects of the clinical study are randomly placed in the different arms 
of the trial. The often cited benefit of RCTs is the reduction in the bias associated with allocating certain 
subjects to one particular arm of the trial over the other. 
21
 Health Canada, Guidance for Industry: General Considerations for Clinical Trials ICH Topic E8, 
(Ottawa, Ontario: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), p. 9. 
22
 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), Ethical and Policy Issues in International Research: 
Clinical Trials in Developing Countries Vol. I: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission, (Bethesda, Maryland: 2001) p. 21. 
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referred to as therapeutic confirmatory trials. Often, the non-validated drug/intervention 
is tested against a placebo or current validated treatments for the disease/ailment under 
study in order to confirm its efficacy as therapeutically beneficial. “These studies carried 
out in Phase III complete the information needed to support adequate instructions for use 
of the drug (official product information).”23 
 Phase IV studies are conducted after the drug/intervention has been approved. 
Though these studies are typically not deemed necessary for approval, they may still 
prove to be quite significant as they can contribute to optimizing the use of the 
drug/intervention. These post-marketing studies can come in a multitude of forms and for 
a variety of purposes. Some common examples include studies investigating: drug-drug 
interactions, indications “for which it is presumed that the drug, once available, will be 
used,”24 the long term effects that a drug may have on morbidity and mortality, and 
additional information regarding the use of the drug “in a patient population not 
adequately studied in the premarketing phase, e.g., children.”25 
 Given these differences between different trial phases, we may now narrow the 
focus of this work as being applicable to only certain phases of clinical trials. More 
specifically the following will undertake to investigate and determine the level of mental 
capacity which can enable an autonomous and ethical informed consent to participate in 
phase I, II, and III medical research trials. One of the main primary aims in what follows 
will be to demonstrate that greater mental capacity is required for terminally ill 
                                                 
23
 Health Canada, Guidance for Industry: General Considerations for Clinical Trials ICH Topic E8, 
(Ottawa, Ontario: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), p. 10. 
24
 Levine, 1986, p. 7. 
25
 Levine, 1986, p. 6. It may additionally be noted that sometimes Phase IV trials are also done for the 
purposes of introducing a drug to a physician and getting her to prescribe it in the hopes that the prescribing 
will continue. These types of trials, often known as “seeding trials”, are for marketing purposes and have 
no scientific value.  
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individuals to consent to participate in phase I, II and III research trials than to consent to 
treatment for the condition under study. Ensuring that an appropriate level of competence 
is possessed by potential research subjects is one of the best safeguards that can be 
offered in order to protect subjects’ interests.    
 
Corruption in Research  
 The idea that the health and wellbeing of patients should reign as a supreme value in 
medicine, even more importantly than the advancement of medical knowledge, is not a new 
concept at all, stemming back to the time of Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.). For “although  
Hippocratic physicians sought to improve medical knowledge, their code of ethics and their 
philosophy of medicine implied that medical advances would occur slowly and would not 
sacrifice the welfare of the individual patient for scientific progress.”26 Unfortunately at 
times throughout our recent history it appears as though we have forgotten this basic precept 
as medical research has been plagued with horrible abuses through numerous scandals. This 
can be seen by some of our most infamous examples such as the medical experimentation 
done under the Nazi regime in WWII, and the Tuskegee Syphilis study.  
 The medical research done in Nazi Germany provides various examples of 
particularly horrific experimentation.  
 These “experiments” included deliberate infection with poisons or pathogens, such 
 as typhus, malaria, smallpox, cholera, yellow fever, and diphtheria, to study the 
 course of the illnesses and possible vaccinations and treatments; studies in which 
 victims were locked in low pressure chambers that duplicated conditions such as 
 falling great distances through space without oxygen; experiments in which victims 
 were exposed for hours to freezing temperatures or freezing water; infliction of 
 simulated battle-caused wounds and infections to test various treatments; sexual 
 sterilization experiments using surgery, high-dose x-rays, and pharmacological 
                                                 
26
 Shamoo & Resnik, 2009, p. 237. 
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 techniques; and the deliberate “induction” of the death of selected Jewish inmates to 
 provide skulls and skeletons for research purposes.
27
 
 
It was from the Military Tribunals following this atrocity that the Nuremberg Code, an 
internationally recognized document regarding the ethics of research, was developed. 
 However, despite recognizing this code and some of the core ethical values it 
advocated, the United States was not without its own infamous cases of reprehensible 
medical experimentation. For example, the U.S. has been widely criticized for its 
implementation of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. This research study began in 1932 and was 
initiated in 
 Macon County, Alabama, to determine the natural course of untreated, latent syphilis 
 in black males. The test comprised 400 syphilitic men, as well as 200 uninfected 
 men who served as controls. … When Penicillin became widely available by the 
 early 1950s as the preferred treatment for syphilis, the men did not receive therapy. 
 In fact on several occasions, the USPHS [U.S. Public Health Service] actually 
 sought to prevent treatment. Moreover, a committee at the federally operated Center 
 for Disease Control decided in 1969 that the study should be continued. Only in 
 1972, when accounts of the study first appeared in the national press, did the 
 Department of Health, Education and Welfare halt the  experiment. … At that time 
 seventy-four of the test subjects were still alive; at least twenty-eight, but perhaps 
 more than 100, had died directly from advanced syphilitic lesions.
28
   
                                                 
27
 Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield, and Colleen M. Flood. Canadian Health Law and Policy 2
nd
 edition 
(Ontario: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2002) p. 464. (This information was derived from T. Taylor. “Opening 
Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946” In The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human 
Rights in Human Experimentation, Annas and Grodin, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). It 
should further be noted that despite the focus historians and ethicists have placed on the Nazi experiments 
during World War II, Japan was guilty of performing equally atrocious medical experiments during the 
same time. “From 1932-1945, Japanese medical researchers killed thousands of human subjects in medical 
experiments… The experiments included intentionally wounding and operating on human beings for 
surgical training, vivisection of live humans, infecting humans with pathogens, exposing subjects to 
extremes of temperature, and biological and chemical warfare research… At the end of the war, the U.S. 
government made a deal with Japan to gain access to the data from chemical and biological warfare 
experiments. In exchange for this data, the U.S. government agreed to not prosecute Japanese physicians 
and scientists for war crimes. As a result of this cover-up, the Japanese atrocities were not widely known 
until the 1990s, and Japanese political leaders have been reluctant to acknowledge that these crimes against 
humanity occurred” (Shamoo and Resnik, 2009, pp. 241-242). For more on this see: T. Tsuchiya. “Imperial 
Japanese Medical Atrocities and Their Enduring Legacy in Japanese Research Ethics” In Contemporary 
Issues in Bioethics, Beauchamp, Walters, Kahn, and Mastroianni, eds. (Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, pp. 56-
64, 2008). 
28
 Allan M. Brandt. “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study” The Hastings Center 
Report, Vol. 8(6), pp. 21-29, 1978, p. 21. What perhaps further adds to the degree to which ethics was 
ignored in this case was the fact that the subjects who participated were not informed of their particular 
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 Of course these are not the only two cases of misconduct in medical research 
involving human subjects,
29
 and as the numerous cases have been brought to the public’s 
eye, so too has the desire for proper oversight. In fact, regulatory changes including research 
ethics codes, laws, and international guidelines regarding medical trials, have often come as 
a response to these disgraceful cases of ethical indiscretions in medical research. For 
example:  
 Vaccination trials conducted without consent on poor and vulnerable people, mainly 
 abandoned children and prostitutes, led to research regulations in Prussia as early as 
 1900 and, remarkably, to rather detailed regulations in pre-Nazi Germany in 1931. 
 [As previously mentioned] the horrific experiments conducted by German doctors 
 under the Nazi regime led to the first internationally influential declaration of 
 standards for medical research, commonly known as the Nuremberg Code.”30  
 
It would thus seem to be no exaggeration to assert that “research ethics-as a discipline that 
informs and responds to clinical and regulatory practice- was ‘born in scandal and reared in 
protectionism,’ to use Carol Levine’s apt phrase.”31 While governments have often 
responded to these dark moments by releasing codes and guidelines for medical research, 
the problem of ethical misconduct on human subjects in medical research still persists.  
 Though the situation may look bleak, it should be noted that much work and 
progress has been done in order to try to afford better protections from abuse and 
unethical conduct for subjects of clinical research, especially for certain vulnerable 
                                                                                                                                                 
illness, or that they were even participating in a research study. Rather they were told that their blood was 
bad and could receive free treatment and lunches. 
29
 See: J. Kats. Experimentation with Human Beings (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972); H. 
Beecher. “Ethics and Clinical Research” N Eng J Med, Vol. 274, pp. 1354- 1360, 1966; M. Pappworth. 
Human Guinea Pigs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967); and Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital, 248 N.Y.S.2d 2455 (1964). Canada has also not been immune to medical research scandals, 
engaging in its own share of unethical research practices. “One of the most notorious research scandals 
involved the scientifically flawed mind-altering experiments by then world-renowned psychiatrist Dr. 
Cameron at McGill University’s Allan Memorial Hospital in the 1950s. Another instance of abuse of 
research subjects in psychiatric research came to light only recently, with an investigation into the 
administration of lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”) and electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) in Kingston’s 
federal prison for women” (Downie et al., 2002, p. 466). 
30
 Downie et al., 2002, p. 464. 
31
 Emanuel et al., 2003, p. 2.  
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populations, including children, prisoners and pregnant women. Various guidelines, such 
as Title 45 (Public Welfare), Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 (Protection of Human 
Subjects)
32
 and The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects
33
 have focused on ensuring that these and other vulnerable populations 
do not have their vulnerability exploited.
34
 However it seems that one particular 
vulnerable group requires far more attention. More specifically, it must be recognized 
that terminally ill persons also constitute a vulnerable population and require similar 
consideration.  
 Many of the ethical controversies surrounding terminally ill subjects often revolve 
around a disrespect for the requirement of informed consent. While informed consent has 
proven to be a great safeguard against abuse, it alone is insufficient. A crucial issue often 
neglected is determining the competency of a potential research subject. However, this is a 
vital step, for it should be clear that if autonomy is to truly be respected, then for an 
informed consent to be considered ethically legitimate it must be the case that the person is 
substantially competent to provide the informed consent. Unfortunately, this realization 
raises more questions than it answers. How great does one’s level of mental capacity need to 
be in order to consent to participate in a medical research trial? Does the level of risk 
associated with participation play any type of significant role in determining one’s 
                                                 
32
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Protection 
from Research Risks, Title 45 (Public Welfare), Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 (Protection of 
Human Subjects) Washington, D.C.: Revised January 15, 2009 (Effective July 14, 2009). 
33
 Council for the International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in Collaboration with the 
World Health Organization (WHO): International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, (Geneva: August, 2002). 
34
 It should be noted that despite the various advances and attention on correcting potential ethical 
misconduct with vulnerable populations, the situation is still far from being resolved. However, the 
regulatory guidelines, laws, and the fact that ethics has become a prominent matter in this field, certainly 
demonstrate progress and suggest a step in the right direction.  
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competency? Assuming evaluations of others’ competence can be mistaken, what level of 
evidence is necessary to show that an individual is competent to participate?  
 However, prior to engaging in any analysis regarding the requisite level of 
competence, or evidence of competence, needed for participation in medical research, it is 
imperative that first a precise definition of competence be adopted, second that an account 
of informed consent be provided, and third that the concept and value of autonomy be 
explicated. Thus, we shall proceed by examining each in turn.  
 
Competence/Mental Capacity 
 Throughout this chapter it may be noted that the terms “mental capacity” and 
“competence” have been used interchangeably, and while this is not entirely accurate, it 
has served a practical purpose. In actuality competence is often thought of as a legal 
requirement, and the term “mental capacity” is instead frequently employed to refer to a 
person’s capability to perform a decisional task when the law itself is not being 
discussed. Despite this dissimilarity though, the two terms are thought to have similar, if 
not the exact same, criteria and conditions. The only real difference is that competence, 
being a legal term, functions as a threshold. This implies that a person is either 
considered legally competent or not for the specific decisional task at hand. Whereas, 
mental capacity is often recognized as being a matter of degree, and thus though two 
persons might both be legally competent to perform some decisional task, providing an 
informed consent for example, the mental capacity of one might be greater than that of 
the other. However, since much of the literature, laws, and ethical guidelines tend to 
 17 
 
oscillate between the two terms, this distinction need not trouble us any further as we 
shall proceed using both terms interchangeably in order to avoid confusion.
35
 
 No longer concerning ourselves with this distinction, we may appropriately ask: 
how is competence/mental capacity to be defined? Competence is often considered to be 
‘the ability to perform a task’, and thus competence for the medical research context will 
refer to the ability to perform the task of decision making regarding participation in 
medical research trials. However, this definition alone is incomplete as it does not 
provide a satisfactory explanation of all of the elements that comprise competence. 
 Though establishing criteria for competence is a fairly controversial topic, and the 
legal standards for competence appear to vary slightly between jurisdictions, both the law 
and leading contributions to this topic seem to have converged somewhat and agreed that 
some form of the following four conditions are at least necessary for competence.
36
 These 
conditions include (1) Understanding, (2) Appreciation, (3) Reasoning, and (4) 
Intentional/Voluntary Choice.
37
 Though some have also argued that a value criterion 
                                                 
35
 It should be mentioned that this will not affect any of the arguments made below since both competence 
and mental capacity are thought to consist of very similar if not the exact same elements. Furthermore, 
“although incompetence denotes a legal status that in principle should be determined by a court, resorting 
to judicial review in every case of suspected impairment of capacity would probably bring both the medical 
and legal systems to a halt” (Appelbaum, 2007, p.1834). Recognizing that many evaluations of capacity 
will thus occur on the fly by medical practitioners and researchers, all recommendations made herein 
regarding the appropriate standards of competence for terminally ill medical research subjects, should be 
applied by courts and the relevant medical personal alike. However, it should be noted that in the following 
Chapters, recommendations will be provided as to who ought to be the competency evaluator for terminally 
ill subjects of medical research. 
36
 Some of the controversy revolves around whether or not a value criterion should be included. 
37
 These criteria are derived primarily from: Louis Charland, “Decision-Making Capacity”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/decision-capacity/>. However, the criteria along 
with the accompanying analysis of each condition have also been heavily influenced by Appelbaum 2007; 
Thomas Grisso, and Paul Appelbaum. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for 
Physicians and Other Health Care Professionals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Tom 
Beauchamp & James Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009); and Jessica Berg, Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso. “Constructing Competence: Formulating 
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions” Rutgers L. Rev. Vol. 48, pp.345-396, 1995-
1996. 
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should be added, the acceptance or denial of this fifth condition is irrelevant for our 
present purpose.
38
 
 The understanding component is perhaps the most evident condition of 
competence. It involves both being in possession of and having the ability to grasp the 
salient information in a particular decision making context. In the medical practice or 
medical research context, understanding can be compromised not only if the person 
cannot adequately comprehend certain facts, but also if the physician or researcher 
respectively does not disclose relevant or correct information to the patient or subject. 
Since a full or complete understanding of all aspects of a decision is unlikely if not 
impossible, an appropriate level of understanding will likely refer only to some 
substantial level of comprehension regarding relevant information. However, what may 
properly constitute relevant information is not always clear. This ambiguity has allowed 
for an abundance of controversies and legal disputes.
39
 
 There is an additional manner in which understanding can be compromised that is 
specific to the medical research context. Namely, sufficient understanding is lacking if 
the research subject does not grasp the nature and purpose of the research study. More 
specifically, the subject may misconstrue the research trial for therapeutic practice. This 
                                                 
38
 Though not vital for our purposes, a brief explanation of the contentious value criterion may be 
instructive. The value condition can be said to require that a person be able to make a judgment about the 
relevant information in light of her values. “Since a subject’s values can be expected to change over time, 
what is required is not an immutable, fixed, set of values, but a minimally consistent and stable set of 
values (Buchanan & Brock, 1987, 24). Another way of expressing this point is to say that capacity requires 
‘a conception of what is good’ (Ibid). The reason for this last requirement should be obvious. Weighing the 
risks and benefits of various alternative choices requires values (Charland 1998a). So does selecting one 
option over others” (Charland, 2008). 
39
 See, for example: Reibl v. Hughes, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 880. The facts of this case are discussed below in 
note 45. 
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phenomenon has become a prevalent dilemma in medical research trials and has been 
referred to as the therapeutic misconception.
40
  
 Furthermore, as will be the case with all four conditions of competence, it should 
be recognized that ensuring that the criterion is satisfied at one particular occasion may 
not be sufficient. Since, as time passes, new information may become available, the 
understanding criterion is only met if any new relevant material is made known to the 
decision-maker. This can become especially pertinent in the medical research context, 
where it is likely that new salient information may become available. The International 
Conference on Harmonisation, Guideline for Good Clinical Practice (hereafter ICH-
GCP) corroborates this sentiment, asserting that the “subject or the subject’s legally 
acceptable representative should be informed in a timely manner if new information 
becomes available that may be relevant to the subject’s willingness to continue 
participation in the trial.”41 For this reason, the understanding criterion of competence, 
and the three remaining criteria discussed below, can be viewed as requiring a continual 
fulfillment, as opposed to simply being satisfied at the onset of the clinical trial.     
 The appreciation condition, being slightly more complex than understanding, 
requires that a subject be able  
 ‘to appreciate the nature and meaning of potential alternatives — what it would 
 be like and “feel” like to be in possible future states and to undergo various 
                                                 
40
 The therapeutic misconception and how it affects competence will be elaborated upon in Chapter Three. 
41
 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline- Guideline for Good Clinical 
Practice (Geneva: 1996),  p.15. This international document forms the basis for much of the ethical 
regulations in clinical trials. In fact “certain member states of the European Union, Japan, Russia, Hungary, 
and Poland have adopted ICH-GCP as national law; the United States, Canada, India and the Philippines 
have adopted ICH-GCP as official guidance” (National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), Ethical 
and Policy Issues in International Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries Vol. II, “Comparative 
analysis of international documents addressing the protection of research participants” (staff analysis), 
Bethesda, Maryland, 2001, p. D-60). It should be noted that since this publication Hungary and Poland 
have in fact become member states of the European Union. 
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 experiences — and to integrate this appreciation into one's decision making’ 
 (Buchanan & Brock, 1989, 24). This element of capacity is sometimes held to 
 derive from the legal requirement that each subject must have ‘insight’ into the 
 circumstances of a given decision (Glass 1997).
42
 
 
Appreciation, for example, in regards to medical treatment decisions would thus refer to 
“the ability to relate diagnostic and treatment information and related consequences to 
one’s own personal situation”43 as opposed to merely understanding that information in 
an abstract and detached sense. Thus, for example, “patients who accept that their 
physicians believe they are ill, but deny that there is a problem in the face of objective 
evidence to the contrary, would fail this component.”44  
 This criterion of competence emphasizes the significance of grasping the 
relevance of certain information and decisions for one’s own personal circumstances. 
What is required for appreciation may thus be different from person to person. This 
denotes a slight departure from the understanding criterion. An example may be helpful 
in demonstrating the difference. We can imagine two patients, both being brought to the 
hospital and as a result of both being diagnosed with a gangrenous leg, each patient will 
require amputation. These individuals are further informed that after the surgery they will 
then be provided with prosthetic replacements.  
                                                 
42
 Louis Charland, "Decision-Making Capacity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/decision-
capacity/>.   
43
 Jennifer Moye and Daniel Marson. “Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older Adults: An 
Emerging Area of Practice and Research” The Journal of Lifelong Learning in Psychiatry, Vol. 7(1), 2009, 
p. 91. 
44
 Berg et al., 1995-1996, p.355. See for example: Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992); and Lane v. 
Fiasconaro, 1995 WL 584522 (Mass. App. Div.); and also Alaska Statutes 2011, Title 47, Welfare, Social 
Services and Institutions, Sec. 47.30.837(d)(1)(B) (2011) which asserts that competence includes that a 
patient “appreciates that the patient has a mental disorder or impairment, if the evidence so indicates; denial 
of a significantly disabling disorder or impairment, when faced with substantial evidence of its existence, 
constitutes evidence that the patient lacks the capability to make mental health treatment decisions.” 
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 It may seem clear that the understanding component for both patients will require 
some level of comprehension regarding their diagnosis of gangrene, the treatment of 
amputation, and how prosthetics function. This does not represent an exhaustive list of 
everything that these patients ought to understand, but it does suggest that the information 
that must be understood will be similar for both of them. However, what the patients 
must appreciate might be different. Expanding on this hypothetical case, we may further 
imagine that one of these patients was a professional basketball player, while the other 
was an author. Appreciation for the basketball player may require some comprehension 
of how this procedure will affect his career and perhaps even the manner in which he 
views himself. However, appreciation for the author may be quite different. For the 
manner in which she conceives of what it would be like to be in the possible future state 
post amputation, and how she integrates that in her decision making, may vary greatly 
from that of the basketball player since her career and identity do not have their 
foundation in her ability to run or perform well in athletics.  
 Thus, while some may misguidedly conflate the understanding and appreciation 
criteria and view them as one in the same, the stark differences between the two should 
now be apparent, and any true assessment of another’s competence will require an 
evaluation of both.
45
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 To see how understanding and appreciation both play a significant role in legal matters, consult: Reibl v. 
Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880. Mr. Reibl “elected to undergo an internal carotid endarterectomy to remove 
an occlusion in an artery near his brain… The operation was performed competently by Dr. Hughes, a fully 
qualified neurosurgeon. However, following the procedure, Reibl suffered a massive stroke, resulting in the 
paralysis of his entire right side…The risk of stroke, in the absence of surgery, had not been imminent… 
The trial judge found that the precise purpose for the operation was not sufficiently explained, and that Mr. 
Reibl was left only with the impression that his headaches and hypertension would decrease… The only 
risks Mr. Reibl was cognizant of were those inherent in any surgical procedure, such as infection. Had he 
known of the more serious risks, Mr. Reibl claimed he would not have gone ahead with the operation, 
especially in light of the fact that he was only one and a half years away from being eligible for pension 
benefits from his employer” (Francoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie, Barry Hoffmaster, & Susan Sherwin. 
 22 
 
 The third condition, categorized as reasoning, involves the ability to “engage in a 
rational
46
 process of manipulating the relevant information.”47 This includes some level 
of consistency in choices, actions and deliberation, as well as the ability to derive the 
appropriate conclusions from premises. This is not to suggest that choices must be 
consistent with past character and values, for that would be an element of a value 
condition, but rather merely that a person should not exhibit obscenely frequent reversals 
of choice, which may show a defect in cognitive functioning. “Reasoning is also usually 
said to include the ability to weigh risks and benefits and evaluate putative 
consequences,”48 an ability that is crucial in the medical research decision making 
context. 
 There might be some concern that including the ability to rationally manipulate 
information in order to derive a conclusion could “lead to incompetence adjudications 
based simply on the unconventionality of a patient’s decisions.”49 The issue being that 
any decisions made contrary to a physician’s professional opinion might be deemed 
irrational. Any criteria of competence which could lead to this consequence would 
                                                                                                                                                 
Health Care Ethics in Canada 2
nd
 edition (Toronto: Nelson Ltd., 2004) p. 245. In this case it was thus 
determined that the material risks that must be disclosed to a patient considering a treatment cannot be 
determined solely by an objective standard or subjective standard, but rather should be based on some 
combination of both. Ultimately, it was decided that Dr. Hughes in this case behaved negligently as a result 
of not adequately disclosing certain risks that would not only be considered relevant by any reasonable 
person, but were also particularly relevant given the specific circumstances of the patient, Mr. Reibl. This 
thus left Mr. Reibl unable to satisfy the appreciation criterion needed for the capacity to be able to consent 
to treatment. 
46
 While the concept of rationality is quite complex, a rough and ready definition will suffice here. Thus 
rationality can be understood simply as the ability to formulate proper interests and ends, pursue one’s 
interests and ends, and effectively employ proper means/ends reasoning. More concisely, rational means 
the ability to further one’s interests in an effective way. For a more specific depiction of rationality see: 
John Rawls. “Justice as Reciprocity” In Collected Papers: John Rawls, Freeman, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999) p. 199.  
47
 Appelbaum, 2007, p. 1836. Appelbaum also correctly elucidates the point that this condition “focuses on 
the process by which a decision is reached, not the outcome of the patient’s choice” (Appelbaum, 2007, p. 
1836). 
48
 Charland, 2008. 
49
 Berg et al., 1995-1996, p. 358. Similar to the position adopted here, these authors also do not view this 
fear as warranted.  
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certainly be flawed. However, an appropriate application of this reasoning criterion of 
competence must recognize that what is sought is not some absolute, objective rational 
decision, but rather that whatever the decision, it can be demonstrated as following 
logically from relevant premises. Thus this reasoning criterion may be satisfied even if 
the decision made is not in accordance with that of a medical professional. While the 
medical professional may be a reasonable person himself, his preferences “are neither 
exhaustive or definitive of the repertoire of the reasonable man.”50 We may therefore 
dismiss this concern as something that would only follow from a misguided and 
inappropriate use of the reasoning criterion of competence. 
 The fourth condition, frequently referred to as the choice criterion, is often 
thought of as merely “expressing a choice, referring to the patient’s ability to state a 
preference.”51 However, it is crucial that this criterion be revised such that the notion of 
voluntariness be incorporated. Though voluntariness is often considered a condition of 
informed consent, 
 it can also be thought of as an important aspect of the choice element of 
 decision-making capacity. The ability to express a choice is morally irrelevant if 
 the choice itself cannot be made voluntarily. Even if a person is expressing a 
 choice but is unable to mentally overcome a coercive environment, as would be 
 the case if the  person made a choice while being deceived or manipulated, then 
 the expression of the choice was certainly not a true satisfaction of this fourth 
 requirement of decision-making capacity. Other scholars have alluded to 
 something similar; for example, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) state that 
 “patients or prospective subjects are competent to make a decision if they have 
 the capacity to…communicate freely their wishes to caregivers or investigators” 
 (p. 113). The term “freely” implies what is being argued here, namely, that 
 voluntariness is a feature of the choice condition of decisional capacity. While 
                                                 
50
 Benjamin Freedman. “Competence, Marginal and Otherwise: Concepts and Ethics” International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 4 (1-2), pp.53-72, 1981, p. 60.   
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 Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998, p. 58. 
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 this voluntariness feature can be considered to be an implicit part of the choice 
 element of competence, it is certainly worth emphasizing.
52
  
 
The addition of this voluntariness aspect is crucial. For it must be noted that an individual 
who possesses the requisite understanding, appreciation and reasoning, but who lacks 
confidence in himself to such an extent that his opinion can be swayed by the mere 
suggestion of another, may be unable to make competent decisions, even if he was 
physically capable of expressing a choice. This is not just an unlikely hypothetical, but 
may be particularly true in the medical decision making context where decisions may be 
of a complex and emotionally taxing nature and may require a certain confidence and 
strength of will. Jessica Berg et al. express a similar sentiment in a discussion of 
autonomy claiming that: 
 People who feel they are too ignorant or too weak to make choices, or who cannot 
 find the emotional strength to do so, are not capable of acting autonomously. As a 
 result, they may become overly susceptible to external influences that would 
 otherwise not be considered undue. They may, for example, be overawed by the 
 prestige of medical professionals or defer to an authority figure in their family. 
 Some people may suffer from phobias or other internal constraints that 
 overwhelm their wills so they cannot freely choose an option they would 
 otherwise desire. A patient who has been sexually abused, for example, might feel 
 incapable of having a physical exam despite intellectually recognizing the health-
 related benefits it may afford.
53
  
   
 The connection between voluntary choice making and competent decision making 
should thus seem clear. It is not merely sufficient that people be able to understand, 
appreciate and reason substantially, but must furthermore make their final decision freely 
based on that understanding, appreciation, and reasoning. In judging one’s ability to 
make competent decisions, if there is a disconnect between the first three conditions of 
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competence, and the choice made at the end of the day, then the fact that one is capable 
of understanding, appreciation, and reasoning, becomes almost irrelevant, as the decision 
made would be an incompetent one. Thus this fourth condition of competence may 
properly be referred to as the intentional/voluntary choice criterion.
54
  
 Apart from adding a voluntariness aspect to the choice criterion, it is further 
important to realize that mere expression of choice should not form a necessary part of 
this fourth criterion of competence, for it would fail to account for a person who 
possesses a full and healthy level of mental capacity, but has a muscular ailment that 
impedes him from using his facial muscles to speak. Of course, as some have noted, the 
mere inability to speak does not mean that one cannot satisfy this condition, for “some 
patients may be able to express a choice in nonverbal ways, for example, in writing or by 
giving signals with their hands or eyes in response to questions.”55 However, we may 
adjust our example and assume even further that the patient was incapable of any 
muscular movement. This is not an implausible scenario “since some patients — for 
example, stroke victims — can have an active mental life and satisfy our first three 
conditions for capacity, but are unable to express anything verbally or through gestures 
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 The type of voluntariness being discussed here may differ from common conceptions of voluntariness. 
For it is often the case that a physical coercion is considered to render an action involuntary. However, 
while a physical coercion does indeed make an action involuntary, it would not be able to render a decision 
incompetent. It would be conceptually false to claim that a perfectly competent individual with respect to 
certain decisions is rendered mentally incompetent in the presence of physical coercion despite the fact that 
his mental faculties are the exact same as they were prior to the physical coercion. This amounts to the 
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of assessment in competency determinations. Thus, for the above claim, specifically that for a decision to 
be competent it must be made voluntarily, it must be acknowledged that this only applies to a particular 
subsection of voluntariness, specifically mental voluntariness. Thus while a physical coercion would not 
count against one in a competency evaluation, falling prey to manipulation, being influenced by verbal 
bullying, or being in a state of mind of desperation, phobia, or addiction, that would have one make a 
decision that did not properly follow from the requisite level of reasoning, understanding, and appreciation, 
would fall in the category of failing to satisfy this fourth and final condition, namely the voluntariness 
needed for competence. 
55
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(e.g. blinking the eyes, lifting a finger etc.).”56 Would this render competence an 
impossibility for this individual? Certainly not, for all of his cognitive faculties may still 
prove to be substantially intact.  
 The fact that a person cannot physically express a choice does not speak in any 
way to her level of competence, for she may still have great understanding, appreciation, 
and reasoning abilities and may also be able to freely formulate choices. That is why this 
fourth condition of competence must not only include a voluntariness aspect, but also 
exclude the previously accepted, ability to express a choice, feature. The ability to 
express the preference is irrelevant to competence, though it should be recognized that for 
practical purposes, a person who cannot communicate in any manner may justifiably be 
provided a surrogate to make decisions on her behalf, but from a conceptual standpoint, 
this is not equivalent to a determination of incompetence. To suggest otherwise would not 
accord with our long-standing common usage of the term competence which relates to 
mental abilities (the deliberative process for example), not physical ones. In fact it 
appears evident that any expression of choice criterion would be “the least mental of the 
sub-capacities that constitute capacity, which may explain why it is not considered an 
element of capacity by some authors.”57 Mental processes are the correct object of 
evaluation here and thus this fourth element of capacity must be considered to be the 
ability to intentionally and voluntarily formulate preferences.
 58
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 It is likely that courts and scholars have considered the, “expression of choice”, condition to be a 
necessary part of competence in order to be able to easily manage situations where patients are comatose or 
in a persistent vegetative state. It is often said that these patients can be deemed incompetent since they 
cannot express a choice (Berg et al., 1995-1996, p.353 and specifically footnote 24). However, this is the 
very conceptual flaw that must be dispelled. What makes the comatose or persistent vegetative state patient 
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 Competence will be considered to be a combination of these four sub-abilities, 
namely understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and the ability to intentionally and 
voluntarily formulate preferences. As will become evident in the proceeding chapters, 
only through an analysis of each of these four elements can one attempt to ascertain the 
appropriate degree of competence needed by terminally ill individuals for an ethical 
consent to medical research participation. It is interesting to note that “legislatures often 
do not specify the degree of incapacity (except, perhaps, in broad terms such as 
‘substantial’ or ‘minimal’) required for a finding of incompetence and instead leave the 
decision to the courts or to clinicians.”59 It should thus then come as no surprise that 
medical and legal systems lack a uniform standard for competence. However, there is 
great value in establishing a uniform concept of the requisite degree of capacity required 
in certain situations, since otherwise, individual clinicians or researchers at one hospital 
may apply very different standards from those at another hospital, and competency 
assessments will lack consistency, and may at times be flawed and unethical.
60
    
 
Informed Consent 
 Given that in the following chapters an appropriate standard of competence 
required for terminally ill individuals to provide an ethical informed consent to research 
participation will be established, it is imperative that the concept of informed consent be 
                                                                                                                                                 
incompetent is that he lacks the ability to understand, appreciate, reason, and freely formulate a preference, 
and not that he cannot physically express a choice. 
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 Berg et al.,  1995-1996, p. 349, footnote 15. 
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 Since there is no single perfect approach to ascertaining competence, it may be noted that even with an 
established standard of competence needed for consent, there is still no guarantee that the standard will be 
applied consistently by different people at different institutions. Therefore, in addition to establishing the 
necessary standards of competence for terminally ill research subjects, it will be similarly important to 
establish some sort of procedure by which such a standard can be applied in order to best ensure 
consistency between different research institutions. Such an issue will be revisited in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
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explored in some depth. “Although usually viewed as a legal concept informed consent is 
essentially an ethical imperative to promote personal well-being and self-
determination.”61 In the medical context, it accomplishes this goal through attempting to 
ensure that a patient or research subject is provided with the relevant information 
necessary for him to make an autonomous decision. 
 It should come as no surprise that one of the main questions surrounding informed 
consent concerns the particular items that must be disclosed in order for consent to be 
considered informed. Precisely what an informed consent must entail has elicited its own 
controversy in the medical research context as guidelines and academic literature 
sometimes present varied opinions. However, some features of the informed consent 
process in medical research that are generally agreed upon in codes and guidelines 
involve the disclosure of the procedure and purpose of the research, and the risks and 
benefits associated with participation. Robert Levine presents a more detailed analysis of 
the features that should comprise informed consent for research participation, providing 
the following eleven elements:
62
      
1. A clear statement of the overall purpose of the research… 
2. A clear invitation (not a request or a demand) to the individual to become a 
research subject… 
3. The prospective subject should be informed as to why he has been selected for 
participation in the research…63 
4. A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes… 
5. A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be 
expected…64  
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 Irwin Kleinman. “The Right to Refuse Treatment: ethical considerations for the competent patient” Can 
Med Assoc J, Vol. 144(10), 1991, p.1219.  
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 The reason may often be because the prospective subject is afflicted with the specific disease under 
study, or the prospective subject is part of the key demographic being studied. 
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6. A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected… 
7. A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be 
advantageous for the (prospective) subject… 
8. An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures… 
9. When appropriate there should be a suggestion to the prospective subject that he 
might wish to discuss the proposed research with another before consenting… 
10. It should be stated that the prospective subject is free to refuse to participate in 
the research [without incurring any form of penalty]
65
 and further, that he is free 
to withdraw from the research at any time…66 
11. In some studies it is necessary to inform the prospective subject that some 
information is being withheld deliberately.
67
  
 
Though this list is not universally accepted, and should not be assumed to be definitive or 
exhaustive, many of these eleven elements will be found in some form in most laws, codes, 
and guidelines. Robert Veatch would also “include the need for a specific disclosure of the 
presence of a control group within the research design and an explanation of who is to be 
held responsible should the subject be harmed in the course of the research (in anticipated 
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 As Levine notes this should include physical and psychological discomforts as well as personal 
inconveniences. It should be noted that there is controversy over which risks must be disclosed, and to what 
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and unanticipated ways).”68 Of course, these additional elements, particularly the latter, are 
far more controversial, but demonstrate the potential for disputes in determining the 
ethically appropriate elements of disclosure for informed consent.
69
  
 Apart from disclosing various facts to potential subjects, as some guidelines explain, 
it is also imperative that all “the information that is given to the subject or the [subject’s 
legally authorized] representative shall be in language understandable to the subject or the 
representative. [Additionally] no informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any 
exculpatory language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or 
appear to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears to release the 
investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.”70  
 Given the above explanation and elements of informed consent, its value should 
seem evident. The aim of an informed consent process is to protect a subject’s well-being 
and respect her autonomy. In order to truly respect peoples’ autonomy and allow persons to 
make decisions freely in a manner that they see as beneficial for themselves, it is imperative 
that any consent acquired be a competent consent. As discussed previously, understanding is 
a vital component of competence, and since the informed consent process aims at ensuring 
that the relevant information is provided to the decision maker, it can be viewed as a 
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necessary step in ensuring that the consenter is indeed competent to consent. However, 
informed consent “is justified not only out of respect for patient [and subject] autonomy but 
also because of positive consequences anticipated in its pursuit. These include: protection of 
patients and subjects, avoidance of fraud and duress, encouragement of self-scrutiny by 
medical professionals, promotion of rational decisions, and involvement of the public in 
health care.”71 Despite these advantages though, the informed consent process has come 
under scrutiny and has been criticized by scholars and medical researchers alike, with some 
suggesting moderate adjustments to the process, while others seemingly preferring its 
abolition. Before proceeding, it would be prudent to briefly examine some of the criticisms 
launched against informed consent. 
 A recent objection voiced by Ian Roberts and collegues relates specifically to the 
process of informed consent in emergency care research.
72
 Their argument asserts that since 
various trials attempt to assess experimental non-validated time-critical treatments for life-
threatening ailments, such as traumatic brain injury, then any consent process that increases 
the wait time to receiving treatment, increases mortality rates and should be viewed as 
unethical. They assert that “the CRASH-2 trial showed that giving tranexamic acid to 
trauma patients with bleeds results in a significant and clinically important reduction in 
overall mortality (relative risk 0·91, 95% CI 0·85—0·97)… [and] further analyses have 
shown that these beneficial effects depend importantly on the promptness with which 
treatment with tranexamic acid is started.”73 The authors continue to argue that the delay 
from the informed consent process thus diminishes these beneficial effects, increases the 
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mortality rate among the patients/subjects, and that therefore the informed consent 
process in emergency care research should be eliminated. 
 One glaring problem with this argument relates to the overall lack of evidence. 
The conclusion only follows from their example because in the one particular case 
described, the non-validated experimental treatment turned out to be effective. It is 
important to remember though that in research, before a trial is completed there will be 
some genuine uncertainty about the efficacy of the medical intervention being tested. The 
argument presented by Roberts et al. relies heavily on “hindsight and only has the 
appearance of validity because in [this case]… the drug was efficacious; had the drug 
lacked efficacy (or worse) the conclusion would have been very different.”74 Since there 
is no certainty regarding the efficacy of the non-validated treatment, to eliminate a 
consent process may subject patients to possibly dangerous and harmful medical research 
that the patient may have refused. Roberts and collegues’ argument must therefore not be 
accepted since despite the example provided, “there is [still] no evidence that not 
acquiring patients’ consent confers net aggregate benefit [and any] post-hoc 
counterfactual arguments should not influence ethical debate.”75 
 Furthermore, even despite this tremendous flaw, a complete elimination of the 
consent process in emergency research leaves open the possibility for increased abuse by 
researchers and sponsors. This should not be viewed as an unwarranted fear with no basis, 
for as mentioned earlier the medical research sector is rife with scandals. It would seem that 
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“the research enterprise has the onus of proving its trustworthiness before we embrace any 
further deregulatory measures, however reasonable they seem.”76 
 Another, less recent, but far more common objection insists that informed consent 
may be too stringent of a requirement in all circumstances as it may lead to poor 
recruitment into some trials. This concern has led to some precarious arguments that 
seem to minimize the importance of ensuring the patient/subject’s welfare in favour of 
expediting medical research.
77
 Jeffrey Tobias, however, presents a slightly more palatable 
solution to the problem of under-recruitment by proposing an alternative approach to 
informed consent, whereby a patient is asked for a “blanket” approval, at the start of 
treatment, to be included in studies that might be in progress while the patient is ill, and 
to accept that the physician would always act in good faith.
78 
 
 While Tobias’ main concern appears to be a noble one, hoping to accelerate the 
research process through which new medical knowledge can be attained and thus 
potentially provide substantial benefits for future patients, it is not thus free from ethical 
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scrutiny. Though advancements in the field of medicine are vital, we cannot decide in 
pursuit of a healthier disease free tomorrow to shed the shackles of morality today.  
As appealing as Tobias’ proposal might be, it is based on an unrealistic expectation that 
the physician would always act in good faith, and on an implicit supposition that is 
ethically flawed, namely that sometimes a person’s well-being can be made secondary to 
the achievement of the goals of medical research. 
 First, the suggestion that one should accept that the physician will always act in 
good faith, gives a misrepresentation of the situation. If a medical practitioner is 
attempting to recruit a patient into a research trial, then he is acting as a researcher or 
investigator who plays a significantly different role in medicine than one’s physician.79 
This indicates that a patient must then put faith, not simply in the medical practitioner 
whom she has known, perhaps even for some time, as her physician, but in the physician 
who is also assuming the role of a researcher/recruiter, a role that brings with it different 
duties and responsibilities than that of a physician. Given the various scandals that 
medical research has faced, and the numerous cases where a subject’s wellbeing was 
ignored in favour of the goals and aims of the research, the suggestion that one should 
trust that the medical practitioner attempting to recruit him into a clinical trial will always 
act in good faith, appears to be more of a fantasy than a reality.  
 Second, it should be recognized that at the root of most suggestions to reduce the 
restrictions that informed consent places on research, lies the extremely dangerous notion 
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that sometimes the infringement of a particular individual’s rights is permissible in order 
to achieve a greater public good. Accepting a “blanket” approval at the onset of treatment 
to be included in medical research, avoids informing the potential subject of pertinent 
information needed in order to make competent decisions. This thus not only allows a 
person to enter into an environment with an increased possibility that he will incur 
physical harm, but may do so without the person even knowing of such a possibility, and 
thus also disrespects his autonomy, something that is often viewed as harmful in itself.
80
   
 Justifying the sacrificing of one’s good for the general good of society represents 
a disrespect for the dignity and autonomy of persons and sets a dangerous precedent. 
“One need only recall the horrors of medical experimentation during World War II to 
appreciate the brutal extension of the utilitarian philosophy of the sacrifice of the 
individual for a societal purpose.”81 Abandoning the informed consent process in order to 
increase recruitment numbers and thus benefit society, while certainly not in itself 
equivalent to some of the horrors that plague our medical research history such as the 
WWII experiments, does still employ the same type of unethical and dangerous 
reasoning. It should be noted that “accepting the unconscionability of inflicting such 
harm in the public interest may well mean that some potentially fruitful medical research 
cannot be done because of the problem of under-recruitment. So be it; this is the price we 
pay for living in a society which is morally worth preserving, one where we treat each 
other with respect and where we take human rights seriously.”82 
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 Furthermore, despite the alleged social good
83
 produced by improving recruitment 
in medical research trials, it is interesting to note that we generally do not even allow an 
exception to the informed consent process in the medical practice context for the possibly 
more noble reason of attaining good for the particular patient involved. In the medical 
practice context there are two main exceptions to the rule of informed consent. A physician 
is permitted to bypass the informed consent process with a patient in the case of an 
emergency
84
 or therapeutic privilege.
85
  
 Therapeutic privilege allows for an exception to the informed consent requirement 
where the information that a physician is withholding would be harmful to the patient. 
Harmful in this sense is often taken to mean a psychological harm so severe that it would 
impede the patient’s rational decision-making ability anyway. Though a full analysis of this 
concept cannot presently be undertaken, it must be noted that the scope of this exception has 
often been and must continue to be very limited, since if harm is defined too broadly it 
would allow physicians to avoid disclosure in every instance where it was thought that the 
disclosure of information would have the patient render a decision which was contrary to the 
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physician’s judgment. In fact in the landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence, it was ruled 
that “the physician’s privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be 
carefully circumscribed,… for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself. The 
privilege does not accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent 
simply because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels 
the patient really needs.”86 
 Relating this back to our medical research context, it can be said that if indeed 
there is good ethical reasoning to not allow an exception to informed consent even when 
a physician thinks the welfare of the patient may be better served by employing the 
exception, then certainly an exception to informed consent cannot be permitted in order 
to increase the number of subjects in a research trial, an objective that is unrelated to the 
particular patient’s interest. The issue in the Canterbury v. Spence case may have proved 
to be a difficult ethical quandary because of the fact that it required consideration 
between two conflicting fundamentally important operating principles in medicine, 
namely: (1) ensuring the well-being of the patient and (2) respecting the patient’s 
autonomy. However, this conflict is not present in the research case, and thus the decision 
to not infringe upon one’s right to autonomous decision making should be that much 
clearer.  
 Thus, permitting an exception to informed consent in order to improve 
recruitment in clinical trials would prove to be inconsistent with current ethical views 
regarding informed consent and autonomy, and represents a dangerous rational. The 
claim that one can assume that the physician involved in the recruitment will be acting in 
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good faith does little to assuage these fears. “The suffering and indignity which some 
medical research has visited upon unsuspecting and vulnerable patients must never be 
allowed to happen again. To ignore the lessons of the past through not taking the right of 
informed consent seriously is to insult the memory of those who paid such an 
unacceptably high price in the name of medical progress.”87 
 While the informed consent process may not be perfect, for the reasons outlined 
above it is imperative that it not be eliminated despite some objections.
88
 Its value cannot 
be underestimated as it proves to be one of the greatest protections for potential subjects 
of medical research as it ensures respect for their autonomy and dignity. It furthermore is 
a key protection for physicians and researchers from having to bear the burden of the blame 
and responsibility should one of the risks of research occur. In many legal cases, properly 
obtaining an informed consent from the potential subjects would have provided the 
researchers necessary legal protection.
89
 Informed consent thus not only empowers the 
potential subject, and ensures respect for his/her autonomy, but also allows physicians 
and researchers to not bear full moral or legal responsibility for any damages suffered by 
the subjects. Therefore it remains the case that informed consent is a process that is vital to 
the proper continuation of medical research. It is thus not surprising that every document 
and guideline concerning medical research with human subjects reviewed by the National 
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Bioethics Advisory Commission
90
 “has specified a need for the informed consent 
process.” 91 
 
Autonomy 
As Len Doyal contends, in regards to the objections to informed consent:  
 “it is unlikely that any of these arguments against informed consent would be 
 taken seriously unless they were linked to the further belief that it is acceptable to 
 compromise individual rights if the public interest demands it. Such arguments 
 amount to justifying exploitation of individuals and ignore the objective harm 
 which is inflicted upon them by disrespect for their autonomy. Harm of this kind 
 should not be equated with physical damage or emotional distress and is therefore 
 not affected by the level of risk of either. Rather it is an attack on human dignity: 
 the harm is to the moral integrity of the uninformed volunteer.”92 
 
Doyal’s sentiment rightly suggests that what is of concern is not solely physical or 
psychological harm, but something else as well, namely disrespect for an individual’s 
autonomy. While many ethical discussions in law, politics, and medicine presume the 
value of autonomy, its definition and importance require some elaboration.  
 Though autonomy and competence differ in meaning, where autonomy refers to 
self-determination or self-government, and competence refers to the ability to perform a 
task, the two are inextricably linked. A right to self-determine, that is one’s right to 
autonomy, presupposes the capacity for self-determination. Competence/mental capacity 
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can thus appropriately be thought of as the ability to be autonomous.
93
 This relationship 
between the two concepts is further solidified by the fact that the criteria of autonomous 
action share many similarities with the criteria of competence discussed earlier. Though 
somewhat contentious “it is widely agreed that, for an action to qualify as autonomous, it 
must be (1) intentional, (2) based on sufficient understanding, (3) sufficiently free of 
external constraints, and (4) sufficiently free of internal constraints.”94 Most of these 
conditions were explicated in the earlier discussion of competence, however it should be 
noted that as a result of the similar criteria between competence and autonomy, many of 
the hindrances to one are similarly hindrances to the other.  
 Obvious examples of factors that can hinder or in some cases eliminate autonomy, 
include some form of external or internal constraint,
95
 where the former may be 
understood “as including physical barriers deliberately imposed by other individuals and 
different forms of coercion…, [while the latter involves] internal phenomena that, to 
some degree, constrain our actions and choices,”96 such as alcoholism, drug addiction and 
intense fears. An extensive, but by no means exhaustive list of potentially autonomy 
hindering factors includes: external constraints such as physical force or imprisonment 
and internal constraints such as depression, intense fear, alcoholism, drug addiction, pain, 
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strong emotions, stress, ignorance,
97
 limited capacities, certain commitments, limited 
self-control, and limited rationality.
98
 Though, it would be odd to speak of external 
constraints such as physical force or imprisonment as diminishing one’s competence,99 
internal constraints can function as impediments to both autonomy and competence. In 
fact, it is by hindering one’s competence, that these internal constraints prevent truly 
autonomous action. 
 Given what autonomy is, it remains necessary to inquire about its value. 
Autonomy has often been recognized as the moral cornerstone of the Western World’s 
democratic system. While autonomy is not necessarily considered a supreme value by 
every culture,
100
 its importance for morality cannot be understated.  
 Put most simply, to be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed by 
 considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed 
 externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s 
 authentic self. Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable value, especially since 
 its opposite — being guided by forces external to the self and which one cannot 
 authentically embrace — seems to mark the height of oppression.101  
 
Autonomy thus places limits on what others can do to us. In the context of medicine it 
has limited what physicians can do to patients. In fact, the “principle of respect for 
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autonomy has grounded several rights for patients, including rights to receive 
information, to consent to and refuse procedures, and to have confidentiality and privacy 
maintained.”102  
 However, autonomy’s moral significance is also very relevant in the medical 
research context, as it places limits on what investigators may do to subjects. While the 
immorality of researchers behaving negligently and imposing physical and psychological 
harms that could have been avoided seems self-evident, a researcher should also not be 
permitted to disrespect the autonomy of a subject, something that is harmful in itself. This 
is supported by the fact that while “it is sometimes argued that minimal risks might 
justify the randomisation of patient volunteers without their consent (for example, in 
studies where one group is unknowingly used as a control)….some patients have been 
outraged to discover that they were used in a trial without their knowledge. The fact that 
they faced small risks in the process was not the point.”103 The concern here is 
deontological. From a Kantian perspective “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of 
human nature and of every rational nature.”104 While Kantian ethics was mainly 
concerned with moral autonomy, one of Kant’s oft cited formulations of his categorical 
imperative seems to relate quite closely to our present concern. This formulation states 
that “one should always act in such a way that humanity either in oneself or in others is 
always treated as an end in itself and never merely as a means. [For] if a person is treated 
as a mere means, then he is treated as nothing more than a thing without purposes of his 
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own rather than as a self-determining rational agent.”105 Morality thus requires us to 
always respect other persons as self-determining autonomous agents. This becomes 
especially relevant in the medical research context where it may sometimes be difficult to 
view the subjects as anything more than the means to achieving scientific progress. 
However, any form of deception, manipulation, coercion, or even failing to disclose 
relevant information, constitutes this moral failing. To accord subjects of research their 
due respect as autonomous agents, they must never be solely treated as the mere means to 
scientific progress and thus never prevented, either explicitly or implicitly, from decision 
making regarding their participation in the medical trial.
106
  
 It is this type of moral reasoning that had led some to view an abandonment of the 
informed consent process in medical research as ethically perilous. As Len Doyal argues: 
  To deny volunteers such information is a clear breach of their moral rights. 
 Our abilities to deliberate, to choose, and to plan for the future are the focus 
 of the dignity and respect which we associate with being an autonomous person 
 capable of participation in civic life. Such respect is now widely regarded as 
 essential for good medical care and should dominate the practice of medical 
 research.
107
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It is important to realize that the claim here is not that autonomy is important since 
respect for a person’s autonomy may diminish the probability of a harm befalling him 
that he would have otherwise not permitted, though this is indeed true, but rather that 
“autonomy is in fact a constituent of a person’s well-being, and that therefore any 
violation of a person’s autonomy is a harm to that person.”108 We may thus posit a 
scenario where a researcher fails to notify a subject of a particular risk associated with 
participation in a research trial, and though the risk itself never materializes, given the 
above claim about autonomy, it is still appropriate to maintain that a harm has in fact 
been done; specifically a harm to the dignity associated with being an autonomous agent. 
Thus, in the discussion that follows regarding the use of terminally ill persons as subjects 
for medical research, it is crucial to recognize that judgments and evaluations concerning 
the level to which medical research may be inappropriate and unethical, are not to be 
limited to an analysis of bodily and/or psychological harm, but must also include an 
assessment of harms to autonomy. This is an issue that may become particularly relevant 
in the case of minimal risk research trials. 
 We may conclude with a brief discussion of the relation between the three main 
concepts explicated above. While the three terms that have been expounded in some 
detail -- autonomy, informed consent, and competence/mental capacity -- may have at 
first seemed to be quite different concepts, they are clearly intimately intertwined with 
one another. The relation between the three can be described as follows: a certain level of 
mental capacity/competence is required in order to enable the autonomous decision 
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making of an individual, which in our clinical research context is performed through the 
process of informed consent. The importance of determining the necessary level of 
mental capacity for a decision thus becomes apparent, since our ability to truly act 
autonomously is ultimately what is at stake. It is this close relationship between these 
terms that have led some to suggest that “consent capacity is a fundamental aspect of 
personal autonomy.”109 
 Given the relation between these three terms, the central aim in what follows can 
properly be described as attempting to establish the appropriate degree of competence 
needed for the informed consent that enables and protects the autonomous rights of 
terminally ill subjects of research. However, prior to establishing this minimum standard, 
it will be necessary to first engage with a common risk based approach to determining 
appropriate degrees of competence needed for particular contexts. This method suggests 
that competence to consent should vary in accordance with risk. According to this 
approach, as the risks of a particular decision increase, so too must the level of mental 
capacity needed to consent. It is thus often referred to as the risk based sliding scale 
approach to competence. In Chapter Two the merits of such a proposal will be examined, 
and ultimately it will be concluded that such an approach is not only conceptually flawed, 
but also fails at providing the type of protection being sought for the terminally ill 
potential research subject. 
 Apart from the flaws of this type of approach, it must also be recognized that it 
would be ethically perilous to assume that the appropriate standard of competence for 
making treatment decisions translates into an appropriate standard of competence for 
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medical research decision making. This is especially true since generally when one 
consents to treatment, “the law presumes patient competence.”110 However, often, 
research participation decisions require greater mental capacity than consenting to 
treatment
111
 and thus merely presuming competence would fail to provide any type of 
adequate respect or protection for research subjects. Chapter Three will then demonstrate 
that the medical research and medical practice contexts are fundamentally different, and 
thus one cannot extrapolate an appropriate level of competence for research decision 
making from the appropriate level needed for decision making in a therapeutic setting. 
This chapter will conclude that for terminally ill persons, a greater mental capacity is 
required for research participation decisions than for consent to treatment for the 
condition under study.
112
 The differences between the two contexts expressed in Chapter 
Three will influence the minimum standard of competence that will ultimately be shown 
to be necessary for terminally ill subjects of research. The establishment of this standard 
will comprise Chapter Four. Chapters Five and Six will provide a basis for understanding 
what type of and how much evidence is needed to determine that one is sufficiently 
competent to ethically consent to research participation. Appendix A will then provide 
cases that will illustrate how these recommendations regarding standards of competence 
and types of evidence of competence can be applied in practice.  
 While numerous guidelines, and much academic scholarship has been dedicated 
to protecting the rights of vulnerable populations in medical research, ensuring that one is 
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sufficiently competent to provide an autonomous consent in the first place might prove to 
be the greatest and most empowering protection of all.  
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Chapter 2: What Role Should Risk Play in the Determination of Competence? 
 
 Some of the current bioethical literature expresses the idea that one’s required 
level of competence to be able to consent to medical decisions will vary in accordance 
with risk.
113
 Thus, greater levels of mental capacity are required to consent to medical 
decisions when the amount of risk present is greater. A person may then be found 
sufficiently competent to consent in one scenario, but may lack the necessary competence 
for consent in a scenario where the decision is riskier. This strategy is often referred to as 
the sliding-scale approach, for it dictates that as the “risks of a medical intervention 
increase for patients, we should raise the level of ability required for a judgment of 
competence to elect or refuse the intervention. [Conversely] as the consequences for 
well-being become less substantial, we should lower the level of capacity required for 
competence.”114 Thus, the required mental capacity needed for an ethical consent slides 
up (more demanding) and down (less demanding) in accordance with risk. This is often 
accepted in medicine as a necessary way for physicians to ensure the right balance 
between respecting autonomy and concern for the patient’s welfare.  
 This position however, has some intriguing implications for medical research 
participation. It may suggest, assuming that participation in a medical research trial will 
often involve additional risks than standard therapy,
115
 that by applying this sliding-scale 
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strategy of competence, it would be justifiable to require greater levels of competence for 
consent to participate in research than for consent to medical treatment. While this may 
certainly seem prima facie intuitive, in what follows I shall demonstrate that this is a 
mistaken way in which to construe competence requirements.
116
 
 Grounding a requirement for a higher level of competence for medical research 
participation decisions in risk proves to be a conceptually and morally flawed analysis of 
competence determinations. It is dubious to suggest that the actual capacity required for a 
particular decision is relative to the possible harmful consequences of that decision. Some 
proponents of such a strategy seem to confuse the complexity or difficulty of a decision 
with the risk associated with that decision. It may be appropriate to suggest that the 
required capacity to decide depends upon the complexity of a decision, and that often 
more complex decisions tend to also be riskier ones, but this is conceptually quite 
different from the assertion that required capacity to decide ought to vary with risk. 
 Still, various arguments have been put forth in favour of the sliding scale strategy. 
As shall be demonstrated, these arguments not only contain various fallacies, they are 
also ethically problematic, and furthermore fail to accord with the long-standing 
interpretation of competence assessments as being process-oriented and not results 
oriented.  
 However, even setting aside the conceptual errors to such an approach, it would 
still lack in practical applicability. For, apart from questioning the appropriateness of 
using risk in the first place to determine competence requirements, it will furthermore be 
demonstrated that this sliding-scale strategy of competence is ineffective in determining 
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the adequate level of competence that ought to be required for consent to medical 
research participation. The basis of this argument will revolve around the notion that once 
risk has been clearly demarcated between treatment and research, and once the condition 
of clinical equipoise
117
 has been met, our risk based sliding-scale strategy accomplishes 
very little, if anything at all. Thus, any notion that a risk related sliding scale approach to 
competence entails that research participation decisions ought to require higher levels of 
competence on the part of potential subjects for their consent to be ethical, is mistaken.
118
 
This has the further implication that any protection that advocates of the sliding scale 
approach thought was being provided to potential subjects of research by this strategy, is 
illusory.
 
 
 However, prior to highlighting the flaws with such an approach to competence, it 
is necessary to first better explicate the sliding scale strategy and describe the arguments 
its advocates have put forth in support of it.  
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The Sliding-Scale Strategy 
 Some recent literature has already begun to question this sliding scale approach to 
competence. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress claim that:  
 This account is conceptually and morally perilous… [For] it is confusing to blend 
 a decision’s complexity or difficulty with the risk at stake. No basis exists for 
 believing that risky decisions require more ability at decision making than less 
 risky decisions.
119
 
 
 Contrary to this line of argument, many maintain that there exists a very real 
correlation between risk and the amount of decisional capacity needed to consent. As 
Paul Appelbaum reminds, “Although some commentators object to this “sliding scale” 
approach, it makes sense from a policy perspective, it was endorsed by the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research,
120
 and in the judgment of many experts, it reflects how courts 
actually deal with these cases.”121  
 As is often argued by its proponents, applying this risk based sliding scale 
strategy is the best way in which to balance two vital medical values; respecting the 
patient’s, or subject’s, in the case of medical research, autonomy, and protecting that 
individual’s wellbeing. Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum suggest that it may be useful 
to think of this process as involving a “competence balance scale”. The  
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 competence balance scale has cups suspended at the ends of each arm, with a 
 fulcrum between them. One cup is labeled “autonomy,” the other “protection.” It 
 is in this balance that the judgment [of competence] will be made, as elements for 
 consideration are deposited in each cup. The judgment will be for competence, if 
 the interest in respecting the patient’s autonomy finally outweighs the interest in 
 protecting the patient from the potentially harmful consequences of his or her 
 decision-making incapacities. It will be for incompetence, if the interest in 
 protection outweighs autonomy.
122
 
 
Given this depiction, the appeal of such a strategy becomes apparent. Since the principles 
of respecting autonomy, and beneficence
123
 can often conflict, especially in the field of 
medicine,
124
 medical professionals are often put in difficult, seemingly intractable 
situations attempting to determine which ethical norm should outweigh the other. The 
risk based sliding scale strategy seems to offer a method to make such decisions easier.
125
 
Specifically, this strategy suggests that the riskier a decision appears to be, the less likely 
a patient will be competent to decide and thus the more justifiable it is to behave 
beneficently as opposed to respecting the patient’s decision.   
 Apart from this seemingly appealing upshot, this risk based sliding scale position 
is one that is also supported by various scholars in the field as it has been entrenched in a 
great variety of bioethics literature, perhaps most notably by Allen Buchanan and Dan 
Brock.
126
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 They endorse this risk related view of competence as a way in which to contest 
what they refer to as the “fixed minimal capacity” view where competence is not decision 
relative. “The simplest version of this view holds that a person is competent if he or she 
possesses the relevant decision-making capacities at some specified level, regardless of 
whether the decision to be made is risky or nonrisky, and regardless of whether the 
information to be understood or the consequences to be reasoned through are simple or 
complex.”127 
 Buchanan and Brock appear correct in objecting to this view, for this position 
would possibly create too strong a required level of competence for some cases and too 
weak a required level in others since the mental capacity required for any decision would 
remain fixed regardless of any external factors related to the particular decision itself. 
Given though that competence is the ability to perform a task, then it seems clear that the 
level of competence required may vary between different tasks and different contexts 
within which the task must be performed.
128
  
 According to Buchanan and Brock, the risk related sliding scale strategy is not 
only superior to the fixed minimal capacity view in this respect, but there are various 
other points favouring such an approach. We shall proceed by examining each in turn.  
 First, as they suggest, this risk based sliding scale approach to competence is 
consistent with how people already intuitively make informal competency 
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determinations. “For example, you may decide that your 5-year-old child is competent to 
choose between a hamburger and a hotdog for lunch, but you would not think the child 
competent to make a decision about how to invest a large sum of money. This is because 
the risk in the latter case is greater, and the information required for reasoning about the 
relevant consequences of the options is much more complex.”129 There are various other 
common everyday examples where it appears as though we routinely require a greater 
level of competence for riskier decisions, such as is the case with Alzheimer’s patients, 
who many think may be competent enough to choose their meals, but not their medicine. 
 Second, it seems this approach better coheres with our current legal framework 
since the courts have accepted that a fixed minimal capacity view is inappropriate. It is 
now widely accepted throughout our legal institutions that competence “is not an all-or-
nothing status”130 and that for example children might be competent to make certain 
decisions, but not others.
131
 The judgment made in the now well-known Jehovah’s 
Witness blood transfusion case lends further support to Buchanan and Brock’s  risk based 
sliding scale strategy. In this case the Court of Appeal had to consider the situation of  
 an adult Jehovah’s Witness who refused treatment. [More specifically] A 
 pregnant woman was involved in a car accident and, after speaking with her 
 mother, signed a form of refusal of blood transfusion. After the delivery of a 
 stillborn baby, her condition deteriorated, therefore a Court order was obtained in 
 order to legalise a blood transfusion…132  
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Regarding the matter of the role risk plays in determining competence, the court declared 
that, “what matters is that the doctors should consider whether at that time he had a 
capacity which was commensurate with the gravity of the decision. The more serious the 
decision, the greater the capacity required.”133 
 The third argument offered is related to the notion of paternalism.
134
 In addition to 
the fact that legal cases have sometimes applied a risk-based sliding scale strategy, Brock 
and Buchanan further point out that this approach remains consistent with the law’s 
general refusal to allow interference with a competent patient’s voluntary choices. While 
related to their previous point, since if true, this would demonstrate further coherence 
with our current legal framework, we shall treat this as a separate and third argument.
135
 
The main idea is that since generally “the law makes a finding of incompetence a 
necessary condition for justified paternalism,”136 then the sliding scale strategy garners 
further support by increasing the chances of finding an individual incompetent in 
precisely those circumstances where paternalistic behaviour will most likely occur, 
namely in high risk decision making contexts. Therefore, this sliding scale approach to 
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competence “allows paternalism in situations in which the case for paternalism seems 
strongest, while at the same time preserving the law’s fundamental tenet that, in general, 
people may be treated paternalistically only when they are incompetent to make their 
own decisions.”137 
 As a fourth point, Brock and Buchanan point out that the sliding scale strategy 
allows “a finding of incompetence for a particular decision to be limited to that decision, 
and so it is not equivalent to a change in the person’s overall status as a decision 
maker.”138 In their view, this limitation acts as a safeguard, ensuring that one finding of 
incompetence does not compromise an individual’s autonomy over other aspects of her 
life. 
 The fifth and final argument, which may be referred to as the balance argument, 
maintains that the sliding scale technique is far superior to a fixed minimal capacity view 
in its ability to balance the competing values of self-determination and well-being. As 
already discussed above, this alluring feature appears to be one of the most popular 
reasons many adopt the risk based sliding scale strategy and is succinctly explicated by 
Grisso and Appelbaum’s “competence balance scale”. Recalling their explanation of the 
balance scale, it would appear that the crucial feature of such an argument is that when a 
risky decision is made, this type of scale would place less weight on respecting the 
wishes of the decision maker. Put conversely, a decision with a poor risk/benefit ratio 
would add “substantial weight to the cup representing protection.”139 Brock and 
Buchanan corroborate such sentiments and perhaps go a step further suggesting that the 
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level of “importance or value to the patient of self-determination can vary depending on 
the choice being made.”140 
 Given a proper understanding of competence as outlined in chapter one, we may 
now submit such arguments in favour of the sliding scale strategy to ethical scrutiny. 
Ultimately it will be demonstrated that each reason supporting such a strategy is either 
fallacious or has unforeseen ethical pitfalls, and that there remains no good reason to 
accept that the level of risk present in a decision determines the required level of capacity 
for one to be declared sufficiently competent to decide.  
 However, before proceeding to an evaluation of the various arguments given in 
favour of the sliding scale, it is important to note that proponents of this approach are 
committed to an asymmetrical conception of competency in medical decision making. 
That is to state that consents and refusals for the exact same decision will not necessarily 
have the same competence requirements attached to them. “Because the consequences of 
consenting to a procedure are different from those of refusing to undergo it, a person can 
be competent to refuse to participate in research but not to agree, and to consent to a 
treatment but not to refuse.”141 This asymmetrical conception of competence in medical 
decision making will be questioned in the following sections which will be dedicated to 
assessing each argument put forth in support of the sliding scale. However, the 
implication for the medical research context specifically, namely that an application of 
the risk based sliding scale will create a greater level of competence requirement when 
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agreeing to participate in research but a lower one when refusing participation, a 
consequence of the sliding scale strategy that some may find favourable as it seems to 
provide greater protection for potential subjects of research, will merit its own analysis 
later in this chapter.  
 
Flaws with the Sliding Scale Strategy and the Arguments in Support of it  
 Before critiquing each of the five arguments presented, it is important to first 
make note of a general dilemma with two of the arguments. Arguments 2 and 4 suggest 
that the risk based sliding scale approach better coheres with our current legal framework 
since the courts have rejected the fixed minimal capacity view and unlike the fixed 
minimal capacity view, the risk based sliding scale ensures that one isolated finding of 
incompetence for one particular decisional context does not qualify that individual as 
incompetent in all aspects of life, respectively. While these points are certainly true, 
Buchanan and Brock seem to create a false dichotomy suggesting that if indeed we are 
not to subscribe to this fixed minimal capacity view, then we must embrace a risk based 
sliding scale strategy. However, these are not the only two options. For example, we may 
instead accept a sliding scale approach that turns solely on the complexity or difficulty of 
the decision, and not the risk. The idea here being that as the difficulty of either 
possessing or performing any of the four elements of competence, as described in 
Chapter One,
142
 increase, it may be appropriate to suggest that the level of competence 
required would increase as well. Buchanan and Brock ignore this and other possible 
solutions to avoiding the fixed minimal capacity view and as such, while the two 
arguments they present demonstrate that a decision relative conception of competence is 
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preferable, they do not truly justify embracing specifically a risk based sliding scale. 
Despite this general flaw, the five arguments are also fraught with other errors and 
fallacious reasoning. We may proceed by examining each in turn. 
 Two problems arise with the first argument, that the risk based sliding scale 
strategy is actually how people already intuitively make informal competence judgments. 
First, such an argument appears to fall prey to the is/ought fallacy. It is an error in 
reasoning to derive an “ought”, a statement regarding what should be done, from an “is”, 
a statement describing a current state of affairs. To do so would involve a jump from a 
descriptive claim, in this case that we already make competency determinations based on 
risk, to the normative claim that we should make competency determinations based on 
risk and thereby adopt the risk based sliding scale approach. The fallacy here lies in the 
idea that the mere fact that a practice is commonly accepted does not in itself make that 
practice justifiable.
143
 It should be noted however, that Brock and Buchanan do not 
explicitly commit such a fallacy, for that would require a jump to the normative claim 
without any other justification other than the descriptive claim. Instead, Brock and 
Buchanan seem to have provided various justifications for adopting the sliding scale. 
However, as shall be demonstrated in what follows, each justification will not withstand 
scrutiny, and as such, if all that remains is the mere fact that we generally already make 
informal competency determinations based on risk, then any conclusion that we therefore 
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ought to accept the risk based sliding scale strategy will indeed commit the is/ought 
fallacy.   
 While this fallacy presents a problem for their first argument, there is a second 
concern as well, namely that this is not even an accurate descriptive claim in the first 
place. For even if in an attempt to be charitable we overlook the looming is/ought fallacy, 
and focus solely on the descriptive claim that indeed the risk based sliding scale is 
intuitively already applied by people, there is still a dilemma, particularly that this is 
factually incorrect. The example used by Buchanan and Brock, as discussed above, was 
that of a child who may be competent to choose between a hotdog and hamburger for 
lunch, but who would not be thought competent to decide how to invest a large sum of 
money. According to Buchanan and Brock we would not assume the child competent to 
decide in the latter situation because the risks associated with the consequences of the 
decision are far greater. 
 Though we may agree that the child may be competent to decide between a hot 
dog and hamburger, but not competent to invest a large sum of money, it can be 
questioned whether the reason that drives this intuition is really risk related. It seems 
clear that deciding about an investment, which may typically require an understanding of 
economics, an appreciation of one’s current financial situation, some basic mathematical 
reasoning skills, among other things, is of a more complex nature than deciding between 
a hot dog and hamburger for lunch, which is commonly accepted as merely a matter of 
one’s taste preferences. Therefore, a greater level of ability is indeed required in the 
decision making process in the investment case, specifically a level of competence that 
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the child will lack.
144
 The conclusion then, that the child will be competent to choose 
between a hamburger and a hotdog, but not competent to invest a large sum of money, is 
primarily based on the fact that the complexity and difficulty of the decision is far 
greater. Since this fact alone appears to justify our competency assumptions regarding the 
child, it therefore seems unnecessary and arbitrary to posit that the additional risk also 
plays a significant role in those assumptions.
145
 
 In order to further demonstrate that risk is not the motivating factor behind the 
intuition that the child is not competent to decide in the investment case, but might be in 
deciding what to have for lunch, a slightly modified version of the example may be 
construed. Posit the exact same 5 year old child, faced with an investment decision 
involving a large sum of money, for example $100,000. However, suppose that this 
child’s family were billionaires and actually gave their child a $200,000 a week 
allowance simply to see how she would spend it. Though this may seem implausible, it 
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should be noted that this reconstructed version of the example is such that there is little to 
no risk involved in the child’s decision. For if the 5 year old were to invest poorly and 
lose all the money, it would not affect her well-being, or her family’s. The loss would be 
shrugged off as many of us might do with the loss of a penny. But note, even with the 
risk being minimized, if not completely eliminated from this example, it would still be 
inappropriate to consider the 5 year old, in any way sufficiently competent to decide how 
to invest the money. Thus, it must actually be something else that drives this intuition that 
the child does not have the capacity to decide about investments; something separate 
from risk. I have already argued that what actually prompts the intuition is the degree of 
complexity present in the decision, and more specifically the level of difficulty involved 
in performing or possessing the particular elements of competence themselves. 
 Brock and Buchanan’s second line of argument, alleging that the risk based 
sliding scale approach better coheres with our current legal framework also suffers from 
some fallacious reasoning and inaccuracy. First, it must be acknowledged that whether or 
not something is legal does not necessarily indicate whether it is morally or ethically 
correct. This is not to suggest that there is no overlap between morality and law, for that 
would be plainly false. However, one need look only to the days of slavery in the 
American South to notice an example of where what was legal did not correspond with 
what many of us now take to be an obvious ethical precept, namely that all persons have 
a right to freedom and equal treatment. In fact, as is acknowledged in jurisprudence, 
“moral criticism is often used to support a change in the law”146; a fact that necessitates 
that what is law and what is moral might diverge. Thus, it would be improper to conclude 
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that we ought to accept the risk based sliding scale approach merely because it cohered 
with current law and policy.  
 However, putting this issue aside, there still remains a factual problem with Brock 
and Buchanan’s second line of argument. They correctly suggest that the courts seem to 
have rejected a fixed minimal capacity view and instead embraced, for the most part, a 
decision relative conception of competence. They are further correct in asserting that in 
regards to children, courts have seemed to accept that “features of the decision itself 
(including risk) are relevant factors in determining whether the child is competent to 
make that decision.”147 However, despite this, the claim that the risk based sliding scale 
accords with current law appears to be too strong a statement. The reason for this is that 
much case law also exists where judgments were made that are contrary to the risk based 
sliding scale approach.  
 The case of Lane v. Candura
148
 functions as such an example. In “Lane v. 
Candura, a Massachusetts Appellate Court upheld the right of a woman to refuse 
amputation of a gangrenous leg. The court found that Ms. Candura appreciated the nature 
and consequences of her act because she accurately believed that she was suffering from 
gangrene and would likely die without surgery.”149 Initially the woman’s “daughter, 
Grace R. Lane of Medford, filed a petition in the Probate Court for Middlesex County 
seeking appointment of herself as temporary guardian with authority to consent to the 
operation on behalf of her mother. An order and a judgment were entered in the Probate 
Court to that effect, from which the guardian ad litem appointed to represent Mrs. 
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Candura has appealed.”150 The court considered that in the proceeding for the 
appointment of a guardian, 
 Dr. Kelley, one of two psychiatrists who testified, did state that in his opinion 
 Mrs. Candura was incompetent to make a rational choice whether to consent to 
 the operation… [However this court ruled that] the decision of the judge, as well 
 as the opinion of Dr. Kelley, predicates the necessity for the appointment of a 
 guardian chiefly on the irrationality (in medical terms) of Mrs. Candura's decision 
 to reject the amputation… But the irrationality of her decision, does not justify a 
 conclusion that Mrs. Candura is incompetent in the legal sense. The law protects 
 her right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that 
 decision is wise or unwise.
151
 
 
The court thus seemed to suggest that Mrs. Candura’s competence was not to be assessed 
in reference to the risky nature of her decision, even when a risk as severe as death was 
present. Instead her competence was evaluated based on her ability to appreciate and 
reason. This judgment further reinforces the idea that the decision made, regardless of 
how risky or how much others may disagree, is not the appropriate object of evaluation in 
competence assessments. Instead, a judgment of incompetence must be based on 
cognitive capabilities and more specifically the four criteria of competence as set out in 
Chapter One. 
 It must furthermore be noticed, that the ruling in this case and in most case law, 
seems fairly consistently committed to the notion that competence assessments are not to 
be made by the application of a best interest standard. That is to state that what is in a 
person’s best interest is irrelevant when evaluations of competency are being conducted. 
However, this runs contrary with one of the underlying features of the risk based sliding 
scale, specifically that competence assessments should be closely connected with one’s 
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welfare.
152
 Instead, the law in most North American jurisdictions seems to recognize that 
determining what is best for a person’s well-being should not be considered an 
appropriate element in competency determinations. This was reinforced more recently in 
Starson v. Swayze
153
 where “both the six-judge majority and three-judge dissent in this 
Supreme Court judgment agreed that under Ontario’s test for capacity to make treatment 
decisions, persons are not held to a ‘best interests’ standard and so may make decisions 
that are contrary to physicians’ advice,”154 even if such a decision is considered to be 
riskier. Furthermore, despite the fact that Starson in this case was considered to be 
making the riskier decision by refusing certain medical treatments for his psychiatric 
condition, Justice Major made his ruling based on whether Starson appreciated the 
potential risks of the decision in question. It was found that Starson indeed did appreciate 
the  
 primary intended effects of these medications, and rejected them. These included 
 the dulling of his perception and slowing or “normalizing” of his thought, to 
 produce in him a condition he deemed “so boring it would be like death.” The 
 evidence did not disprove Starson’s assertion that the proposed drug treatments 
 would prevent him from engaging with theoretical physics, which was what gave 
 his life meaning. Thus he appreciated the intended benefits, but valued these 
 differently than his doctors did.
155
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This legal reasoning supports the idea that the inherent riskiness of the decision itself is 
not relevant in an evaluation of competence, but rather the ability to appreciate and 
reason are the appropriate objects of assessment.
156
 The judgment explicitly maintained 
that “the legislative mandate of the Consent and Capacity Board is to adjudicate solely 
upon a patient's capacity and the Board's conception of the patient's best interests is 
irrelevant to that determination.”157 
 Both of the cases presented here demonstrate that the risk based sliding scale in 
fact does not cohere with current legal framework as Brock and Buchanan suggest. 
Instead, in both cases it is clear that the level of risk of the decision itself did not play any 
significant role in the competency evaluation. Furthermore, as is exemplified by the 
above two cases, the principle that the best interest of a patient is irrelevant to 
competency assessments, is one that is endorsed by our current legal framework, and 
such a principle appears to be in direct opposition to the risk based sliding scale strategy.  
 Momentarily setting aside Brock and Buchanan’s third argument, we may notice 
that not much can be disputed regarding their fourth point. This suggested that an upshot 
of the risk based sliding scale was that it ensures that one isolated finding of 
incompetence for one particular decisional context would not label an individual as 
incompetent in all other aspects of life. This was praised as being a safeguard that is built 
into the risk based sliding scale. However, as noted previously, this, while certainly true, 
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will only provide reason and support for a decision relative conception of competence 
and not necessarily the risk based sliding scale. This is true since all decision relative 
conceptions of competence would have a similar built-in safeguard. 
 With that, Buchanan and Brock’s arguments 1,2 and 4 in support of the risk based 
sliding scale have all been undermined, and only 3 and 5 remain. These were the 
paternalistic and balance arguments respectively. These are perhaps the most troubling of 
the five arguments and warrant their own separate analysis. For as the following section 
will demonstrate, the implications of both ultimately fall prey to serious ethical pitfalls.   
 
The Problem of Disguised Paternalism 
 Buchanan and Brock admit and agree with the law in most North American 
jurisdictions that “has in general steadfastly refused to recognize a right to interfere with 
a competent patient’s voluntary choice on purely paternalistic grounds - that is, solely to 
prevent harms or to secure benefits for the competent patient him or herself. Instead, the 
law makes a finding of incompetence a necessary condition for justified paternalistic 
interference with the patient’s choice.”158 We may refer to this as the patient paternalism 
principle.
159
 However, while they may be in agreement with this principle, they have 
endorsed a strategy that runs contrary to the spirit of this legal precept. This is 
exemplified by Brock and Buchanan’s third and fifth arguments. Both of these arguments 
appear to suffer from the same dilemma, namely that they demonstrate that the risk based 
sliding scale strategy would allow for a disguised hard paternalism and thus render this 
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approach to competence as being in contravention with the patient paternalism principle. 
In order to demonstrate this we must briefly recall both arguments.  
 The third argument suggested that the risk based sliding scale remains in 
accordance with our current legal framework by following the generally accepted 
principle that justified paternalism requires a finding of incompetence. As previously 
discussed, this is often referred to as soft paternalism, while paternalistic action against a 
competent individual is referred to as hard paternalism, and is generally considered 
unjustifiable. Brock and Buchanan suggest that the risk based sliding scale remains in 
accordance with this principle by increasing the chances of finding an individual 
incompetent in precisely those circumstances where paternalistic behaviour will most 
likely occur, namely in high risk decision making contexts. The fifth argument, 
specifically the balance argument, suggested that a proper assessment of competence 
requires considerations of beneficence as well as autonomy, and that the sliding scale 
achieves a balance between these two values by accounting for the well being of the 
individual in the competence evaluation itself.
160
  
 Through an analysis of both of these arguments, it will become apparent that 
implementing a risk based sliding scale approach will have the dangerous consequence of 
allowing a disguised hard paternalism. This dilemma, more specifically, is that there is a 
potential danger that patients, and subjects of research alike, may have themselves 
unjustly deemed incompetent so that a physician may behave paternalistically. Buchanan 
and Brock assert that according to their risk based sliding scale approach,  
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 the greater the potential harm to the individual, the higher the standard of 
 competence. From this it follows that a finding of incompetence is more likely 
 in precisely those instances in which the case for paternalism is strongest - cases 
 in which great harm can be easily avoided by taking the decision out of the 
 individual’s hands. Thus, the concept of competence favored here allows 
 paternalism in situations in which the case for paternalism seems strongest, 
 while at the same time preserving the law’s fundamental tenet that, in 
 general, people may be treated paternalistically only when they are 
 incompetent to make their own decisions.
161
 
 
Without realizing it, Buchanan and Brock have expressed a very dangerous consequence 
of their view. In order to circumvent hard paternalistic behaviour, which is often 
condemned, physicians may apply this risk based sliding scale strategy, and set the 
criteria for competence impossibly high when the perceived risks to the patient are great 
enough to convince the physician that paternalistic action is appropriate. Thus, a 
competent person may be inappropriately judged incompetent and have her autonomy 
usurped based solely on the fact that her decision did not coincide with her physician’s 
recommendation and was therefore considered too risky.
162
  
 This dilemma is further exacerbated by the balance argument that acknowledges 
and encourages competency evaluators to account for the well-being of the individual 
whose competence is being assessed. Thus, even for a competency evaluator who claims 
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 Buchanan and Brock, 1986, p. 40. This, they seem to argue is a positive upshot of the risk based sliding 
scale. As shall be argued presently, this is mistaken, and in fact this conception of competence is ethically 
perilous. However, apart from this it should also be recognized that a correct conception of competence 
will not necessarily be one that gives society license to behave paternalistically when it feels it should. 
Questions concerning when it is appropriate to behave paternalistically are conceptually separate from 
questions concerning proper assessments of competence. 
162
 In Chapter One we examined a similar concern that determinations of incompetence would be made 
based solely on the unconventionality of a patient’s decisions. The concern more specifically was that 
including a reasoning component in competence assessments could allow some physicians or other health 
care professionals to find a patient incompetent when that patient’s decision did not coincide with the 
health professional’s medical opinion. This concern was dismissed as only following from an inappropriate 
and perverse application of the reasoning criterion since proper reasoning would not require that the 
decision-maker arrive at some fixed, absolute, objective decision, but rather only that it can be 
demonstrated that whatever the decision made, it had been arrived at logically and as following from 
relevant premises. However, while this concern was dismissed, it would seem to reemerge here, and apply 
quite aptly if this risk based sliding scale strategy were implemented. 
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to value and respect the autonomous choices of competent patients, an acceptance and 
implementation of this sliding scale would still allow for a patient to “be classified as 
incompetent when setting aside their treatment choices is thought to be justified by a 
concern for their well being.”163 Brock and Buchanan’s assurance that the risk based 
sliding scale approach only allows for paternalistic behaviour when one is incompetent 
proves to be completely meaningless if the sliding scale is designed to allow for a finding 
of incompetence in precisely those situations where paternalism is most likely to occur. 
This is truly troublesome, because it appears that a tactic is made available by this sliding 
scale strategy whereby patients can simply be deemed incompetent when a physician may 
not agree with their choices, and thus any paternalistic action would prima facie appear to 
be a justifiable soft paternalism, when in fact it may be a hard paternalism masquerading 
as soft.
164
 
 We generally view such hard paternalism as unconscionable due to the high value 
we place on respecting and protecting the autonomy of individuals.
165
 Despite this 
though, the sliding scale strategy manages to allow for this type of disguised hard 
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 Wicclair, 1991, p. 96. 
164
 This is not to suggest that soft paternalism is always justifiable and permissible or that hard paternalism 
is never permissible, for that would be plainly false. We often accept as permissible certain laws that force 
particular courses of action upon individuals without their voluntary consent. For example the law that 
forces persons to wear seat belts in cars may be considered a permissible form of hard paternalism. 
Furthermore, even some forms of soft paternalism have come under criticism. For example, some have 
argued that “soft paternalistic governmental policies or health care practices may be susceptible to abuse if 
they lack public scrutiny” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 212). Thus the idea that soft paternalism is 
always permissible while hard paternalism is never permissible is not being advanced here. However, these 
are exceptions caused by overriding or extenuating factors and present a departure from the typical 
acceptance of soft paternalism and condemnation of hard paternalism. We must realize that the conceptual 
difference between the two types of paternalism, namely that hard involves a disrespect or devaluing of a 
person’s autonomy while soft paternalism does not, makes the former highly controversial and 
condemnable while the latter generally acceptable. Thus, we may assume that in cases of hard paternalism 
the onus would be on the person behaving paternalistically to produce an adequate justification for his/her 
action, while in cases of soft paternalism the onus would be on critics to demonstrate why the paternalistic 
act might not be justifiable. 
165
 Recall the discussion of autonomy and its value from Chapter One. 
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paternalism precisely in those instances in which society or medical professionals would 
most want to behave paternalistically by raising the standards of competence in those 
cases. However, without any good reason to require a raised standard of competence in 
higher risk cases,
166
 then to raise the standard for this reason alone would be to 
completely undermine the legal spirit of the patient paternalism principle. It appears on 
the surface to satisfy such a principle since paternalist measures will still only be forced 
on those deemed incompetent, but it creates a situation where a finding of incompetence 
can occur much more easily where paternalism seems most desirable. As a result it fails 
to truly respect autonomy and thus runs contrary to the spirit of the patient paternalism 
principle, while deviously managing to appear as if it has satisfied it. If a model of 
competence is adopted “whereby striking a proper balance between autonomy and 
beneficence is part of the process of assessing the competency of patients, then the 
statement that the treatment preferences of competent patients cannot be set aside for 
paternalistic reasons is an empty tautology, and not a strong affirmation of patient self-
determination.”167 
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 As was already established in the previous section some of the main arguments supporting the risk based 
sliding scale are fraught with flaws and fail to be any good reason to accept such a strategy.  
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 Mark Wicclair. “A Response to Brock and Skene” Bioethics, Vol. 5(2), pp. 118-122, 1991, p.122. It is 
possible that Brock and Buchanan began to notice the hard paternalistic consequence of their view. For in 
describing the difference between a low and high risk choice, in an earlier work they state that the 
“presumed net balance of expected benefits and risks of patient choice in comparison with other 
alternatives refers to the physician’s assessment of the expected effects in achieving the goals of prolonging 
life, preventing injury and disability, and relieving suffering from a particular treatment option as against its 
risks of harm” (Buchanan and Brock, 1986, p. 34). This places the final decision regarding risk and thus 
competence with the physician. For, given this, a physician would have the sole power in determining when 
risks were sufficiently high so as to warrant a raised level of competence, and thus the concern of a 
disguised hard paternalism would be quite warranted. However, in a later work, Buchanan and Brock 
suggest that a risk and benefit assessment “should focus on the expected effects of a particular treatment 
option in forwarding the patient’s underlying and enduring aims and values, to the extent that these are 
known” (Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.52. This seemingly slight shift allows for a patient’s 
autonomous desires to play a significant role in risk assessments, and since according to the risk based 
sliding scale, competence adjudications are contingent on determinations of risk, then this shift may return 
some decision-making power to the individual patient. However, while accepting this latter interpretation 
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 It should also be noted that the patient paternalism principle “appears to require 
that assessments of decision-making capacity focus on the decision-making process and 
not its outcome. [We may call this the process-oriented rule.] Specifically, the principle 
appears to express the idea that if there are no relevant deficits in a patient’s 
understanding, reasoning, and so forth, then even if a treatment refusal appears to be a 
bad decision from the perspective of a patient’s well being, such refusals generally should 
be respected.”168  
 However, the process-oriented rule, like the patient paternalism principle, is 
similarly not satisfied by the risk related sliding scale which endorses an asymmetrical 
conception of competence. As mentioned earlier, supporters of a risk based sliding scale 
are committed to the idea that a choice to accept treatment or refuse participation in 
medical research will likely have a lower standard of competence required than a refusal 
of treatment or consent to participate in medical research. This is as a result of the fact 
that the risks will change depending on the decision made, and decisions to reject 
treatment or to participate in medical research are generally considered riskier than their 
                                                                                                                                                 
of risk assessment that Brock and Buchanan provide may certainly demonstrate a step in the right direction, 
a risk based sliding scale approach will always leave open the possibility of a disguised hard paternalism 
since it will inevitably be the physician who will be viewed as having the more reputable, and ultimately 
final say regarding the risks and benefits between the various possible choices that a patient could make.   
168
 Wicclair, “A Response to Brock and Skene” 1991, p.119-120. Such a principle has been deeply 
entrenched in a variety of governmental reports and scholarly literature on the topic. For example The 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research rejected “as the standard of capacity any test that looks solely to the content of the patient’s 
decision” (U.S. Government Printing Office, Making Health Care Decisions: a Report on the Ethical and 
Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, Vol. 1, President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 
Washington, D.C., 1982, p.61). In fact even proponents of the sliding scale strategy have endorsed this 
process-oriented rule. For example, as mentioned in Chapter One in a discussion regarding the reasoning 
component of competence, Paul Appelbaum asserted that this condition “focuses on the process by which a 
decision is reached, not the outcome of the patient’s choice” (Paul Appelbaum. “Assessment of Patients’ 
Competence to Consent to Treatment” The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 357, pp. 1834-1840, 
2007, p. 1836). Buchanan and Brock also assert that an “adequate standard of competence will focus 
primarily not on the content of the patient’s decision, but on the process of reasoning that leads up to that 
decision” (Buchanan and Brock, 1986, p. 33). As shall be discussed below however, the endorsement of a 
risk based sliding scale is inconsistent with any true acceptance of the process-oriented rule.  
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decisional counterpart. This asymmetrical feature of the risk based sliding scale may 
itself already alarm some. For it appears to follow from the four elements of competence 
as described in Chapter One that the “choice between having treatment x and not having 
treatment x requires an ability to comprehend and weigh the consequences of both 
options.”169 If true, this would then suggest that regardless of the decision made, the same 
level of deliberative processes should be required.
170
  
 Apart from this however, an asymmetrical conception of competence which is 
inextricably bound to the risk based sliding scale “appears to be incompatible with the 
principle that assessments of decision-making capacity should utilize a standard that is 
process-oriented, and not result-oriented.”171 This is evident by the fact that the 
asymmetry here entails that competence assessments can be determined by the result of 
the deliberative process (i.e. the choice made) and not the deliberative process itself.
172
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 Wicclair, “A Response to Brock and Skene” 1991, p.119. 
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 This view of competence is shared by other scholars. For example, Charles Culver and Bernard Gert 
suggest that “two decisions are of the same kind with regard to competence when a person who understands 
and appreciates the pertinent information relevant to deciding in one way - for example, consenting to a 
treatment - also understands and appreciates the pertinent information relevant to deciding in the other -  
refusing the very same treatment. It should not be surprising, when we are discussing a person’s 
competence to make a decision about his medical treatment, that if we regard him as competent to consent 
to a given medical treatment, then we must regard him as competent to refuse that very same treatment” 
(Charles Culver and Bernard Gert. “The Inadequacy of Incompetence” The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 68(4), 
pp.619-643, 1990, p.620). 
171
 Wicclair, “A Response to Brock and Skene” 1991, p. 118.  
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 We should note that this criticism applies generally to the risk related sliding scale strategy and not just 
to Brock and Buchanan’s version of it. We may recall Grisso and Appelbaum’s claim that a judgment “will 
be for incompetence, if the interest in protection outweighs autonomy” (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998, p. 
130), that is, if the interest in protecting the wellbeing of the patient outweighs the value placed on 
respecting autonomy. However, this falls prey to the same line of criticism. It enables a hidden hard 
paternalism to occur by making a finding of competence contingent upon the actual decision made and not 
the mental process by which it was made. A closer examination of Grisso and Appelbaum’s statement 
reveals the dilemma with their reasoning. The assertion that the interest in protecting wellbeing may 
override respecting one’s autonomy does not in any way speak to the issue of mental capacity. Instead the 
acceptance that respecting one’s autonomy may be overridden by the value in protecting wellbeing 
presumes that a patient may indeed be capable of being autonomous and thus have the mental 
capacity/competence required for a truly autonomous decision, but that this can be overridden in certain 
situations by what would be a clear case of hard paternalistic action. It must be recognized that a concern 
for wellbeing cannot in itself provide any type of justification for deeming one incompetent. To confuse the 
two would be to create the dangerous scenario described above, whereby hard paternalistic action can be 
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This is truly problematic for the sliding scale approach since it is the decision-making 
process that is the appropriate object of assessment, and not whether the person’s 
decision is judged by others to be in his best interest.
173
 
 Brock attempts to defend the asymmetry stating that “one reason a patient might 
be competent to consent but not to refuse a treatment, and vice versa, is that the two 
choices to consent or refuse will be based on different processes of reasoning or 
desisionmaking; the overall processes of reasoning must be different if for no other 
reason than that they result in different choices.”174 If indeed a consent to or refusal of 
treatment or research participation would entail two different processes of reasoning, then 
applying different standards of competence might remain perfectly consistent with a 
process-oriented approach to competence.  
 However, such a position would actually rob the process-oriented rule of any 
meaning. For if a difference in the result of a deliberation is sufficient to require a 
different standard of competence, then in what sense is a process oriented model being 
utilized? It seems that if “one holds that different choices (outcomes) warrant the 
                                                                                                                                                 
performed under the guise of soft paternalism by unjustly deeming persons incompetent. It seems that 
proponents of the risk based sliding scale inevitably conflate two distinct questions, precisely: “(a) Does a 
patient have decision-making capacity with respect to a particular choice or set of choices? (b) Is it justified 
to override the patient’s decision for paternalistic reasons?” (Wicclair, 1999, p.149-150). 
173
 It should be noted that the concern here regarding the process-oriented principle is also intimately 
intertwined with the previous matter concerning hard paternalism. For imagine that we accept such an 
asymmetrical approach to competence and, for example accept that, as Brock suggests: “when clearly 
beneficial life-saving treatment is accepted, minimal understanding may be sufficient to warrant respecting 
the patient’s self-determination since doing so has no cost for, but on the contrary furthers, his well-being. 
If the treatment is refused, on the other hand, the price for the patient’s well-being of respecting his self-
determination may now, by his own standards, be too high” (Brock, 1991, p. 112). Then it seems that we 
have further facilitated an environment where physicians are able to disguise hard paternalistic action under 
the guise of a more ethically permissible soft paternalism. This is true since it would seem that such an 
asymmetry would provide justification for findings of incompetence by raising the required level of 
competence too high when the decision made conflicts with the recommendation of the treating physician. 
However, as has already been argued, it is conceptually flawed to suggest that that the level of competence 
required when making a decision changes depending on the actual choice made by the decider. 
174
 Brock, 1991, p.112. 
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conclusion that the processes of reasoning are sufficiently different to call for different 
criteria of decision-making capacity, it is implausible to maintain that a process-oriented 
standard is being used to assess decision-making capacity.”175 Thus Brock’s defense of 
the asymmetry ultimately fails and it becomes clear that a risk based sliding scale 
approach cannot be considered consistent with the process-oriented rule. 
 It should be noted that an asymmetry may be acceptable in regards to standards of 
evidence of competence. That is, it may be appropriate to suggest that indeed there is 
reason to apply a stricter standard of evidence for determining competence when the risk 
is great, as it is when life-saving treatment is refused. Accordingly, when risks are high, 
the evidence of competence that must be obtained might be greater, and the methods for 
acquiring that evidence might be stricter, but this is conceptually quite different from 
suggesting that the actual level of competence required by the patient ought to be greater. 
It seems that advocates of this risk based sliding scale approach may also be conflating 
precisely these two issues: (1) the required mental capacity needed in order to consent 
and (2) the required evidence needed by a physician or research investigator in order to 
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 Wicclair, “A Response to Brock and Skene” 1991, p.119. In order to make explicit the conceptual flaw 
present in Brock’s assumption that different choices must be the result of different processes of reasoning, 
we may posit the following thought experiment: Imagine a patient with a fairly low level of decision 
making capacity. His physician informs him that he has a respiratory infection and will require antibiotics 
that should clear up the problem within a week, but without which, more serious complications could result 
such as pneumonia. The patient decides to flip a coin in order to determine whether he will take the 
antibiotics. Now, in one version of this scenario, the coin flip results in the patient choosing to take the 
antibiotics, and according to the risk based sliding scale strategy, since such a choice is associated with 
very low risks, he would be deemed competent. However, if the coin flip was such that the patient chooses 
not to take the antibiotics, then this strategy may justify a finding of incompetence since such a decision 
would be quite risky. However notice, even though two different choices could have been made, the 
decision making process, as absurd as it was, was the same. The same identical decision-making abilities 
were present regardless of which choice was made. Thus, Brock’s assertion that different choices are 
necessarily associated with different processes of reasoning is untrue. It should also be noted that for an 
example such as this, a proper process oriented analysis utilizing the four elements of competence, would 
likely declare that this patient’s decision, whichever way he did choose, was not competent. This aligns 
with where our intuitions might already fall in this case. 
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deem a patient or subject competent, whereby risk may only significantly influence the 
latter and not the former.   
 This mistake seems to occur since we generally do not question the competence 
of a patient who makes a choice that is commonly viewed as non-risky and as being in 
her best interest. However, this is done for pragmatic reasons and not because we take 
our approval of the patient’s decision as somehow being evidence that the patient is 
indeed competent. It is clear that merely being in agreement with another’s choice fails to 
demonstrate that the decision-maker possesses the necessary decision-making capacity. 
“If [for example] a two year old child does not want to play in the street or pet a strange 
dog, it does not follow that she has the capacity to decide whether to play in the street or 
to pet strange dogs. Assent to the correct option from the perspective of one’s welfare no 
more suffices to establish decision-making capacity than a lucky guess suffices to 
establish knowledge.”176 Lowering the required capacity for a decision simply because 
the choice actually made is the less risky one commits this very mistake of attempting to 
classify one as competent simply because her decision is one with which we would agree.  
 However, it is still appropriate to suggest that in such a case, the required level of 
evidence necessary to determine that the patient is competent is quite low since any 
mistake in competency assessment would not result in any harm. Whereas greater 
evidence of competence might be necessary when the risk of harm is greater since the 
stakes in making a correct competence evaluation are higher. This is to suggest that when 
a riskier decision is made, health care professionals must be that much more certain that 
the decision was made competently, lest they allow for an individual to make a decision 
that brings him harm despite not having the requisite decision making capacity. 
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 Wicclair. “Patient Decision-Making Capacity and Risk” 1991, p.100-101.  
 77 
 
 The idea here is that the level of risk may in fact be relevant, but only in 
determining how certain we ought to be that a patient is competent before proceeding 
with his decision.   
 When the consent is to a lifesaving and benign procedure [for example], it doesn’t 
 matter whether we are wrong to judge the patient competent; we will treat the 
 patient in any case. When, however, that patient changes his or her mind and 
 refuses the procedure, it matters a great deal whether we’re wrong in judging the 
 patient to be competent and, in the name of self-determination, we permit the 
 refusal to stand. In this circumstance, we rightly demand a much higher degree of 
 evidence for that person’s competence, not because the capacities necessary for a 
 competent decision about this treatment have changed, but because our need to be 
 sure about the patient’s possession of those capacities has escalated 
 dramatically.
177
 
 
It seems that without realizing it, this variable standard of evidence that turns on risk is 
actually what the supporters of the sliding scale are seeking. For example Brock and 
Buchanan assert the following:   
 When the expected effects of the patient’s choice for his or her well-being  appear 
 to be substantially worse than available alternatives, as in the refusal of a simple 
 appendectomy, the requirement of a high/maximal level of competence provides 
 grounds for relying on the patient’s decision as itself establishing that the choice 
 best fits the patient’s good (his or her own underlying and enduring aims and 
 values). The highest level of competence should assure that no significant 
 mistakes in the patient’s reasoning and decision making are present.”178 
 
This demonstrates that what is truly sought is an assurance that the patient, or subject as 
in the case of medical research, is actually competent to decide and was not mistakenly 
deemed competent and allowed to consent to high risk procedures or interventions while 
actually being incompetent to do so. Thus risk may actually increase the evidence we 
require that someone is in fact competent, but this is not to suggest that it increases the 
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 Tom Tomlinson. “Who Decides, and What?” In Biomedical Ethics fifth edition, Mappes and Degrazia, 
eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., pp. 114-116, 2001) p. 116. Similar suggestions have been 
made by others as well. For instance see: Joseph Demarco. “Competence and Paternalism” Bioethics, Vol. 
16(3), 2002. 
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 Brock and Buchanan. “Standards of Competence” In Biomedical Ethics fifth edition, Mappes and 
Degrazia, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., pp. 109-114, 2001) p. 112. 
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required level of competence itself for that decision. This is the conceptual flaw that 
appears to exist throughout the literature that supports the risk based sliding scale.
179
 
 It has now been demonstrated that the various reasoning and arguments in favour 
of the sliding scale approach are all lacking. The previous section made clear that it is 
not, as Brock and Buchanan had claimed, the case that informal competency 
determinations are already being intuitively made in accordance with the risk based 
sliding scale or that this approach coheres with our current legal framework. 
Additionally, to accept such a competence strategy allows for a dangerous asymmetrical 
approach to competence evaluations, which as has been argued, can lead to a disguised 
hard paternalism that egregiously undermines the value of autonomy; a value that is often 
considered paramount in medicine. More specifically the risk based sliding scale will 
inevitably present the danger “that standards of understanding, reasoning, and so forth 
will be set arbitrarily and unattainably high by those who believe that paternalism is 
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 Ian Wilks, an avid supporter of the risk based sliding scale discusses a case regarding a pneumonia 
patient who in one scenario acquiesces to treatment with antibiotics, but in another scenario refuses that 
same treatment. He then suggests that in such cases there is no difference between a greater standard of 
evidence and a greater standard of competence, ultimately concluding that such a distinction “is not a real 
one” (Ian Wilks. “Asymmetrical Competence” Bioethics, Vol. 13(2), pp. 154- 159, 1999, p155). He 
continues to assert that “if we do not assess very closely how people meet a standard it becomes much 
easier for them to get by without actually meeting that standard - which is in effect exactly the same as 
holding them to a lower standard” (Wilks, 1999, p.155). While Wilks might be correct in pointing out that 
both methods would similarly accomplish the goal of preventing some persons from “getting by” and being 
incorrectly deemed competent, the two approaches are certainly not the same. The difference is not only 
conceptually apparent, but will have ramifications in reality as well. If standards of competence are 
themselves greater, then the patient will need to demonstrate greater levels of the four sub abilities that 
comprise competence, that is, understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness. However, if 
greater evidence of competence is all that is sought, then higher abilities on the part of the patient need not 
be demonstrated. Instead, only further inquires and assurances that the patient is indeed competent might be 
undertaken. Thus the main difference would be specifically the different tools, methods, and instruments 
that would be applied in order to test the patient. Methods for determining or assessing the presence of 
greater levels of competence would only be appropriate if the standards of competence change. This 
difference further implies that the same person who might be deemed incompetent under a higher standard 
of competence, might be deemed competent under only a higher standard of evidence of competence. 
Wilks’ objection fails to account for this crucial difference. A more detailed discussion regarding the 
different tools and instruments used in order to assess competence will be provided in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
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justified when perceived risks are great.”180 Furthermore, such an approach runs contrary 
to the often accepted principle that competency assessments must embrace a method that 
is process oriented and not result oriented. Given these various objections, it becomes 
difficult to maintain that this risk based sliding scale strategy is one that is ethically 
defensible and should be implemented. Any continued suggestion to this effect, as has 
been argued, is likely a mistake in categorization, where one is conflating a greater 
standard of competence with a greater level of evidence necessary for a competence 
determination. “While the risks related to a decision might be grounds for taking more 
care in assessing a person’s competence, they should not provide grounds for increasing 
the standards by which a person’s competence is assessed.”181 
 
Sliding Scale and the Research Context 
 Given the various dilemmas with the arguments supporting a risk based sliding 
scale approach to competence, it seems clear that such an approach stands on fairly 
unstable conceptual and ethical grounds. However, before entirely dismissing it as a 
method for consideration in our current effort to derive an appropriate standard of 
competence for the medical research context for terminally ill subjects, it would be 
prudent to note how such an approach would function specifically in that context. Apart 
from the criticisms put forth above against the risk based sliding scale approach, its use 
and application in the medical research context might still be urged by some who may 
view it as an appropriate safeguard since it would seem to entail that greater competence 
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 Wicclair, “Patient Decision-Making Capacity and Risk” 1991, p.99.  
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 Gita Cale. “Continuing the Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence” Bioethics, Vol. 13(2), 
1999, p. 148.  
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would be required to consent to participate in a clinical trial as opposed to consenting to 
treatment.  
 This may indeed appear to be an appealing possible safeguard for potential 
subjects of research, and perhaps especially so for terminally ill subjects. However, it 
must be questioned whether this risk based sliding scale strategy can actually justify 
requiring a greater level of competence for medical research participation decisions than 
for decisions regarding treatment. It may seem fairly intuitive that the answer should be 
in the affirmative, for having experimental medical interventions tested on one seems 
inherently riskier than standard therapy, and thus the sliding scale strategy would seem to 
require a greater level of competence for consent to medical research participation. 
However, I shall demonstrate that with a proper understanding of research risks and the 
ethical condition of clinical equipoise, this assumption should be viewed as specious.   
 It is crucial to be careful when discussing the risks associated with medical 
research trials. In assessing the risk
182
 associated with a research trial, it is imperative that 
the risks related to the research itself are demarcated from the risks related to the standard 
therapeutic intervention that the patient would otherwise confront. Rather than viewing 
all the risks related to the interventions in the research trial as risks of research, one must 
determine which of the interventions are purely grounded in research and accept the risks 
related to only these interventions as research risks. In a discussion regarding minimal 
risk, Benjamin Freeman and Charles Weijer articulate this view well, asserting that 
minimal risk should be understood as “risks commensurate to the experiences of the 
group being studied, that is, as relative to the experiences and associated risks inherent in 
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 Risk is often understood as encompassing both the magnitude of harm and the probability of its 
occurrence. 
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the daily lives of the relevant population.”183 Research risks therefore do not include risks 
that would otherwise be present if the subject of the research were instead receiving 
standard therapy. Thus, for example, a patient with cancer who is enrolling in a research 
trial that is testing a new form of chemotherapy that has many severe side effects, should 
not be considered to be accepting substantially additional risks, if the risks related to the 
medical intervention in the trial arm for which he is a subject, are the same as the risks 
related to the chemotherapy treatment that this patient would otherwise be receiving if he 
had not enrolled in the research trial.  
 That therapeutic and research interventions need to be demarcated in the ethical 
 analysis of clinical studies underlies several comments made by the Belmont 
 Commission and the interpreters of the United States’ regulations adopted 
 following that Commission’s recommendations. These speak of the need to 
 distinguish which procedures are “purely investigational,” [and] which parts of 
 the activities “are research and which are practice”.184  
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 Benjamin Freedman & Charles Weijer. “Demarcating Research and Treatment Interventions: A Case 
Illustration” IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research, Vol. 14(4), pp. 5-8, 1992, p.7. 
184
 Benjamin Freedman, Abraham Fuks, and Charles Weijer. “Demarcating Research and Treatment: A 
Systematic Approach for the Analysis of the Ethics of Clinical Research” Clin Res, Vol. 40, pp. 653-660, 
1992, p. 654. It should be noted that the process of separating research risks from therapeutic practice risks 
involves a difficult conceptual problem, namely, being able to distinguish research from therapy. How 
“therapy” or “research” is defined will affect which interventions are to count as therapeutic practice or 
research and thus which risks ultimately constitute risks of research. Without fully exploring this issue, for 
a full analysis of this matter is beyond our current scope, we might recall as mentioned in Chapter One that 
The Belmont Report provides the criteria for a fairly instructive distinction. As The Belmont Report 
elucidates: “the term “practice” refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of 
an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose of medical or 
behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment, or therapy to particular individuals. By 
contrast, the term “research” designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be 
drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in 
theories, principles, and statements of relationships). Research is usually described in a formal protocol that 
sets forth an objective and a set of procedures designed to reach that objective” (The National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical 
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1979). Section A Boundaries Between Practice and 
Research). 
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Given that the risks of research are to be separated from therapeutic risks, it would seem 
“that relatively few clinical research studies [should] pose a high incremental risk 
associated with fully demarcated interventions.”185 
 This analysis already begins to place pressure on the notion that a risk related 
sliding scale strategy would necessitate that a greater level of competence is required to 
decide about medical research participation, by demonstrating that much of the risk in 
many research trials can actually be classified as therapeutic risk. However, the ethical 
requirement of clinical equipoise further pushes the point. As the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement suggests: “at the start of the [research] trial, there must be a state of clinical 
equipoise regarding the merits of the regimens to be tested,”186 which requires that there 
exist a “genuine uncertainty within the expert medical community... about the preferred 
treatment.”187 More specifically there must not be a “consensus within the expert clinical 
community about the comparative merits of the alternatives to be tested”188 and 
furthermore the research trial should be designed such that it is reasonable to expect that 
the successful completion of the trial will disturb clinical equipoise. Thus, for example, if 
there is a potentially new treatment X, which can be tested on a population P that has a 
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 Freedman, Fuks, & Weijer, 1992, p. 660. 
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 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans. 1998 (with 2000, 2002 and 2005 amendments) p. 7.1.  
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 Benjamin Freedman. “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research” New England Journal of 
Medicine, Vol. 317(3), pp. 141-145, 1987, p. 141. 
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 Freedman, 1987, p. 144. This is contrasted with the outdated requirement of what Benjamin Freedman 
referred to as “theoretical equipoise” which requires a “state of genuine uncertainty on the part of the 
clinical investigator regarding the comparative therapeutic merits of each arm in a trial” (Freedman, 1987, 
p. 141). This notion has often been summed up by asserting that the investigator of a clinical trial must 
have no treatment preference between the arms in the trial. Though the difference between clinical and 
theoretical equipoise may seem slight, the implications of the difference are quite substantial. The 
theoretical version of equipoise was deemed unsatisfactory for a multitude of reasons, perhaps most notably 
because of its fragility. For it seems that theoretical equipoise is disturbed by not only personal hunches and 
biases of investigators, but it is also jeopardized by the earliest results of a trial which may lend support to 
one arm over the other, and thus the trial would need to be halted. 
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specific disease for which there is a current accepted treatment A, then clinical equipoise 
would require that “there exists (or, in the case of a novel therapy, there may soon exist) 
an honest, professional disagreement among expert clinicians about the preferred 
treatment”189 between X and A and that the completion of the trial can be expected to 
resolve this disagreement. 
 The condition of clinical equipoise therefore necessitates that the risk/benefit ratio 
between the arms of a trial be roughly equivalent, or at least that one arm of the trial is 
not thought by the expert clinical community to have a substantially worse risk/benefit 
ratio. If, experimental treatment X, was known to have a significantly worse risk/benefit 
ratio than standard treatment A, or visa versa, then clinical equipoise would already be 
disturbed and the medical research trial would be ethically impermissible. Given this we 
may begin to notice the dilemma with applying a risk based sliding scale strategy to the 
medical research scenario.  
 If research and treatment risks are properly differentiated, and if the clinical 
equipoise requirement is satisfied, then these two conditions together would entail that 
research risks are appropriately determined by examining the risks of the medical 
interventions specific to research, and that the risk/benefit ratio of these research specific 
interventions be approximately equivalent to the risk/benefit ratio of standard treatment. 
It can then be concluded that therefore research that satisfies the clinical equipoise 
requirement does not force the subject of the research to bear substantially greater 
incremental risks. Thus, requiring a greater level of competence when risk is greater 
would become a meaningless condition in medical research; for if indeed the medical 
research trial satisfied clinical equipoise, then taking part in the research should not be 
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considered to knowingly have any substantial risk/benefit differences from standard 
treatment. It seems that applying the risk based sliding-scale approach would therefore 
not accomplish anything useful in the medical research context, and certainly would not 
afford potential subjects any additional protections by justifying a higher standard of 
competence.
190
 If we expect a sliding-scale strategy of competence to have any 
significance in the medical research decision-making setting, it seems apparent that it 
must be grounded in something other than risk.
191
   
 Before proceeding with this argument it would be prudent to discuss a potential 
objection. Specifically, the objection involves the recognition that having the arms of the 
trial in a state of clinical equipoise does not entail that there are no added risks to 
participating in a medical research trial. The risk related to added uncertainty is always 
present regarding the more novel or experimental arm of the research trial.
192
 This is 
because even though the trial arms may be in a state of clinical equipoise, the knowledge 
regarding the experimental/novel procedure is often less than what is known regarding 
the current standard treatment. The standard therapy may have numerous years of use in 
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 I am indebted to Professor Duff Waring at York University for bringing this argument to my attention.  
191
 One may suggest that I have mistakenly assumed that the risks associated with participating in research 
are roughly the same regardless of the type of research. However, the objector may claim that this is not 
true, and that a research study on a new cancer chemotherapy intervention, for example, compared to a 
research study on Advil would certainly seem to have very different risks associated with them, with the 
former study appearing far riskier than the latter. Thus it would seem that different research trials can have 
different levels of risk associated between them and that therefore a risk based sliding scale strategy of 
competence may still prove beneficial. However, this line of criticism crumbles as soon as it is examined. 
For, if one properly demarcated research and treatment risks, it would become clear that this objection is 
fallacious. The subject population enrolling in the chemotherapy research trial are those for whom the risks 
of the chemotherapy intervention, given that the trial is in clinical equipoise, are not incrementally greater 
than the risks associated with the treatment that these subjects would otherwise be receiving if they had not 
enrolled in the research, but instead had received standard cancer chemotherapy treatment. Thus, though it 
may seem that one research trial appears far riskier than the other, a proper separation of treatment related 
risks from research related risks, demonstrates that in fact once the treatment risks have been accounted for, 
the remaining risks associated with the research should be minimal and roughly similar between different 
research trials. 
192
 I am indebted to Professor Trudo Lemmens at The University of Toronto for bringing this objection to 
my attention. 
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which the evidence accumulated regarding its safety and efficacy far outweigh any 
knowledge regarding the experimental procedure. It is this added uncertainty that can be 
considered to be an additional risk associated with participating in research.  
 Though it must be conceded that in fact uncertainty remains as a potential 
additional risk, two points must be made regarding this issue. 
 First of all, it should be recognized that the level of uncertainty present cannot be 
thought to pose too great of a risk. For it seems that properly satisfying clinical equipoise 
would require that enough preliminary data on the experimental intervention exists such 
that there is a genuine uncertainty among the expert clinical community between the 
comparative risk/benefit ratios of this experimental intervention and standard treatment. 
More precisely, “for a nonvalidated intervention to be in equipoise with a standard 
treatment arm, its associated expectations of risk and benefit must be roughly equivalent 
to those of treatments commonly used in clinical practice.”193  Thus, even though the 
standard treatment may have potentially many more years of knowledge accumulated 
regarding its safety and efficacy, the added uncertainty with the experimental intervention 
cannot be considered to be too great of a risk if clinical equipoise has been satisfied. I 
would then contend that this additional risk is not sufficient to justify requiring a greater 
level of competence for consent.  
 Second, it must be questioned whether the risk of uncertainty is the type of risk 
that could even warrant a change in the level of competence required to make a decision. 
We may consider the following thought experiment. Peter is attempting to decide 
between two potential investment opportunities that his investment broker has discussed 
with him. Both types of investments are actually quite similar. The amount that Peter 
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would have to invest is the same, the level of active involvement required of Peter would 
be the same, and the type and length of the forms that Peter would have to fill out is also 
the same. Furthermore, the level of complexity associated with each type of investment, 
the mathematical calculations for example, and the economic jargon used, is also the 
same. The only difference between the two investments is that investment A has a 99.9% 
chance of providing Peter with a 2.5% return on his investment, whereas the exact return 
on investment B is unknown. Investment B could provide Peter with a return anywhere 
between the range of 0 and 5%. Thus, the only real difference between these two 
investments is the level of uncertainty.  
 Does this uncertainty increase the level of competence that should be required of 
Peter in order to consent to investment B? It would certainly seem odd, given the 
similarities between the two investment opportunities, to consider investing in B as 
requiring a greater level of competence than investing in A. Uncertainty does not seem to 
necessarily raise the complexity or difficulty of the material that needs to be understood, 
appreciated, reasoned or voluntarily decided about in order for a decision to be 
considered competent. This investment case clearly demonstrates this fact as the level of 
complexity of the information involved in each investment was the same. It may be 
appropriate to suggest that as the level of uncertainty of the consequences of a decision 
increases so too should the level of certainty that the competence judger must have in 
order to conclude that the individual deciding is competent to do so. However, this is akin 
to raising the standards of evidence required for one to be declared competent, but it is 
not to raise the level of competence itself required to decide.  
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 With the recognition that the level of uncertainty in medical research trials cannot 
be so great so as to disturb clinical equipoise, and that uncertainty is not likely to be the 
type of risk that could justify an increase in the level of competence required in order for 
one to make a decision, the earlier assertion that a risk based sliding scale approach to 
competence is useless in the medical research setting, can be maintained.
194
  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 It may have been noticed that when I have referred to the sliding scale strategy, I 
have qualified it by placing the term “risk based” in front. This was to allude to the idea 
that there may be other ways in which to ground a sliding scale approach. While it was 
argued that risk may only appropriately affect the level of evidence of competence that 
ought to be required, for example by investigators who are recruiting potential subjects 
for research, we do not have to completely abandon a sliding scale strategy for 
competence. Rather than discard this approach entirely, it may be appropriate to instead 
ground it in something other than risk. The suggestion offered earlier was that a sliding 
scale strategy can be grounded in the complexity of the decision. For it appears “correct 
to say that the level of demonstrated skill to decide will rise as the complexity or 
difficulty of a task increases (deciding about spinal fusion, say, as contrasted with 
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 It should be noted that what has been argued here does not amount to the assertion that indeed all 
clinical trials always maintain a reasonably equivalent risk/benefit ratio between standard therapy and the 
non-validated experimental intervention and that clinical equipoise is always satisfied. Indeed, many 
clinical trials often involve procedures that are too risky. We need only recall the Jesse Gelsinger case, 
discussed in Chapter One footnote 14, in order to recount an example where the risk was incredibly high 
and various ethical principles such as clinical equipoise were ignored. However, the immorality and 
sometimes illegality of such research is not currently being discussed. It is quite clear that corrupt or 
negligent medical research does occur, and is indeed ethically and sometimes legally condemnable. 
However, the crucial aspect for what is being argued here, is that even in cases where our ethical precepts 
such as clinical equipoise are followed, and even where blatant levels of corruption and negligence are 
absent in a clinical trial, then it is still necessary to ensure the protection of research subjects’ autonomy by 
ensuring an appropriate degree of competence. And given this aim, it is clear that applying the risk based 
sliding scale approach proves futile. 
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deciding whether to take a minor tranquilizer).”195 More specifically, as a decisional 
context is such that it is more difficult to satisfy the four conditions of competence, 
namely understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness, then it would be 
appropriate to raise the required standard of competence. 
 This may be precisely the situation for our medical research context where the 
potential subjects are terminally ill persons. This research scenario, as compared to the 
decision making in a standard therapeutic context, seems to represent a situation where 
numerous factors are present that would make it more difficult to satisfy the four criteria 
of competence. For example, research trials that facilitate a therapeutic misconception,
196
 
provide undue payments, or that exploit the desperation of terminally ill patients,
197
 might 
all increase the level of difficulty for the potential subject in possessing or performing the 
four criteria involved in competence.  
 The assertion that the medical research context might be substantially different 
from the context of therapeutic practice so as to warrant requiring a different level of 
competence for consent is a fairly controversial claim, but it is this claim that will be the 
focus of the following chapter. More specifically, Chapter Three will examine relevant 
differences between the therapeutic and research contexts that will influence the level of 
competence that ought to be required in the latter. It will be these differences that will 
ultimately fuel the discussion in Chapter Four that will be dedicated to specifically 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p. 117. 
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 As we may recall from Chapter One, this is the phenomenon where a subject of research misconstrues 
the research trial for therapeutic practice. 
197
 As Mark Hochhauser has recently pointed out, many research trials have a “brand name” which can 
often exploit the desperate and hopeful mindset of severely and terminally ill patients and may also 
contribute to a subject’s therapeutic misconception. See: Mark Hochhauser. “Therapeutic Misconception 
and Recruiting Doublespeak in the Informed Consent Process” In Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of 
Clinical Research, Emanuel et al., eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) p. 222. This 
issue will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
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determining how high the required level of competence ought to be for medical research 
participation with terminally ill subjects. 
 As Jocelyn Downie et al. state: “in the interest of the protection of research 
participants, both ethics and law have placed a central focus on the promotion of 
autonomy or self-determination. Informed consent as an expression of autonomous 
choice is seen as a crucial component of research participation.”198 However, in order to 
truly respect autonomous choice, it is imperative that we properly judge competence, so 
that those whose autonomy is being respected are in fact those who possess the necessary 
mental capacity for truly autonomous choice. To that end, it has been argued that a risk 
based sliding scale approach to competence is a misguided position, for it not only 
proved to be questionable conceptually and ethically, but it failed to be any type of 
safeguard in our medical research context. While this approach must be abandoned, it is 
still necessary to look elsewhere for the appropriate safeguards for terminally ill potential 
subjects of medical research. However, while establishing the proper safeguards that will 
regulate terminally ill persons’ participation in medical research is of vital ethical 
importance, we must remember that succeeding in this endeavour will first require 
establishing the appropriate competence requirement suited to such a context. It is only 
by determining and applying the appropriate competency requirement for this context 
that people’s autonomy will truly be respected and their wellbeing protected. It is to this 
task that we now turn. 
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Chapter 3: The Requirement of Competence: A Comparative Analysis Between  
the Medical Practice and Medical Research Context 
 
  
 Understanding the context within which an action is preformed is critical for its 
ethical evaluation. “A kiss may be just a kiss; but, depending upon the context in which 
bestowed it may also be a mark of affection, the fulfillment of a contract for services, or 
as in the Godfather saga, the pronouncement of the death penalty.”199 It should thus seem 
clear that context matters when determining the ethicality of an action. However, the 
same can be said regarding standards of competence. An ethically appropriate standard of 
competence in one context may be wholly inappropriate in another. Though the notion 
that different contexts and different tasks will require different levels of competence has 
been generally assumed in the prior chapters, a brief elaboration will prove instructive.
200
 
 Since, as discussed in previous chapters, the generic meaning of competence is 
the ability to perform a task, then the level, or standard of competence required, will vary 
from context to context depending on the specific task. The required standard “for 
someone’s competence to stand trial, to raise dachshunds, to write checks, or to lecture to 
medical students are radically different. The competence to decide is therefore relative to 
the particular decision to be made. Rarely should we judge a person incompetent with 
respect to every sphere of life.”201  
 Assuming then, that different decisional tasks require different levels of 
competence, our question thus becomes: what level or standard of competence is required 
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 Benjamin Freedman, Abraham Fuks, Charles Weijer. “Demarcating Research and Treatment: A 
Systematic Approach for the Analysis of the Ethics of Clinical Research” Clin Res, Vol. 40(4), pp.653-660, 
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 It should be noted that in what follows, one who possesses adequate competence in a particular context 
will be referred to as being substantially or sufficiently competent for that context. 
201
 Tom Beauchamp & James Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) p.112.  
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in the medical research context with terminally ill subjects or, put differently, what 
degree of competence constitutes substantial competence in the medical research 
context?
202
 While the level of competence needed to make some decisions may seem 
clear, such as where one should eat, or how one should invest her money, some contexts 
are more elusive on this matter. Deciding where to eat will likely require a relatively low 
level of competence since a person would simply require knowledge regarding her 
personal taste preferences.
203
 Deciding how to invest money however, will likely require 
a comparatively higher level of competence since an understanding of some basic 
economic principles along with mathematical reasoning skills may be required. However, 
determining the requisite level of competence becomes a quite complex matter with 
medical decisions, and an especially controversial issue in the context of medical 
research participation decisions for the terminally ill specifically.  
 We must be cautious and not depict the standard of competence needed in 
medical research as too great by requiring something resembling full or complete 
competence. This would render decision making in the medical research context 
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 Some have objected to this type of analysis of competence, contending that it creates a false dichotomy 
“i.e., that competence is an all-or-nothing phenomenon… [the idea being that this analysis of competence 
will] lump all sorts of patients, with quite different degrees of mental impairment, into the same class, vis. 
those for whom an active paternalistic stance is always appropriate” (Stephen Wear. “Patient Autonomy, 
Paternalism, and the Conscientious Physician” Theoretical Medicine, Vol. 4, pp. 253-274, 1983, p. 259). It 
must be admitted that this objection raises a good point, for the degree of competence may in fact vary 
greatly from person to person, where the range runs from complete competence to partial proficiency to 
total mental ineptness, and the objection is further correct in asserting that with the above analysis persons 
with different degrees of competency or incompetence may be all lumped into one category. “Nonetheless, 
[in the medical context] it is confusing to view this continuum in terms of degrees of competency. For 
practical and policy reasons, we need threshold levels below which a person with a certain level of abilities 
for a particular task is incompetent. Not all competent persons are equally able, and not all incompetent 
persons are equally unable, but competence determinations sort persons into these two basic classes, and 
thus treat persons as either competent or incompetent for specific purposes” (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2009, pp. 113-114).  
203
  Of course the level of competence required for such a situation may appropriately increase if the 
context changes, for example if the person deciding where to eat has a particular food allergy or is on a 
specific diet. 
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impossible, and clearly misconstrues our endeavour in a problematic way. For as 
Beauchamp and Childress elucidate: “to restrict adequate decision making by patients 
and research subjects to the ideal of fully or completely autonomous decision making 
strips their acts of any meaningful place in the practical world, where people’s actions are 
rarely, if ever, fully autonomous.”204 Asserting that full or complete competence is 
required for decision making in the medical research context certainly sets the standard 
too high, however, assuming the threshold so low that the only persons who fail to have 
substantial competence are children and the mentally handicapped seems similarly 
inappropriate. 
 Though currently participating as a subject in medical research entails that the 
subject first review and freely sign an informed consent document, the question of how 
competent a potential subject must be in order to be able to provide informed consent 
remains largely unanswered. There appears to be a common implicit assumption that the 
standard of competence needed to consent to medical research should be akin to the 
standard applied in ordinary therapeutic medical practice decision making.
205
 In fact 
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 See: Robert Levine. “Consent Issues in Human Research” In Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical 
Research, Emanuel, Crouch, Arras, Moreno, & Grady, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003), who in a discussion regarding standards of informed consent, “proposes that both patients and 
clinical research participants should be afforded the same rigorous degree of protection in this regard” 
(Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Robert A. Crouch, John D. Arras, Jonathan D. Moreno, and Christine Grady. Ethical 
and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) p. 
189). It should be noted that the discussion of standards of informed consent is intimately tied to our 
discussion here regarding standards of competence, in that a certain level of competence is required for an 
ethical informed consent. However, the issue of determining informed consent standards has become more 
of a legal matter, with arguments suggesting that the law should afford greater protections through 
thoroughly detailed and properly structured informed consent documents. Whereas the issue being explored 
here, regarding the appropriate standard of competence required, relates more to a person’s decisional 
capacity, and thus a higher standard of competence requirement would imply, not that a more elaborate and 
better detailed informed consent document should be required, but that many individuals simply may not 
have the requisite capacity needed to provide informed consent for medical research participation. This 
controversial assertion along with possible remedies will be explored in greater detail in this chapter. 
However it is important to recognize that a specific standard of competence for the medical research 
context is not being suggested here, but rather it will be argued that the level of competence needed of a 
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“there is virtually no case law on the basis of which legal standards for consent to 
research, as distinguished from practice, might be defined.”206 However in what follows 
it will be demonstrated that this is an ethically flawed approach. While patients are 
generally assumed to be competent when consenting to therapy, unless there is reason to 
suspect otherwise, the medical research context with terminally ill subjects is markedly 
different such that the same assumption is not warranted or ethically appropriate. 
 The proceeding discussion will be dedicated to presenting a tripartite argument in 
favour of a higher standard of competence for the medical research context compared to 
the therapeutic medical practice context with terminally ill persons. This argument will 
demonstrate that there exist three significant differences between the medical practice 
and the medical research contexts such that the latter requires a higher level of 
competence for decision making. These differences include the difference in the nature of 
the researcher/subject relationship as opposed to the physician/patient relationship, the 
higher potential for exploitation of the situation or mental state of terminally ill subjects, 
and the presence of the therapeutic misconception.
207
 
 The claim that participating in medical research must require a greater level of 
competence than consenting to medical therapy for terminally ill persons may warrant 
some immediate doubt and concern. How can a government or a researcher justify the 
                                                                                                                                                 
terminally ill person in order to be able to provide an ethically appropriate informed consent for 
participation in medical research is comparatively higher than the level of competence required for that 
person to make decisions in the context of ordinary medical practice. 
206
 Levine, pp. 197-198. One notable exception occurs in the case of Halushka v. University of 
Saskatchewan, where the Court determined that the level of disclosure required for a proper informed 
consent for medical research participation should be “at least as great as, if not greater than, the duty owed 
by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient. [Furthermore] there can be no exceptions to the 
ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of research as there may well be in ordinary medical 
practice” (Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan [1965], 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436.) 
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 Recall from Chapter One that the therapeutic misconception is the phenomenon where a subject of 
research may misconstrue the research trial for therapeutic practice. 
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scenario where a person’s desire to be admitted into a medical research trial is 
overridden? Is this type of paternalism
208
 ever permissible in a state that values 
autonomy? To highlight the issue, we may consider the following case: 
 Sandy, a 45 year old woman who has always displayed the utmost rationality has 
recently discovered that she has terminal cancer. Her physician has made her aware of a 
new clinical trial that is testing new cancer therapies. The clinical trial is a Phase I trial 
which has at its primary aim, to test toxicity levels of the new treatment so that an 
appropriate dosage can be recommended for further trials.
209
 Since this is a trial that tests 
toxicity levels, it has a fairly poor risk/benefit ratio. Sandy, feeling hopeful and optimistic 
that this could be a miracle cure for her, begins to misconstrue this research trial as 
therapeutic practice. However, she is alarmed when she is told that she will not be 
permitted into the medical trial as a result of her misconception of the trial as a 
potentially miraculous life saving therapy. She is especially shocked because at no point 
in her life, while making decisions regarding medical procedures, has her competence 
ever been questioned. Now suddenly her ability to make her own medical choices has 
been deemed insufficient.  
 It appears that Sandy may seem justified in feeling frustrated by this paternalistic 
interference. Sandy, and many others, would argue that her level of competence, which 
has always been substantial enough so as to be capable of making medical decisions, is 
similarly sufficient in this context to decide whether to enter the medical research trial. 
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 Refer back to Chapter Two for a full explanation of paternalism and the distinction between soft and 
hard paternalism. Briefly, soft paternalism involves interference with a person who is less than substantially 
competent while hard paternalism involves interference with a person who is considered substantially 
competent. 
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 Refer back to Chapter One for a full explanation of Phase I trials. 
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However, though this may seem intuitive, the significant differences between the medical 
practice context and the medical research context must give us pause.
210
   
 While full competence cannot be an accurate depiction of the level of competence 
required of terminally ill individuals in order to be able to provide an ethical informed 
consent for participation in medical research, it shall be argued that the level of 
competence required must be greater than that required of them in medical practice 
decision making.
211
 This will be demonstrated with a threefold argument analyzing the 
previously mentioned three significant differences between medical practice and medical 
research and their relation to the claim that a higher level of competence requirement is 
needed in the medical research as opposed to the medical practice context. We shall 
proceed by examining each difference in turn. 
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healthy counterparts. For example Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso produced a study that demonstrated 
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 It is crucial to realize that the argument being advanced here is not the controversial and previously 
refuted idea that a higher degree of competence is required when the risks associated with the decision are 
greater, as would be suggested by the risk based sliding strategy. Refer back to Chapter Two for a full 
explanation and refutation of such a theory. Instead the claim here will involve a demonstration that 
satisfying the sub-abilities that constitute competence, namely understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and 
voluntariness, becomes more difficult in the medical research as opposed to the medical practice context 
for terminally ill persons. If true, then the claim that the medical research decision-making context requires 
a greater level of competence for ethical informed consent follows logically and becomes a mere tautology 
rather than a controversial claim. 
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Difference 1: Relationship between Researcher and Subject versus Physician and Patient 
 It must firstly be recognized that the nature of the relationship between a 
researcher and subject fundamentally differs from that between a physician and patient. 
Specifically, the loyalty that a physician is thought to have toward a patient is not present 
between a researcher and subject. Though fidelity is not as often cited, as autonomy or 
beneficence is, as one of the fundamental moral principles in health care and research, its 
value in medical ethics cannot be ignored.
212
 “Professional fidelity, or loyalty, has been 
traditionally conceived as giving the patient’s interests priority in two respects: (1) the 
professional effaces self-interest in any situation that may conflict with the patient’s 
interests, and (2) the professional favors the patient’s interests over others’ interests.”213 
This formulation of a physician’s obligation of fidelity to the patient can be seen as more 
of an ideal, and often in practice the obligation is not as strict. For example, “caring for 
patients in epidemics has often been considered praiseworthy and virtuous rather than an 
obligatory instance of fidelity.”214 However, despite this, the distinction between the 
physician/patient relationship and the researcher/subject relationship should become 
apparent. For the researcher is not thought to have even a non-idealistic version of such 
an obligation.
215
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 In fact some have argued that a moral norm of fidelity in medical ethics arises as a specific application 
of one or more of the commonly assumed four fundamental principles in medicine, namely: respect for 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. For example respecting the autonomy of a patient 
may involve disclosing certain facts or potential conflicts of interest that would not only enable a patient to 
make an autonomous decision, but would also demonstrate a loyalty to the patient by placing her interests 
above other interests. 
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 Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p. 311.  
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 Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p. 311. 
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 It should be realized that the researcher does have some obligation to the subject insofar as the subject is 
a person with inviolable human rights, but this is far from establishing anything akin to the obligation of 
fidelity that exists in the physician/patient relationship.  
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 The reason for this difference in relationship relates to the differing goals between 
the physician and the researcher. The primary goal and aim of medical practice is 
intended to benefit the patient, whereas the primary aim of medical research is not 
intended to benefit the subject. More specifically, recalling our distinction from Chapter 
One: 
 ‘practice’ refers to interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-
 being of an individual patient or client and that have a reasonable expectation of 
 success. The purpose of medical or behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, 
 preventive treatment, or therapy to particular individuals. By contrast, the term 
 ‘research’ designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit 
 conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable 
 knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, principles, and statements of 
 relationships)…216  
 
Thus while the physician’s and patient’s interests are thought to align, the same cannot be 
said regarding the researcher’s and subject’s interests.217 As a result, the method and 
administration of medical interventions in research differs significantly from that 
performed in medical practice. Certain methodologies in research such as randomization, 
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 It should be noted that some current medical practices represent a departure from this notion of 
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can be said that therefore even physicians in the therapeutic medical practice context face conflicts of 
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recognized that these cases represent a departure from typical therapeutic medical practice. Thus, even 
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with their physician. 
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placebo controls, and double blinding, all demonstrate that in research as opposed to 
medical practice, the subject’s wellbeing and interests are not primary.218 
 “In randomized clinical trials, for instance, research subjects are randomly 
assigned to one of two (or more) treatments that are being compared (or, when treatment 
is compared to placebo, to either treatment or placebo). In clinical care, by contrast, 
treatment is most often geared towards the particular treatment needs of individual 
patients, as determined in consultation with an individual physician.”219 Furthermore, the 
requirement that clinical trials be double blind entails that neither the subject nor 
investigating physician knows what medical intervention the subject is receiving. These 
approaches have become a necessary way to guarantee the integrity of the research by 
ensuring that the conclusions drawn from the trials are without bias. However, the use of 
the randomization and double blinding methodologies demonstrate that indeed the 
interests of the research are placed above the interests of the subjects, representing a clear 
departure from ordinary medical practice.
220
 It may additionally be noted that in many 
cases, participating in a research trial may preclude a subject from taking other 
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potentially beneficial medicines and drugs external to the research trial as that may 
interfere with the results of the research.
221
 
 It should thus be clear that research trials employ “several methodological 
requirements that threaten to undermine the traditional medical ethic of undivided 
physician loyalty to the individual patient.”222 Some ethical guidelines have attempted to 
combat this problem by proposing certain principles that would require researchers to 
treat subjects’ individual interests as primary. For example the American Medical 
Association asserts that “in conducting clinical investigation, the investigator should 
demonstrate the same concern and caution for the welfare, safety, and comfort of the 
person involved as is required of a physician who is furnishing medical care to a patient 
independent of any clinical investigation.”223 However, this type of guideline and ethical 
principle is impractical and infeasible as the very structure of the medical research 
enterprise rests on methods which by their very nature conflict with any obligation to 
treat a subject’s interest as primary and certainly diverges from a physician’s duty to be 
loyal to patients and provide best care for their wellbeing.  
 Based on the methods used in clinical research, it becomes clear that the interests 
of investigators in the research context differ significantly from those of physicians in the 
medical practice context and thus the relationship between a physician and patient is 
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 Furthermore, in some medical research situations, even if a subject is experiencing therapeutic benefit 
from the experimental non-validated intervention in the medical trial, the medical intervention may be 
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significantly different from that between a researcher and subject. However some further 
elaboration regarding the specific interests present in research may further demonstrate 
how drastically the physician/patient relationship differs from the researcher/subject 
relationship. 
 Within medical research, the primary interest is often one or both of the 
following: I) to benefit the financial interests of the company who funds the research
224
 or 
II) to benefit society as a whole.
225
 Each of these interests may conflict with the interests 
of the subject. Though this may seem clear in the case of financial interests, the conflict 
similarly arises when the primary interest of the researcher is to benefit society by 
contributing to scientific knowledge. Where research is done in the name of providing 
benefit to society then accordingly, these “responsibilities to future generations may 
conflict with due care for current patients who become research subjects.”226 This leads to 
a crucial distinction, being that “the prospective subject should be informed that in 
research, in contrast with practice, the subject will be at least in part a means and perhaps 
primarily a means to an end identified by someone else.”227 
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medical research. “Pharmaceutical companies and contract research organizations (“CROs”) now play a 
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 Furthermore, that the researcher’s and subject’s interests do not align, and that 
thus the subject will be at least in part treated as a means, increases the possibility of 
corruption, misuse, and abuse in the research case. Since achieving the goals of research 
may conflict with the subject’s own interest, there is an added incentive for researchers, 
which is not present in medical practice, to tend to ignore or diminish a subject’s rights or 
interests in favour of the aims of the research. In fact, “there is ample historical evidence 
to suggest that researchers’ interests in the results of research may at times lead to the 
neglect of the rights and interests of research participants… [Apart from the often cited 
medical experimentation that occurred during the Nazi regime, and the Apotex case cited 
previously], the names ‘Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital,’ ‘Tuskeegee’ [sic] 
and ‘Willowbrook’ are enshrined in medical history as examples”228 of the kind of 
unethical conduct that may transpire in research when a gross neglect of the research 
subject’s rights and interests occurs. This neglect of a research subject’s interests occurs 
in order to advance the conflicting interests of the research. It must be recognized that 
this type of conflict of interest is not present in standard medical practice.
229
 Thus, a 
significantly different relationship exists between researcher and subject as opposed to 
physician and patient, specifically a relationship where interests are not thought to align 
versus a relationship where the interests do align, respectively.  
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the interests of research subjects.  
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 This difference in relationship suggests that a greater level of competence is 
needed in medical research decision making. For since the researcher and subject may 
have conflicting interests, the subject must be that much more competent in order to be 
able to receive what the researcher tells her with a healthy skepticism, be able to 
effectively evaluate the situation on her own, and be confident enough with her 
knowledge of the situation to be able to challenge the researcher’s advice or opinion if 
the situation should warrant it. Thus it would seem that at least a higher level of the 
appreciation and reasoning elements of competence would be necessary in the medical 
research as opposed to the therapeutic medical practice context. 
 
Difference 2: The Potential for Exploitation of the Situation or Mental State of 
Terminally Ill Subjects 
 
 “Some persons report feeling heavily pressured to enroll in clinical trials”230 by 
the situation they are faced with. Thus, though some would argue that many of these 
enrollments may still technically classify as voluntary, since the person involved may 
have still made the choice without being under the direct control of another’s 
influence,
231
 the degree to which the choice is voluntary seems greatly diminished by 
heavy pressures. For the terminally ill individual seeking a miracle cure, this may seem 
obvious. It should be noted that being in such a situation in and of itself is not sufficient 
to characterize the medical research context as making voluntary choice more difficult 
than in medical practice, especially since even in medical practice, one’s particular illness 
may pressure him to choose surgery or medicine that he would not otherwise have 
considered. Benjamin Freedman correctly distinguishes between choices forced by man 
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and choices forced by nature, where only the former necessarily undermine voluntariness 
in a morally significant way. For it ought to be: 
 granted that natural contingencies (‘acts of God,’ things which come to pass 
 naturally, those contingencies which we cannot hold anyone responsible for) do 
 not render a person unfree, nor do they render unfree the choices which a person 
 makes in light of those contingencies…I am not - in the morally relevant sense – 
 lacking in freedom because I cannot, unaided, fly through the air, or live on grass. 
 Nor am I unfree because my heart is about to give out. Nor am I unfree when, 
 recognizing that my heart may give out, I choose to undergo surgery.
232
 
 
However, though “the situation may not necessarily render choices less voluntary… it 
suggests that seriously ill patients may be particularly vulnerable to unrealistic 
enticements and manipulation of hope.”233 This may be especially true for the terminally 
ill individual. It appears that the unfortunate situation that confronts this person is such 
that he may feel that the research trial is the only choice available. This may be as a result 
of financial constraints that make such a patient view participation in the research trial as 
the only way to gain access to medical resources,
234
 or due to viewing his situation as so 
hopeless that out of desperation he inappropriately views the research trial as a miracle 
cure. 
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 The second significant difference between the medical research and therapeutic 
medical practice context which will demonstrate that for the terminally ill a greater level 
of competence is required in making decisions about the former, therefore relates to the 
possibly exploitable situation or mental state of the terminally ill person. The lack of 
access to necessary medical resources due to a poor financial situation or the possible 
desperate mental state of the terminally ill person can facilitate an environment where 
decisions are made without an adequate level of voluntariness and where the potential for 
exploitation arises. We may proceed by examining each issue in turn. 
 “The problem of exploitation centers on whether solicited persons are 
situationally disadvantaged and without viable alternatives, feel forced or compelled to 
accept attractive offers that they otherwise would not accept, and assume increased risk in 
their lives.”235 This appears to pertain quite aptly to the terminally ill subject who is 
unable to afford medical care.  
 Some subjects of research interviewed as part of the President’s Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) alluded to being motivated to 
participate in research for financial reasons. One “respondent with breast cancer stated 
plainly that she, as someone without health insurance, had enrolled in research to get 
treatment and ‘didn't have to worry about trying to pay something back later on’.”236 
While few respondents in this study were as specific in citing monetary reasons for 
consenting to participate in the research, many insinuated it by alleging that they were 
motivated to participate in order to acquire care that would have otherwise been 
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unaffordable. Another respondent, for example “commented that since doctors at the 
military hospital where he received his care were very busy, he could receive closer 
attention and obtain appointments more easily by enrolling in research.”237 This type of 
“inducement that may arise from a monetary incentive is commonly acknowledged as a 
threat to an individual’s ability to freely volunteer and to act on behalf of his or her best 
interest.”238 
 Unfortunately this motivation for entering into a clinical trial is not limited to only 
a few examples, but as an article in the New York Times reported, has become fairly 
pervasive in the United States. The article spoke of Ms. Danforth, a:  
 chronically ill [woman] with limited or no health insurance, relying on clinical 
 trials by private doctors as their primary source of medical care. For these people, 
 experiments have become treatments; clinical investigators are their specialists. 
 … Even people with insurance plans that impose significant restrictions -- like 
 managed care programs that require pre-approval to visit a specialist -- are 
 circumventing the gatekeepers by seeking out clinical trials, researchers said. “A 
 lot of patients tell me that they feel frustrated with the care that they receive from 
 the H.M.O.,” said Dr. Norman Zinner, a Los Angeles doctor who heads Affiliated 
 Research Centers, an organization of private-practice urologists who do drug 
 studies.
239
 
 
 This issue is further exacerbated for the terminally ill who may have unusually 
high health care costs associated with their remaining days, and who may further feel 
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compelled to enter into a clinical trial in order to avoid being a financial burden on their 
family.
240
 
 It would be a mistake to assume that countries such as Canada, where health care 
is publicly funded, are immune to such a problem. Even where health care costs are 
covered, patients may still mistakenly view the clinical trial as the best or only way to 
obtain the most current and optimal health care. Thus, though the possible exploitation of 
the economic situation and need for medical care of the terminally ill subject is of 
concern, the potential desperate mental state of such individuals may further be a factor 
in undermining the voluntariness and thus competence with which a decision is made.  
 As the ACHRE demonstrated, “most patients reported that they had joined a 
research project to get better treatment… and because being in research gave them 
hope.”241 Desperation and feelings of hope often form the primary motivation of 
terminally ill individuals upon joining a clinical trial. Many such subjects of research 
have: 
 remarked that they had joined because they believed that they had “no choice,” 
 meaning they had no medical alternatives. [One subject remarked] “my doctor 
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 told me if I do not take the drug, in a couple of months I ... [will] ... die. So, I 
 had no choice. Who wants to die? Nobody.” Another respondent said, “I had one 
 more option as he [the doctor] put it.” Hope and desperation pervaded the remarks 
 of many terminally ill patients. Patients said they wanted to “try anything” or that 
 this was their “last resort.” One man explained, “Well, what was driving me to 
 say 'yes' was the hope that this drug would work. ... When you reach that stage ... 
 and somebody offered that something that could probably save you, you sort of 
 make a grab of it, and that's what I did.”242    
 
A painful terminal illness may render an individual as feeling particularly desperate. As 
some studies have shown, pain has an “indirect effect on trial participation, as it leads to a 
higher perceived severity of illness, which in turn affects the feeling of urgency, which 
subsequently increases the probability that a patient will participate”243 in the clinical 
trial. 
 Some may object that such desperation and hopefulness does not undermine 
voluntary and thus competent decision making in any type of morally relevant manner. 
Such a critic may further point out that apart from the medical research context, we often 
make, what are deemed as competent decisions, based on our emotions including 
desperation. This may be particularly true of a terminally ill patient who consents to a 
risky therapeutic procedure. However, the main problem in the medical research context 
is that this type of desperate or hopeful mental state may render one especially vulnerable 
to manipulations of hope, and that such manipulations or deceptions would themselves 
undermine voluntary and thus competent decision making. Unfortunately some tactics 
used by investigators do exploit such a state of mind.  
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 Sometimes the hopeful and desperate thinking of terminally ill participants allows 
them to construe research as merely a new and possibly revolutionary therapy.
244
 
Researchers can and have exploited this in their recruitment process. As Mark 
Hochhauser has pointed out, many research trials now have a ‘brand name’ which often 
serves to manipulate potential subjects of research. Examples include names such as 
‘MIRACL’ or ‘SAVED’ which are actually acronyms.245 However, it is clear from these 
types of brand names that “the clinical trial’s ‘brand’ is not just a convenient but 
meaningless acronym, but often an acronym that may subliminally suggest a particular 
perspective on the trial.”246  
 A simpler tactic often employed by researchers relates to the manner in which 
they discuss the research trial with potential subjects. One subject of research described 
the recruitment strategy “in these words: It was almost as if they were courting me… 
everything was presented in the best possible light.”247 It has also been noted that 
sometimes “professional pressure can lead researchers to underestimate inconvenience 
and hazard, misleading volunteers in the process.”248  
 These types of tactics, coupled with the possibly desperate state of mind of a 
terminally ill potential subject creates a dangerously competence undermining cocktail. It 
must be recognized that researchers presenting the information in such a way so as to 
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downplay the negatives and emphasize the positives constitutes a manipulative tactic that 
desperate and hopeful terminally ill persons may be susceptible to, and may undermine 
the level of voluntariness regarding the decision to participate. 
 Thus, it seems apparent, given these concerns of possible exploitation, that 
voluntariness becomes a more difficult condition of competence for some to satisfy in the 
medical research as opposed to medical practice context.
249
 This is especially true if 
researchers employ deceptive and manipulative tactics. The misconceptions about 
research that these tactics seem to promote are the subject of the third salient difference 
between the medical practice and medical research context. 
 
Difference 3: The Therapeutic Misconception 
 
 As previously mentioned the phenomenon whereby subjects of medical research 
misconstrue the research trial as therapeutic practice is known as the therapeutic 
misconception. Recalling the distinction between the two and specifically how divergent 
the goals between medical research and medical practice are, it seems clear that such a 
misconception is seriously problematic.
250
 For it may not only demonstrate a lack of the 
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requisite understanding needed by the subject in order for him to possess the substantial 
competence required for ethical informed consent, but this misconception may also 
significantly influence and unreasonably sway a person’s decision to partake in the 
research in the first place. 
 Unfortunately this misconception is a widespread problem. Many research 
subjects incorrectly see:  
       No conflict between the goals of research and treatment, especially when the 
 researcher is also their treating physician. They expect the research to help them, 
 not harm them. Some may even think that they’re getting state-of-the-art 
 treatment, a drug that’s so new (and so effective) that other people don’t yet have 
 access to it.
251
 
 
A study conducted on research participants carried out by the ACHRE provides empirical 
support for this claim. In an in depth subject interview study it was found that subjects’:  
 research experiences…were inextricably interwoven with their medical care 
 experiences. One respondent described her research experience “as a means of 
 treating what I have”…Most patients reported that they had joined a research 
 project to get better treatment… [In fact] when asked to describe the research 
 project they were in, most of the patient-subjects we talked with described the 
 project as part of their therapy.
252
 
 
Other research has demonstrated that cancer patients consenting to participate in clinical 
trials have expectations of therapeutic benefit that exceed those of their physicians.
253
 In 
fact some studies have further shown that:  
 “Cancer patients who participate in phase I trials are strongly motivated by the 
 hope of therapeutic benefit.
254
 Altruistic feelings appear to have a limited and 
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 Hochhauser, 2002, p. 11. 
252
 The President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, “Chapter 16: Subject Interview 
Study” in Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). 
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 Neal Meropol, Kevin Weinfurt, Caroline Burnett et al. “Perceptions of Patients and Physicians 
Regarding Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials: Implications for Physician-Patient Communication” Journal of 
Clinical Oncology, Vol. 21(13), 2003, pp. 2589-2596. 
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 More specifically one study revealed that “eighty-five percent of patients decided to participate in a 
phase I trial for reasons of possible therapeutic benefit” (C. Daugherty, M.J. Ratain, E. Grochowski, C. 
Stocking, E. Kodish, R. Mick, M. Siegler. “Perceptions of Cancer Patients and Their Physicians Involved 
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 inconsequential role in motivating patients to participate in these trials. Cancer 
 patients who participate in phase I trials appear to have an adequate self-perceived 
 knowledge of the risks of investigational agents. However, only a minority of 
 patients appear to have an adequate understanding of the purpose of phase I trials 
 as dose-escalation/dose-determination studies.”255 
 
 The presence of the therapeutic misconception among research subjects becomes 
even more worrisome with the recognition that it affects not just persons who are easily 
susceptible to suggestions or that generally lack understanding in most contexts, but it 
also affects persons who may have exhibited high levels of competence throughout their 
medical history. For example, in a separate study a:  
 Subject was a twenty-five-year-old woman with three years of college. At the 
 time of the interview, she had minimal psychiatric symptoms and her 
 understanding of the research was generally excellent. She recognized that the 
 purpose of the project was to find out which treatment worked best for her group 
 of patients. She spontaneously described the three groups, including the placebo 
 group, and indicated that assignment would be at random. She understood that 
 dosages would be adjusted according to blood levels and that a double blind 
 would be used. When asked directly, however, how her medicine would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Phase I Trials” Journal of Clinical Oncology, Vol. 13(5), pp. 1062-72, 1995, p.1062). Manish Agrawal 
and Ezekiel Emanuel have recently contended however, that such a motivation, or even the belief that one 
may get therapeutic benefit from phase I trials, despite typically low response rates and poor risk/benefit 
ratios in such studies, does not actually represent a misunderstanding. They claim that “the fact that patients 
participate primarily for the chance of benefit is often seen as indicative of a deficiency in comprehension. 
Yet [they argue], this interpretation fails to recognize that patients could very well comprehend their 
limited chance for personal benefit and still hope that they may actually benefit” (Manish Agrawal and 
Ezekiel Emanuel. “Phase 1 Oncology Research” In The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, 
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Christine Grady, Robert A. Crouch, Reidar K. Lie, Franklin G. Miller, and David 
Wendler, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 356-367, 2008) p. 365). Indeed, the authors go on to 
contend that current evidence shows that despite the majority of subjects enrolling for therapeutic benefit, 
many can sometimes recognize that the chances might be low but believe that “they might be in the lucky 
group” (Agrawal and Emanuel, p. 366). The authors then argue that phase I studies may be defended by 
arguing that current data may not necessarily show that phase I research participants have a 
misunderstanding, but instead may “have a form of adaptive denial” (Agrawal and Emanuel, p. 366). 
However, even if this assessment is correct, it does little to quell the overall concerns regarding competence 
or more specifically the issue of the therapeutic misconception. Indeed, we are still left with a good reason 
to question the competence of these subjects to provide consent, though now for a slightly differently 
labeled reason. This may instead suggest that subjects might understand, but still fail to adequately 
appreciate what the information actually means for them. Furthermore, as will be contended in the 
remainder of this section, even possessing some understanding regarding the research, the therapeutic 
misconception may still persist, as potential subjects may continue to view the research as their personal 
therapy. It should be noted that Agrawal and Emanuel also further contend that the risk/benefit ratio of 
phase I oncology trials is actually not as poor as typically assumed. However, more details regarding their 
argument and the actual response rates of phase I oncology trials will be provided in Chapter Four. 
255
 Daugherty et al., 1995, p. 1062. Refer back to Chapter One for a full explanation of Phase I trials. 
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 selected, she said she had no idea. She then added, “I hope it isn’t by chance,” and 
 suggested that each subject would probably receive the medication she needed.
256
 
 
This case shows that despite even high levels of understanding about research, and a high 
level of cognitive ability, “the subject’s conviction that the investigators would be acting 
in her best interests led to a distortion of an important element of the experimental 
procedure and therefore of the risk-benefit analysis.”257 This demonstrates that the 
therapeutic misconception can affect all persons, not just those who appear gullible or 
often demonstrate low levels of intelligence and understanding. In fact, the Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments found that, despite the fact that when 
asked, “patients appeared to clearly understand which interventions were associated 
specifically with the research, they also conceived of the research as their medical 
treatment.”258 
 There are various reasons for why the therapeutic misconception exists, and how 
it became so prevalent. A complete overview of these reasons would require an 
examination beyond the scope of our current discussion; however a brief overview might 
prove instructive. 
 Firstly, manipulative tactics employed by researchers may contribute to the 
therapeutic misconception. As previously mentioned, the brand names of clinical trials 
often inappropriately suggest that a trial will have therapeutic benefit. For example, some 
of the names used such as MIRACL, SAVED, RESCUE, and ALIVE,
259
 all seem to be 
designed in order to influence the prospective subject’s assessment of the non validated 
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U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). 
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 Hochhauser, 2002, pp. 11-12. 
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drug or procedure. The goal behind such a brand naming technique seems specifically to 
be to bolster and reinforce the therapeutic misconception. 
 The use of language by researchers and by authors can also contribute to the 
therapeutic misconception. “The term ‘therapeutic research’ should be avoided, because 
it can draw attention away from the fact that research is being conducted… Attaching the 
positive term ‘therapeutic’ to research suggests ‘justified intervention’ in the care of 
particular patients”260 and only facilitates the environment where research can be 
confused with therapeutic practice. It must be recognized that not only researchers need 
to avoid this terminology, but similarly authors ought to do the same. Publishing 
literature that attempts to disguise research as therapy only serves to further exacerbate 
this problem.
261
 Apart from misusing the term ‘therapy’ or ‘therapeutic’, it is equally 
important to not refer to research participants as patients.
262
 Though some may be 
hesitant to refer to them as subjects, since that term may seem to belittle and make 
participants feel like ‘guinea pigs’, it is sometimes important to do so in order to draw a 
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 Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 318. 
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 See, for example: Mortimer Lipsett. “On the Nature and Ethics of Phase I Clinical Trials of Cancer 
Chemotherapies” Journal of the American Medical Association Vol. 248, pp. 941-942, 1982. In this article, 
Lipsett claims in reference to Phase I research trials that “first, there is always therapeutic intent.” This is 
not only misleading but represents a clear example of how terminology usage can play a role in 
contributing to the therapeutic misconception. As previously mentioned, “personalized attention 
characteristic of medical therapy is lacking in clinical trials that provide treatment according to a scientific 
protocol. This makes it misleading to characterize such treatment as therapeutic in intent” (Franklin Miller 
and Howard Brody. “What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials Unethical?” The American Journal of 
Bioethics, Vol. 2(2), 2002, p. 6). 
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 Again, it is imperative that authors as well as researchers refrain from this misleading terminology 
usage. See for example: Miller and Brody, 2002, p. 4. In this article Miller and Brody suggest that 
researchers “seek to answer clinically relevant scientific questions by conducting experiments that test the 
safety and efficacy of treatments in groups of patients” (Miller and Brody, 2002, p.4). This 
mischaracterization further obfuscates the distinction between medical research and therapeutic practice 
and allows the therapeutic misconception to flourish.   
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clear distinction between those undergoing medical practice and those taking part in 
research.
263
  
  Another reason that shall be highlighted for why the therapeutic misconception 
exists, is the confusion between physicians and researchers. For:  
 Much of contemporary medicine takes place in health care institutions, which 
 makes it difficult to distinguish clearly the roles and responsibilities of physicians 
 from those of investigators. …Research and treatment are often carried out 
 simultaneously, as, for example, when research is designed to evaluate a 
 particular therapeutic intervention and involves persons who suffer from an illness 
 the intervention is designed to treat. [As mentioned previously] the task of 
 distinguishing research from treatment is further complicated by the frequent 
 usage of the term ‘therapeutic research’ which obfuscates the fact that research, 
 unlike therapy, has as an aim the production of generalizable knowledge. Blurring 
 of the distinction between research and therapy is also due in part to some notable 
 departures from standard practice that have often been referred to as 
 ‘experimental’ interventions, particularly by the courts,”264 
 
as for example when a physician attempts an uncertain experimental procedure because 
he believes that it is the only recourse left in order to aid the patient. For individuals to be 
able to distinguish between medical practice and research, it is crucial that they be able to 
distinguish between physicians and researchers. Of course this can be highly problematic 
especially when the researcher is also a subject’s treating physician. Referring to the dual 
nature of the physician/investigator, Trudo Lemmens and Paul Miller ask: “can one really 
expect the research subjects to be aware of such subtle and continuous transformations? 
Jekyll and Hyde wear the same white coat, speak the same language, and handle the same 
instruments. They seem the mirror image of one another to the unsuspecting patient.”265  
Jay Katz “encourages physician investigators to see themselves as scientists only and not 
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and Regulation of Clinical Research 2
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 Downie et al., 2002, pp. 459-460. 
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 Trudo Lemmens & Paul Miller. “Avoiding a Jekyll-and-Hyde Approach to the Ethics of Clinical 
Research and Practice” The American Journal of Bioethics, Vol.2(2), pp.14-17, 2002, pp.15-16. 
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as doctors. Only by adopting this univocal self-image, he suggests, will investigators be 
able to avoid unwittingly becoming ‘double agents’.”266 
 Though this is by no means an exhaustive list of why the therapeutic 
misconception exists, it begins to demonstrate why it is so prevalent in our society. As 
Rebecca Dresser asserts, “in this environment, it would be shocking if patients were not 
affected by the therapeutic misconception.”267 The above discussion also begins to 
illustrate how undermined a potential subject’s understanding and appreciation of 
research might be. It should thus seem clear that satisfying these criteria of competence is 
more difficult in the medical research as opposed to the medical practice context for the 
terminally ill. More specifically, understanding and appreciation should at least be great 
enough in order to be able to overcome the high potential for the therapeutic 
misconception.
268
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 Some may point out that a version of the therapeutic misconception occurs at times in standard medical 
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 It is thus quite clear, based on all three salient differences between the medical 
research and the medical practice context, namely the difference in relationship between 
the physician/patient and the researcher/subject, the exploitable situation and mental state 
of the terminally ill, and the presence of the therapeutic misconception, that the 
conditions of competence each become more difficult to satisfy in the medical research 
context. As has been demonstrated, each difference relates to a greater need for one or 
more of the elements of competence, specifically understanding, appreciation, reasoning 
and voluntariness, in order for a terminally ill person to be sufficiently competent to 
provide informed consent to participate in medical research. Thus, since a greater level of 
each of these elements of competence is required, it thus follows that a greater level of 
competence as a whole is necessary for a terminally ill person to be able to consent to 
medical research participation. Specifically a potential subject must be that much more 
competent in order to be able to steer clear of all the influences and potential for 
misconceptions that would render her competence less than substantial and thus 
unsuitable for providing consent. 
 Given that a greater level of competence is needed for the terminally ill to provide 
consent to participate in medical research trials, the question now becomes, how great a 
level of competence is required, and how should we test for this competence. These 
                                                                                                                                                 
Frequency and Risk Factors” IRB: Ethics and Human Research, Vol. 26 (2), pp.1-8, 2004, p.2). The 
therapeutic misconception in medical practice, on the other hand, does not appear as powerful, as little to 
no evidence exists demonstrating that it poses the same threat to one’s competence or that it is influential 
enough to persuade a patient to make a choice that he would not have otherwise made. Therefore, despite 
the existence of a therapeutic misconception in standard medical practice, the misconception in research is 
of a fundamentally different kind, and thus the assertion that it represents a serious difference between the 
medical research and medical practice context, remains intact. The misconception present in medical 
practice might be better labeled as therapeutic optimism, so as to distinguish it from the type of severely 
competence hindering therapeutic misconception present in the medical research context. (I am grateful to 
Professor Joel Lexchin for bringing to my attention the presence of the therapeutic misconception in 
standard medical practice). 
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questions will be addressed in Chapters Four and Five respectively. However, prior to 
engaging with these issues, three objections to the above argument need to be addressed. 
These three objections include the concern that this greater competence requirement 
amounts to an unjustifiable hard paternalism, that the proposal for a greater level of 
competence in research accomplishes nothing more than the already rejected risk based 
sliding scale approach that was criticized in Chapter Two, and that, as Benjamin 
Freedman has written, an ignorant consent to participate in medical research might be 
ethically justifiable. We shall proceed by addressing each challenge in turn.    
 
The Paternalism Objection  
 
 If the above assessment is correct, and the medical research context indeed 
requires a greater level of competence for consent than the medical practice context for 
terminally ill individuals, then it appears that the implication of this is that some of the 
research subjects who are currently being permitted to enter into a research trial should 
not be so permitted, as their consent may not be competent.
269
  
 Do governments or individual medical researchers ever have the right to override 
a potential subject’s decision to enroll in a medical research trial? This was one of the 
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 Though the immediate issue appears to be that this would lead to there being too few subjects for 
research and that this would therefore slow medical research to a standstill, various suggestions and 
proposals exist which if implemented would better enable competence amongst research subjects. Thus the 
concern that medical research trials would grind to a halt is one that can be largely mitigated with the 
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to be able to provide informed consent. While this is only one brief suggestion, it demonstrates the 
possibility of being able to find ways to improve the competency environment currently surrounding 
terminally ill research subjects and thus maintain substantial enrollment numbers for medical research. 
These types of proposals will be looked at in more depth in the following chapters. 
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issues that arose in a 2007 U.S. court case
270
 where it was determined that there is no 
constitutional right to access experimental drugs or participate in experimental medical 
research. The issue of paternalism re-emerges here. For if indeed governments and 
perhaps even medical researchers are permitted to usurp the decision making authority 
from an individual in the research context, then either a form of hard paternalism that 
disrespects individual autonomy is being advocated, or this usurping of decision making 
authority is actually a form of soft paternalism.
271
  
 In the 2007 court case Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, it was decided that there 
does not exist any constitutional right for even competent persons to accept any level of 
risk to access experimental drugs or procedures. In a popular dissent, Judge Judith Rogers 
claimed that:   
 In the end, it is startling that the oft-limited rights to marry, to fornicate, to have 
 children, to control the education and upbringing of children, to perform varied 
 sexual acts in private, and to control one's own body even if it results in one's own 
 death or the death of a fetus have all been deemed fundamental rights ... but the 
 right to try to save one's life is left out in the cold despite its textual anchor in the 
 right to life. This alone is reason the court should pause…272 
 
Though a very powerful dissenting opinion, it must be recognized that nothing that has 
been argued here falls prey to this type of argument. This dissenting opinion which has 
garnered much support, attacks the hard paternalistic decision made by the courts which 
prevents even competent persons from entering into certain medical research.  
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 It should be noted that the 2007 court case did not distinguish between the two forms of paternalism, and 
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Eschenbach, p. 28 of the dissenting opinion). However, what has been argued here does not follow the 
same pitfall. For as shall be demonstrated the arguments here are at most only committed to a soft 
paternalism.  
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 Alternatively, the arguments presented here in no way suggest that competent 
persons should be prevented from enrolling in medical research, but rather only that the 
amount of competence required to make such a decision and to be able to provide 
informed consent may be greater than previously thought, and specifically greater than 
the amount of competence required to make decisions in the medical practice context for 
terminally ill persons. As a result of this, it does become the case that some individuals 
who may have previously been thought of as substantially competent, might now, in light 
of the higher standard, be seen as falling below the minimum required level of 
competence needed to consent. However, preventing these individuals from enrolling in 
medical research trials only amounts to a soft and justifiable paternalism since these 
individuals fall short of satisfying the required level competence necessary for 
participating in medical research. It is important to stress that therefore any paternalism 
that may result from the argument here only amounts to a justifiable soft paternalism. For 
if indeed one lacks sufficient competence in a particular context, then allowing that 
individual to make decisions on such a matter cannot be viewed as any respect for 
autonomy and rights, but instead as a lack of regard for the well-being of that person. 
Thus, despite the fact that as a result of what has been argued here, some persons will no 
longer be admitted into medical research, since there will be persons that fall below the 
new higher threshold of competence required in the medical research context, only soft 
paternalism is being employed. Therefore, objections against hard paternalism do not 
affect the present argument. 
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Is this Different than the Risk Based Sliding Scale? 
 
 The risk based sliding scale approach to competence, discussed in Chapter Two, 
suggested that the required competence for a decision should shift depending on the risk 
present in the decision. The riskier a decision is, the greater the amount of competence 
ought to be for making such a decision. It would therefore seem that both my proposal 
here and the sliding scale strategy that was rejected in Chapter Two, might be seen as 
accomplishing the same goal, namely raising the level of competence required in certain 
medical research decision making contexts for terminally ill persons. Thus one may 
wonder if there is any difference between the two approaches, and why the sliding scale 
should be rejected while this proposal accepted. To this there appear two clear retorts. 
First, as we may recall the sliding scale strategy may not be as successful as one may 
intuitively think at necessitating a higher level of competence in the medical research 
context. It gives the illusion of requiring a raised level of competence for medical 
research participation decisions since many assume those decisions to be especially risky, 
but as demonstrated in Chapter Two, this assumption is false. As argued previously, 
given a proper demarcation of therapeutic risks from research risks and combining that 
with the principle of clinical equipoise,
273
 it is clear that the sliding scale strategy 
provides little ground for raising the level of competence needed in the medical research 
context.  
 Second, it was also demonstrated that there were numerous issues and possible 
ethical pitfalls with the sliding scale approach that are not present with the proposal here. 
While the sliding scale approach allowed for a raising of the required standard of 
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 This principle requires that there exist genuine uncertainty among the clinical community regarding the 
relative merits of the arms being tested in the trial. For a full explanation of clinical equipoise or the proper 
demarcation between therapeutic and research risks, refer back to Chapter Two. 
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competence by medical professionals to a possibly unachievable level, and thus enabled 
an unjustifiable hard paternalism,
274
 the proposal outlined here in Chapter Three does 
nothing of the sort. In fact what is being suggested here merely asserts that given the 
definition of competence as being context relative, and given the differences between the 
medical practice and medical research context, it is clear that the latter context requires a 
higher level of competence for decision making than the former, for terminally ill 
persons. It is a logically derived conclusion, a mere tautology true simply by virtue of the 
definition of competence and the nature of medical research compared to the nature of the 
medical practice. This makes what is being argued here less likely to be subjected to the 
abuses that were discussed as being related to the sliding scale. Furthermore, as 
previously argued, using risk to determine competency is arbitrary, and proper 
competency determinations must be based on a consideration of the elements that 
comprise competence. Only in this manner can we expect evaluations of competence to 
be consistent and accurately reflect the decision making capacity of individuals. The 
proposal here thus provides protection for terminally ill subjects of research by ensuring 
that they possess the necessary competence for an ethical and autonomy preserving 
consent, while managing to avoid the conceptual and ethical pitfalls associated with the 
sliding scale strategy.  
 
 
What about an Ignorant Consent?  
 
 The final potential objection that shall be considered involves considering a 
proposal initially put forth by Benjamin Freedman which suggests, contrary to what has 
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be denied the right to act as they wish based simply on the physician’s subjective interpretation of how 
much risk one should be permitted to accept.   
 122 
 
been argued here, the legitimacy of an ignorant consent to participate in medical 
research.
275
  
 Ignorant consent involves a person who waives the informational component 
associated with consent. Thus, “an ignorant consent is offered when an individual 
consents in violation of the common informational components required by reasonable 
people.”276 Freedman offers the following thought experiment: 
 Consider an individual, Brown, undergoing invasive electrophysiological studies 
 for clinical reasons. He is a candidate for concurrent noninvasive research; e.g., 
 his body-surface will be ‘mapped’ electrocardiographically… Upon being invited 
 to participate in a study described to him as posing some discomfort but no 
 intrinsic risk… the subject consents. The investigator indicates that further 
 information is generally provided before the subject makes up his mind: the 
 nature of the experiment, its potential benefits, and so on; but the subject declines 
 to be further informed… [As Freedman elucidates] Brown has clearly consented 
 under conditions of ignorance. Far from being cognizant of such esoterica as the 
 presence of a control group, or the names of the members of the institutional 
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the misconception, whether by inadvertently acting as both physician and investigator, by using misleading 
terminology, by overemphasizing the therapeutic benefit of certain clinical trials, or by brand naming trials 
in order to manipulate subjects’ expectations. Thus, given the large role that researchers have played in 
generating the therapeutic misconception, it is ethically appalling to suggest that they need not be overly 
concerned with it. Sreenivasan also mistakenly argues that subjects are still protected by the fact that they 
“always retain the right not to enrol in a trial or to withdraw from it, even if it has been passed by an 
institutional review board. Even without comprehension, [he adds] individuals are always free to choose 
not to participate in research” (Sreenivasan, 2003, p.2017). However, Sreenivasan fails to realize that this 
protection of being able to refuse to enrol in a trial is at stake when one lacks adequate comprehension and 
is afflicted with the therapeutic misconception. If one is plagued by such misconceptions, it may influence 
him to participate in a trial that he otherwise would not have. Thus it is precisely this protection that is 
threatened by the therapeutic misconception. 
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 review board (IRB) that had approved the protocol, he does not even know the 
 nature and purpose of the research. The only element of which he is aware is that 
 of risk, and even here he is not fully informed
277
.
278
 
 
Is this ignorant consent a legitimate ethical consent? In attempting to demonstrate that it 
could be, Freedman offers three types of argument. We shall engage with each in turn 
and through an analysis notice that each argument has significant shortcomings that 
prevent one from concluding that an ignorant consent could be appropriate in the medical 
research context. 
 The first argument involves the recognition that we already allow for somewhat of 
an ignorant consent in the medical practice setting, and that there are no salient 
differences between the medical practice and research setting that would suggest that the 
same cannot apply in the latter. As Freedman elucidates, in the therapeutic setting it is 
“not unusual for a patient to give his doctor carte blanche to perform any medical 
procedure which the physician deems proper in order to effect a cure. He, [the patient], is 
telling the doctor to act as his agent in choosing which procedure to follow.”279 Given 
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 It should be noted that the term fully informed implies possessing a complete set of information, and is 
often thought of as more of an ideal, but not something that could ever truly be accomplished. Thus 
Freedman perhaps misused the term. Freedman, in attempting to express that even in regards to the one 
element of the research that Brown was somewhat aware of, namely risk, he still knew very little, most 
likely meant to suggest that Brown was not well informed, as opposed to fully informed which instead 
represents a standard that can never be satisfied. Though this may appear as mere semantics, the issue is 
crucial, for if all that is meant by an ignorant consent is one that falls short of full information, then there 
should be very little opposition to Freedman’s proposal. However, Freedman does in fact have something 
far more radical in mind, specifically the idea that an ignorant consent involves one whereby the level of 
information obtained by the consenter falls far below the generally assumed level required by a reasonable 
person prior to providing consent.   
278
 Freedman, 1982, p. 1-2. 
279
 Freedman, 1975, p. 34. The notion of an uninformed consent to medical treatment is not new and many 
have maintained its ethical permissibility. Jessica Berg, Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lids and Lisa Parker for 
example have argued that “informed consent is a right of patients (and subjects) and that as part of that 
right, patients may seek advice from and even share decision making with those whom they trust” (Jessica 
Berg, Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lids and Lisa Parker. Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical 
Practice 2
nd
 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 31). Others have suggested that we 
ought to ensure that patients make their own decisions in matters of health care. See for example: E. Haavi 
Morreim. Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of Medicine’s New Economics. (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1995) pp. 134-139. However, regardless of what one concludes on the matter 
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this, Freedman considers potential differences between the two contexts that would 
justify allowing an ignorant consent for one, but not the other. However, he only 
adequately discusses one difference, namely that “in the therapeutic context it is 
supposed that the physician knows what the sequelae to treatment will be, which 
information, by definition, is not available in the experimental situation.”280 Freedman 
then demonstrates that this distinction is not relevant since an ignorant consent might be 
ethical in the therapeutic-experimental “situation, where a new drug or procedure is 
being attempted to aid the patient”281 and where, similar to the research setting, the 
sequelae are not known. 
 Freedman is certainly correct in asserting that this, knowing the sequelae 
difference, cannot justify allowing an ignorant consent in medical practice, but not in 
research, since as he explains, an ignorant consent might still be valid in the therapeutic-
experimental context where the sequelae are similarly not known. However, it is 
unfortunate that this is the only difference between medical practice and research that 
Freedman discusses. He ignores the three very relevant differences discussed earlier. 
These differences included the relationship difference between the physician/patient and 
the researcher/subject, the potentially exploitable situation or mental state of the 
prospective subject, and the presence of the therapeutic misconception. Each difference 
lends support to the idea that the research context differs significantly from the medical 
practice context with respect to consent and, more specifically as I have argued, with 
respect to the required level of competence needed.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of the ethical permissibility of an uninformed or ignorant consent in medical practice, in what follows it 
shall be contended that the medical research context differs fundamentally such that an uninformed or 
ignorant consent cannot be appropriate, even if it is deemed so in the medical practice context. 
280
 Freedman, 1975, p. 34. 
281
 Freedman, 1975, p. 34. 
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 The first difference is especially relevant in responding to this line of argument 
from Freedman. For it seems that persons are able to give their physicians the authority to 
make their decisions precisely because of the trusting relationship that they have built 
with the physician; a relationship whose foundation is based on the fact that both patient 
and physician have the same goal, specifically the wellness of the patient. However, as 
previously discussed, this type of relationship does not exist between the researcher and 
subject, whose aims differ and often can conflict. Thus, in this context it would seem 
wildly inappropriate to allow for a person to give authority to the researcher to make her 
decisions. It is also for this reason that therapeutic privilege
282
 is deemed appropriate for 
medical practice but “invoking the doctrine of therapeutic privilege to assure a subject’s 
cooperation in a research project is almost never appropriate”283 
 Freedman’s second line of argument suggests that we in fact already allow for 
ignorant consent in the research context. He mentions the cases of placebo 
administration, and blind or double-blind experiments; both of which he claims are based 
on an ignorant consent from subjects. He also provides the example of psychological 
research whereby subjects agree to be deceived in the research.
284
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 Therapeutic privilege is an exception to informed consent that “permits the doctor to withhold 
information when, in his or her judgment, disclosure would be detrimental to the patient’s interests or well-
being” Robert Levine. “Consent Issues in Human Research” In Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical 
Research, Emanuel, Crouch, Arras, Moreno, & Grady, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003) p. 201. 
283
 Levine, p. 201. It should noted that even Berg et al. who as previously mentioned support the ethicality 
of an uninformed consent to therapeutic decisions notice a relevant difference between the two contexts. 
They assert that “with respect to enrolling in a research study that does not have his individual benefit as its 
primary goal, a patient may be quite reluctant to entrust decisional authority to someone else, especially to 
the physician-researcher; however, in an individualized therapeutic context, the same patient may be most 
comfortable relying on his doctor to employ medical expertise and benevolent intentions to decide on his 
behalf” (Berg et al., 2001, pp. 27-28). 
284
 In these types of psychological research cases, Freedman points out that the potential subjects “could be 
told that any experiment of which they would be the subject will pose no (physical) risk, and will have been 
approved by an IRB, which is concerned to safeguard their rights; but they would not be told when, or 
whether, or how they will be studied” (Freedman, 1982, p. 2).   
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 Though Freedman has provided examples that demonstrate cases whereby a 
subject’s consent is somewhat ignorant, they fall short of being what may appropriately 
be called “ignorant consent”. That is to suggest that merely because a potential subject is 
ignorant with respect to some element of the research; it is not necessarily the case that 
the consent itself must be deemed ignorant in any morally relevant sense. For if that were 
the case, then all consent to research would be deemed ignorant since no subject will ever 
have full information, and will always be ignorant in some respect or another. The 
concept of informed consent would thus become meaningless. The question that must be 
asked is not, whether there was something that the subject did not know, but whether 
what the subject did not know was relevant enough to deem the consent as one that falls 
short of an informed consent (i.e., an ignorant consent). Again it must be stressed that any 
ignorance is not sufficient to deem a consent as not informed, for then all consent would 
be uninformed or ignorant since none can live up to the ideal of fully informed consent. 
 Thus a brief review of some of the elements of an informed consent would prove 
instructive.  
 As Levine notes, current U.S. federal regulations require that researchers disclose 
 specific information bearing on (1) the purpose of a study, (2) its foreseeable risks 
 and benefits, (3) the various alternatives to participation in research, (4) 
 protections of confidentiality, (5) the availability (if any) of compensation for 
 research-related injury, and (6) conditions of participation, including 
 reassurances that participants can leave a study at any time without penalty or 
 forfeiture of their medical entitlements.
285
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 Emanuel et al., p. 190. Refer back to the section on informed consent in Chapter One for further detail 
regarding the elements of informed consent. Also see: R.J. Levine. “The nature and definition of informed 
consent in various research settings” In The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix to the Belmont Report, Vol. I. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, DHEW publications no. (OS) 78-0013; and R.M. Veatch. “Three theories of informed consent: 
philosophical foundations and policy implications” In The National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix to the Belmont Report, Vol. II, DHEW 
publication no. (OS) 78-0014.  
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Given that these are the generally accepted elements of an informed consent, and given 
that Freedman defines an ignorant consent as one where some or all informational 
components of informed consent are waived, then for Freedman’s examples to truly 
constitute ignorant consent they would have to have at least one of the six components 
listed above missing. However, the placebo example, double-blind example, and the 
psychological research example do not inherently cause a lacking in any of the six 
informational components.
286
   
 In all three cases, a potential subject may still be sufficiently informed of the 
study’s purpose, its risks and benefits, alternatives to research,…etc. Thus, it is difficult 
to see why Freedman would classify these cases as examples of ignorant consent. 
Freedman’s best example is perhaps the use of a placebo, which seems to add uncertainty 
regarding the risks that may befall a subject, but this is not to say that the subject is 
ignorant of the potential risks. Certainly the fact that one may not know whether or not 
she has received a placebo will have some bearing on what risks she may be exposed to, 
but the subject, though ignorant of whether she has received the placebo, can still be 
informed about what the risks are either way, whether she receives the placebo or the 
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 As discussed further in Chapter One, some may argue that a few additional elements of informed 
consent ought to be included as well. For instance, some have argued that informed consent should also 
require knowledge regarding such matters as “the reason for selecting this individual as a subject, the 
procedures to be followed and the discomforts that the subject will suffer as a result of them… Robert 
Veatch would include the need for ‘a specific disclosure of the presence of a control group within the 
research design’ and an explanation of who is to be held responsible should the subject be harmed in the 
course of the research” (Freedman, 1982, p. 1-2). As Levine has suggested, other elements that might be 
required in informed consent include: an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures, a suggestion 
to the prospective subject that he might wish to discuss the proposed research with another before consenting 
and where appropriate it may be necessary to inform the prospective subject that some information is 
deliberately being withheld. However, even including all of these additional elements of informed consent it 
must still be noted that the placebo example, double-blind example, and the psychological research example 
do not inherently cause a lacking in any of these informational components. 
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active agent. Thus, even in the placebo case, it seems that all elements of informed 
consent, even the knowledge of risk element, are known.
287
  
 It must therefore be concluded that Freedman has not demonstrated anything 
useful with his examples. Though his attempt was to demonstrate that we already allow 
for an ignorant consent in research, all he has demonstrated are cases whereby a subject is 
ignorant in some respect, but has the relevant information necessary for his consent to be 
deemed an informed and not an ignorant consent.  
 Freedman’s third and final attempt at demonstrating the validity of an ignorant 
consent to research fails as well. His final argument is in the form of a response to the 
idea that informed consent is a right that cannot be waived.
288
 He provides examples of 
other rights that cannot be waived and demonstrates that these other rights are 
significantly dissimilar from the right to informed consent such that the justification 
behind not allowing them to be waived cannot apply for the right to informed consent. 
 Freedman’s main example is that of public education. “There is a right to be 
educated, one possessed by the resident and enforceable against the government. But 
education… is not an option. Put another way, there is a right to education but no right to 
                                                 
287
 The fact that certain methods used in research such as double-blinding do not necessarily render consent 
uninformed or ignorant has even been acknowledged in some ethical guidelines. In regards to 
randomization and blinding in clinical trials, the Tri-Council Policy Statement for instance, states that “such 
research is not regarded as a waiver or alteration of the requirements for consent if subjects are informed of 
the probability of being randomly assigned to one arm of the study or another” (Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans. 1998 (with 2000, 2002 and 2005 amendments) p. 2.1). The idea being that methods 
such as double-blinding do not necessarily require a subject to be lacking in any of the informational 
components of informed consent, and thus a subject of research may indeed be able to provide informed 
consent when entering into a clinical trial that makes use of these types of approaches. 
288
 It should be understood that I do not intend to argue whether the right to informed consent is indeed a 
right that cannot be waived. Such an argument would require a philosophical and legal analysis that cannot 
be presently undertaken. Instead, I merely wish to demonstrate that Freedman’s argument as to why the 
right to informed consent can be waived, fails.  
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truancy.”289 Thus it seems that the right to be educated is one that cannot be waived, at 
least by minors. However, Freedman then argues that this is not comparable to the right 
to informed consent. For it is the case that the children involved in the right to be 
educated, lack competence, whereas we assume that the potential research subjects are 
competent. As Freedman elucidates, “if we did not believe the subject to be competent, 
informed consent would not be required”290.  
 However, this is not a correct view of informed consent. The information 
component of informed consent is not provided to persons because they are already 
competent to consent to research, but because they have the potential to be competent.
291
 
To be competent for a context requires that a person satisfy the conditions of competence 
as discussed above. 
 Ignorance, by definition, implies a lack of knowledge and understanding. If a 
person is ignorant of a certain topic, it can be said that he lacks a sufficient level of 
knowledge and understanding about that topic. This is where Freedman’s dilemma 
begins; for it seems highly problematic to claim that a person is substantially competent 
for a particular situation if that person lacks the requisite understanding needed for 
competence. Furthermore, since the reasoning condition of competence involves the 
ability to weigh risks and benefits, then the ignorant person may lack the necessary 
reasoning condition as well, as he may be ignorant of the risks and benefits. Also, 
depending on how ignorant the person is, it may also be argued that ignorance impedes 
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 Freedman, 1982, p. 3. 
290
 Freedman, 1982, p. 3. 
291
 We must recall that competency is not all or none, and is context relative. Thus one may be competent in 
most respects in life, but may be incompetent in others. Thus a potential subject of research may be 
generally competent in various aspects of life, but without the relevant information regarding the research 
trial cannot be said to be competent to decide whether or not to participate in the research. 
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the appreciation component of competence since the person lacking information 
regarding the clinical trial will be unable to see what participation may mean for him. 
Thus ignorance renders one incompetent for that context, and a willful ignorance is no 
different.   
 In what sense then, can Freedman claim that the person who gives an ignorant 
consent is competent? Perhaps by competence Freedman means that the person has 
displayed competence with respect to most other aspects in life, or that the subject has the 
cognitive capacity to be competent, that is that the subject has the potential for 
competence.
292
 However, neither of these is sufficient. Demonstrating competence in 
other facets of life does not imply that one will necessarily be competent in the medical 
research context, and having the potential for competence is certainly not in itself 
sufficient for a legitimate informed consent. Thus it seems that Freedman’s account of an 
ignorant, yet competent consent, cannot be maintained.
293
 
 Given that each of Freedman’s three arguments in favour of an ignorant yet valid 
consent in medical research fails, it must be concluded that an ignorant consent to 
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 We shall return to this issue in Chapter Four, as a further depiction of Freedman’s account will be 
provided. Ultimately, Freedman concludes that an ignorant consent is ethically permissible as long as the 
decision maker’s choice can be deemed responsible. In addition to the issues already raised with 
Freedman’s arguments, Chapter Four will further demonstrate that such a proposal is problematic. 
293
 One may attempt a response by suggesting that this analysis commits me to the view that an ignorant 
consent in ordinary medical practice also lacks competence and is therefore similarly invalid. According to 
this view, consent from a patient who trusts her physician enough such that when it comes to minor 
procedures, such as undergoing a routine surgery, she consents to the physician’s recommendations without 
requiring much information, would be inappropriate. However, while some may be inclined to argue in this 
manner, for example Veatch reminds that “it can be seriously questioned at the ethical level whether one is 
justified in waiving information necessary to make a consent informed” (Freedman, 1982, p. 4), I am not 
necessarily committed to this view. We must recall the first distinction between the medical practice and 
medical research contexts, namely the difference in relationship between the physician/patient and the 
researcher/subject. Since the former relationship is based on a trust that exists because both parties have the 
same goal, namely the welfare of the patient, then allowing one’s physician to be somewhat of a proxy 
decision maker, may be appropriate at times. However, since this relationship does not exist between the 
researcher and a subject, the same justification cannot be employed in order to allow for a researcher to 
decide on behalf of subjects. Thus, while I have argued that ignorance will render one incompetent to 
consent to research and thus an ignorant consent to research should be viewed as inappropriate, particularly 
for terminally ill persons, I am not committed to the same position in the medical practice context. 
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medical research cannot be permitted. Thus, this proposal poses no significant objection 
to what has been proposed here, namely that for the terminally ill, consent to medical 
research will require a level of competence greater than that required in the medical 
practice context. If consent is not provided competently then the notion of informed 
consent is a mere illusion; a device used only as a protection for researchers from legal 
ramifications, instead of a protection for those whom it was initially intended to protect, 
namely research subjects. 
 Before proceeding, it would be prudent to briefly recap. In Chapter One, the 
connection between autonomy, consent and competence was highlighted, and ultimately 
it was shown that an autonomous and ethical consent must be a competent one. Chapter 
Two then examined the commonly applied risk-based sliding scale approach to 
competence, whereby the requisite competence is determined by the riskiness of the 
decision. This approach to competence was shown to not only be conceptually and 
morally flawed, but also inappropriate for the medical research context. Instead, it was 
argued that only when the difficultly in achieving one or more of the elements of 
competence increases, should a greater level of competence be required. Chapter Three 
then demonstrated that in the clinical research as opposed to the medical practice context 
for the terminally ill, all four elements of competence, namely understanding, 
appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness, are more difficult to satisfy and that thus a 
greater level of competence is required for ethical consent to participate in medical 
research. It still remains to be seen however, what specific level of competence should be 
required in this research context for the terminally ill individual. It is to this query that we 
now turn. 
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Chapter 4: Elements of Competence: How Great of an Ability to Understand, 
Appreciate, Reason, and Decide Voluntarily is Necessary for Competence in the 
Medical Research Context with Terminally Ill Subjects  
 
 
Moving from Informed Consent Forms to Competency 
 In an effort to protect potential subjects of research, much effort has been expended 
on analyzing and restructuring informed consent forms. Due to the complexity and length of 
these consent forms, much research has been dedicated specifically toward analyzing the 
readability of forms by potential subjects.
294
 If subjects are unable to read the forms, or at 
least cannot adequately retain information from the forms, then informed consent is not truly 
possible. Some of the more recent suggestions aimed at resolving this issue involve ensuring 
consistency in consent forms between institutions and allowing only minimal modification 
of such forms by local IRBs,
295
 including more direct verbal communication in the informed 
consent process,
296
 and altering consent forms into a social networking format that facilitates 
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 See for instance: Stuart Grossman, Steven Piantadosi and Charles Covahey. “Are Informed Consent 
Forms that Describe Clinical Oncology Research Protocols Readable by Most Patients and their Families?” 
Journal of Clinical Oncology, Vol. 12, pp. 2211-2215, 1994; Nigel Buller, Claire Campbell, David 
Denison, Kim Priestly and Christopher Valentine. “Are Patient Consent Forms for Research Protocols Easy 
to Read?” British Medical Journal Vol. 305, p.1263, 1992; Kenneth Tarnowski, Denise Allen, Christine 
Mayhall, and Patricia Kelly. “Readability of Pediatric Biomedical Research Informed Consent Forms” 
Pediatrics, Vol. 85(1), pp. 58-62, 1990; Lynn White, Jeffrey Jones, Christopher Felton, and Linda Pool. 
“Informed Consent for Medical Research: common discrepancies and readability” Academic Emergency 
Medicine, Vol. 3(8), pp. 745-750, 1996; and Michael Sharp. “The Problem of Readability of Informed 
Consent Documents for Clinical Trials of Investigational Drugs and Devices: United States 
Considerations” Drug Information Journal, Vol. 38(4), pp. 353-359, 2004.  
295
 Koyfman et al. “Consent Form Heterogeneity in Cancer Trials: the cooperative group and institutional 
review gap” Journal of the National Cancer Institute, Vol. 105, pp. 947-953, 2013. 
296
 James Flory and Ezekiel Emanuel. “Interventions to Improve Research Participants' Understanding in 
Informed Consent for Research: A Systematic Review” Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 
292(13), pp.1593-1601, 2004. This type of proposal has been similarly echoed by many others. For 
example, concerned over the accessibility of some consent forms to those possessing only low levels of 
education, Hammerschmidt and Keane suggest that complex research studies ought to be presented to 
subjects by “someone knowledgeable about the study, knowledgeable about informed consent, and skilled 
at the presentation of technical information to a lay audience of limited education” (Dale Hammerschmidt 
and Moira Keane. “Institutional Review Board (IRB) Review Lacks Impact on the Readability of Consent 
Forms for Research” American Journal of the Medical Sciences, Vol. 304(6), pp. 348-351, 1992, p. 351). 
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better online communication.
297
 However, throughout the continued development of 
informed consent forms, most of the effort has been dedicated to ensuring an appropriate 
level of language and technical jargon,
298
 with some recommendations suggesting that such 
forms “be written at or below an eighth-grade reading level in order to accommodate the 
diverse reading skills and competencies of most research participants.”299 Though the 
importance of devising a suitable language for informed consent forms should not be 
understated, the correlative to ensuring that the language in informed consent forms is 
accessible to the varying competencies research subjects may possess would be to also 
attempt to ensure that prospective subjects possess a sufficiently high level of competence. 
Merely lowering the language and technical jargon in order to accommodate the diverse 
reading skills and competencies of potential research participants seems contrary to the main 
goal of the informed consent process, which is to ensure autonomous and thus competent 
informed consent.
300
 Therefore, to this end, added attention must be dedicated toward 
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 Holland et al. “Protecting Human Research Participants: reading vs understanding the consent form” 
Journal of the National Cancer Institute, Vol. 105, pp.927-928, 2013. 
298
 A large amount of medical terminology in informed consent forms can unfortunately make the 
document too complex for many patients and research subjects alike. This issue can lead to lawsuits over 
whether patients or research subjects were ever adequately informed prior to providing consent to a 
particular medical intervention or research trial. For example, in a 1996 Florida case, “plaintiffs (the class 
of pregnant women enrolled in a study) sought damages due to lack of informed consent, claiming both that 
the forms were written in language too technical for the women to understand and that the subjects were 
coerced into signing the forms” (Jessica Berg, Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, and Lisa Parker. Informed 
Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 2
nd
 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 
203). See: Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 165 F.R.D.689 (M.D. Fl 1996). 
299
 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Robert A. Crouch, John D. Arras, Jonathan D. Moreno, and Christine Grady. 
Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2003) p. 445.  
300
 It is important to note that this is not meant to suggest that only those with higher reading levels are 
capable of competent decision-making. Rather, it is meant to suggest that if indeed the main goal behind 
much of the focus on the readability of consent forms has been and continues to be the preservation of the 
autonomy of prospective research subjects, then such a goal requires more than only adjusting the language 
of reading forms. Indeed, such a goal might be better achieved by also attempting to enhance/bolster the 
competence of potential subjects. Though such an idea will be explored in greater detail in the following 
chapter, it can be noted that others have echoed a similar sentiment. Tom Beauchamp & James Childress, 
for instance, have stated that a respect for autonomy may include “in some contexts, building up or 
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ensuring a higher level of competence, as opposed to only attempting to accommodate lower 
levels of competence.
301
   
 The shortcomings of informed consent forms further support such a change in 
strategy. Apart from the issue of the complexity of medical language in informed consent 
forms, additional concerns have arisen regarding their length and use. Firstly, there appears 
to be an inherent tension between the goal of including all relevant information related to a 
clinical trial that may factor in a potential subject’s decision to participate, with the goal of 
not overwhelming or overburdening the potential subject with information. It has long been 
known that “evidence exists that patient understanding of information on consent forms is 
inversely related to their length.
302
 Overly inclusive consent forms may have the paradoxical 
effect of decreasing the level of patient understanding, perhaps even increasing the chance 
that a patient will feel misled, aggrieved, and inclined to sue.”303 The same holds true of 
consent forms in the research setting. However, despite this, over the years many consent 
forms in research have actually increased in length.
304
 
                                                                                                                                                 
maintaining others’ capacities for autonomous choice” (Tom Beauchamp & James Childress. Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.103). 
301
 This is not to suggest that potential subjects will need to be capable of comprehending the various 
scientific intricacies of the experimental procedure at the level of the experts, but rather, as shall be argued 
in what follows, it should be required that subjects have the ability to comprehend the relevant facts 
sufficiently enough such that they are able to deliberate about participation on their own. 
302
 See for example: Lynn Chaikin Epstein and Louis Lasagna. “Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or 
Substance” JAMA Internal Medicine, Vol. 123(6), pp. 682-688, 1969. 
303
 Berg et al., 2001, p.195. 
304
 In a study conducted on the use of consent forms for research in a Veterans Administration medical 
center, Baker and Taub found that “the mean number of lines in 1982 was almost twice the number used in 
1975” (Marilyn Baker and Harvey Taub. “Readability of Informed Consent Forms for Research in a 
Veterans Administration Medical Center” JAMA, Vol. 250(19), pp. 2646-2648, 1983, p. 2647). In a more 
recent study it was found that “the mean length of the ICDs [informed consent documents] increased from 
338 (range 276–464) words in 1987–1990 to 1087 words (range 399–2345) in 2005–2007” (O. Berger, 
B.H. Gronberg, K. Sand, S. Kaasa, and J.H. Loge. “The Length of Consent Documents in Oncological 
Trials is Doubled in Twenty Years” Annals of Oncology, Vol. 20(2), pp. 379-385, 2009, p. 379). The issue 
of length has ironically been exacerbated by an effort to reduce the complexity of consent forms. The 
problem seems to lie in the fact that “polysyllabic medical jargon is often shorthand for longer descriptions 
using simpler words, [and thus] efforts to reduce the complexity of consent forms almost inevitably 
increase their length. [For instance] to simplify the sentence, ‘We are conducting an investigation of the 
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 Furthermore, overtime the informed consent document has transformed into a tool 
used to protect certain parties from legal ramifications. That is, “in an effort to avoid 
liability, consent forms have increasingly included legalistic language about participants’ 
rights, confidentiality, and compensation for injury, among other things.”305 The byproduct 
of such a change has been an increase in technical jargon, though of a legal variety, despite 
the concern over complicated and burdensome language in informed consent forms. The 
inclusion of legal jargon in informed consent forms also further adds to their tedious length, 
decreasing the likelihood that potential subjects will fully and carefully read them. 
Additionally, such an alteration signals that a change in focus has occurred with informed 
consent forms, where they previously were thought of as an informative and necessary 
safeguard for potential subjects, are now an instrument of protection for the investigators 
and institutions conducting the research. This reality has not been lost on patients and 
subjects alike, who, as studies have shown, generally do not view these consent forms as 
being for their interests or well-being. In a study involving 200 cancer patients who had 
signed consent forms for chemotherapy, radiation therapy, or surgery, it was concluded that 
“most believed that consent forms were meant to ‘protect the physician's rights.’ Although 
most thought that consent forms were necessary and comprehensible and that they contained 
worthwhile information, the legalistic connotations of the forms appeared to lead to cursory 
                                                                                                                                                 
pathogenesis and pathophysiology of hyperlipidemia,’ which consists of twelve words, we would have to 
resort to something like: ‘We are trying to find out more about persons who have unusually high levels of 
fats in their blood. In particular, we are studying what leads to the development of this condition and 
related changes in the way the body works.’ Although eminently clear, the more colloquial version more 
than triples the number of words used in the more technical version” (Berg et al., 2001, pp. 197-198). 
305
 Emanuel et al., 2003, p.445. That the use of informed consent forms has shifted in this fashion is a 
sentiment corroborated by many other scholars as well. For example, in regards to consent forms, Berg et 
al. note that “there is a fundamental tension with respect to whose interests are being protected - those of 
the patient/subject or of the physician/researcher” (Berg et al., 2001, p. 190). 
 136 
 
reading and inadequate recall.”306 Such results have been reaffirmed more recently in the 
medical research setting. In a study on 100 individuals who had provided informed consent 
for participation in medical oncology clinical trials, Olver et al. stated that “both this study 
and a parallel study that we performed with patients receiving chemotherapy outside of a 
clinical trial confirmed Cassileth's finding that most patients did not realise that the 
information and consent form was primarily meant to benefit them.”307 The perception that 
the role of informed consent forms is to serve the physicians or research investigators 
undermines what ought to be the main goal of such forms, namely securing the well-being 
of patients or subjects by ensuring the preservation of their autonomy in the decision-
making process.
308
 
 This indictment of informed consent forms should not be taken as undermining the 
efforts put forth by those interested in ensuring the ethicality of such forms. Rather, such 
criticism is meant to serve as an indication that what is required is a shift in focus. While it is 
imperative that informed consent forms be constructed such that they do not deceive 
potential subjects and disclose all relevant information necessary in order to make an 
informed choice, as the preceding discussion from Chapter Three on the therapeutic 
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 Barrie R. Cassileth, Robert V. Zupkis, Katherine Sutton-Smith, and Vicki March. “Informed Consent — 
Why Are Its Goals Imperfectly Realized?” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 302, pp.896-900, 1980, 
p. 896. 
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 N. Olver, L. Buchanan, C. Laidlaw, and G. Poulton. “The Adequacy of Consent Forms for Informing 
Patients Entering Oncological Clinical Trials” Annals of Oncology, Vol. 6, pp. 867-870, 1995, p. 869. 
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 That the perception of informed consent forms as legal protection for physicians or researchers could 
lead to the undermining of the very goals of informed consent is a concern that has been voiced by many 
others. Bottrell et al. for example argue that “aspects of many forms, such as the requirement of a witness 
countersignature, add to their legal appearance and further distance patients. Combined with concerns about 
legal jargon, these format issues help to explain why patients believe forms were created to protect 
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forms, and therefore, an inadequate or distorted understanding” (Melissa Bottrell, Hillell Alpert, Ruth 
Fischbach, Linda Emanuel. “Hospital Informed Consent for Procedure Forms: facilitating quality patient-
physician interaction” Journal of the American Medical Association Surgery, Vol. 135(1), pp.26-33, 2000, 
p. 30).   
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misconception revealed, much of the confusion, misunderstandings, and false beliefs that 
subjects often have, actually stem from sources other than the informed consent form 
itself.
309
 In fact, in an examination of phase I oncology trial consent forms, Horng et al. 
concluded that while the consent forms they analyzed:  
 
 could do more to counteract misunderstandings that subjects may bring to a trial,... 
 their substance does convey the purpose, risks, and benefits of the trials. 
 [Furthermore they state that] much of the attention currently devoted to consent 
 forms by researchers, institutional review boards, and regulators could be directed 
 more usefully to the enhancement of other aspects of the informed-consent 
 process.
310
  
 
Concurring with such a sentiment, the approach suggested here has been to redirect efforts 
toward ensuring the competence of terminally ill potential research subjects. As Paul 
Appelbaum reminds, “one way of protecting people’s rights and interests is to help them 
make decisions for themselves.”311 It is precisely this thought that fuels our current 
endeavour. While informed consent forms can be overly wordy and possibly further 
convolute the matter, ensuring the competence of potential subjects places them in a 
situation where they are better able to protect themselves. If indeed research subjects are 
sufficiently competent to make research participation decisions, then some of the ethical 
concerns surrounding clinical trials with terminally ill subjects, such as misconceptions, 
deceitful tactics employed by some researchers, neglect of the interests of subjects, and 
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 Revisit Chapter Three for a full description of causes of the therapeutic misconception. Additionally, 
given some of the previously mentioned issues regarding informed consent forms, namely readability, 
length, retention, complexity, and inclusion of legalistic jargon, it has been questioned whether informed 
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the possible undermining and disrespect of an individual’s autonomy that is often 
associated with cases of corruption in medical research, are all greatly mitigated if not 
completed eliminated in some instances.
312
  
 In proceeding then, it is imperative to recognize that our endeavour is not to 
determine what particular information must be conveyed during the informed consent 
process so that the subject can possess the adequate facts needed to provide consent.
313
 
Nor is our task to determine what specific information must be appreciated or reasoned 
about for ethical informed consent. Rather, we must proceed by examining how much of 
an ability to understand, appreciate, reason, and decide voluntarily a terminally ill person 
is required to have for a competent and thus ethical and autonomous consent to research 
participation. It is only by viewing each element of competence as a separate sub-ability, 
that we may proceed and determine to what extent one must be capable of each of the 
four elements of competence, and thus to what extent one must be competent overall to 
be able to ethically consent to medical research for terminally ill subjects.  
 
The Competency Continuum 
 
 Current regulations tend to be fairly vague on the requisite competence for 
consent to medical research. In the U.S. for instance, the Department of Health and 
Human Services Title 45 C.F.R. Part 46, barely even acknowledges competence, opting 
                                                 
312
 For instance, any deception or manipulative tactics that contribute to a potential research subject’s 
therapeutic misconception would become largely ineffective if the subject was competent enough to 
understand the existence of the therapeutic misconception, appreciate what it may mean for her, and be able 
to reason with that information. Thus, a higher level of competence would enable the subject to protect 
herself from some of the potential harms, especially those to her autonomy, which may exist in certain 
research trials.  
313
 For such a matter refer back to Chapter One where the various elements of disclosure in the medical 
research context were discussed, along with some of the possible controversies surrounding them. 
 139 
 
instead to focus on the criteria for informed consent documents. In describing the general 
requirements for informed consent, Title 45 C.F.R. 46 does state that: 
 An investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances that provide the 
 prospective subject or the [legally authorized] representative sufficient 
 opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the 
 possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that is given to the 
 subject or the representative shall be in language understandable to the subject or 
 the representative.
314
 
 
Though this appears to touch upon both the understanding and voluntariness elements of 
competence, it fails to discuss either of these in a meaningful way, and falls far short of 
identifying the criteria necessary for a sufficient understanding or voluntariness needed 
for competent consent. Unfortunately, apart from this issue, rarely do regulations such as 
this even mention the other two elements of competence, namely appreciation and 
reasoning. 
 Other regulations do not fare much better. Similar to Title 45 C.F.R. 46, the ICH-
GCP,
315
 dictates that voluntariness is imperative regarding subject participation, stating 
that “neither the investigator, nor the trial staff, should coerce or unduly influence a 
subject to participate or to continue to participate in a trial.”316 Understanding is 
addressed almost as cursorily, with statements not suggesting much more than the 
importance of providing information in a language that is non-technical and easily 
understandable by subjects, or that at times a witness may be required to help ensure 
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 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Protection 
from Research Risks, Title 45 (Public Welfare), Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 (Protection of 
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 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline- Guideline for Good Clinical 
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 ICH-GCP, Section 4.8.3, p. 15.  
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understanding when a potential subject is unable to read the informed consent 
document.
317
 
 The Declaration of Helsinki
318
 makes some advancement, specifically identifying 
necessary elements of disclosure needed for adequate understanding as well as detailing 
certain issues surrounding voluntariness. For instance, regarding voluntariness, it states 
that “when seeking informed consent for participation in a research study the physician 
must be particularly cautious if the potential subject is in a dependent relationship with 
the physician or may consent under duress. In such situations the informed consent must 
be sought by an appropriately qualified individual who is completely independent of this 
relationship.”319 However, despite some improvements recognizing certain issues related 
to understanding and voluntariness, The Declaration of Helsinki ultimately still falls short 
of acknowledging a requisite level of either understanding or voluntariness, or of 
competence overall, necessary for consent to research. This is especially true given that, 
as with most other guidelines, both appreciation and reasoning are not addressed. 
 As a refreshing change of pace, the Tri-Council Policy Statement
320
 does 
acknowledge the requirement of competence and even mentions some of its components 
as it states that competence “involves the ability to understand the information presented, 
to appreciate the potential consequences of a decision, and to provide free and informed 
consent.”321 It further correctly recognizes that competence is decision relative and that 
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therefore competence does not require that potential subjects be able to make every type 
of decision, but instead that they “be competent to make an informed decision about 
participation in particular research.”322 While these assertions are certainly an important 
step forward in addressing the competency requirement for medical research subjects, the 
Tri-Council Policy Statement similarly falls short of fully dealing with the issue. For 
instance, it still remains unclear as to what would constitute substantial competence for 
the research context. Instead the document suggests that since competency laws vary 
between jurisdictions, “researchers must comply with all applicable legislative 
requirements.”323 However, as previously mentioned, the law does not help clarify this 
issue. “There are few cases or statutes that speak to this issue in the treatment setting, and 
none that address competence to consent to research.”324 
 It should be noted that often guidelines and regulations, including the four just 
mentioned, do attempt to address the proper course of action with incompetent potential 
subjects.
325
 However, “the regulations… [ultimately remain] silent on the question of 
what constitutes incompetence in a research setting”326 in the first place. It is to this 
difficult task that we will turn in the following sections.  
 However, prior to this, it is crucial to note that the constituent parts of 
competence, just as with competency overall, are not all or nothing phenomena. That is to 
state that it would be a false dichotomy to assume that, for example, an individual either 
has understanding or lacks it. In fact the understanding a person may possess falls 
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somewhere along a continuum that ranges from full understanding to complete ignorance. 
While a person might fall anywhere along this continuum and thus all individuals may 
possess quite different levels of understanding pertaining to a certain context, for 
pragmatic purposes it will be imperative that we separate those who possess a sufficient 
amount of any of the particular elements of competence, for example understanding 
needed to participate in a medical trial, from those who do not.  
 The recognition that the constituent parts of competence, namely understanding, 
appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness, all exist on a continuum would seem to entail 
that there are a possible infinite amounts or levels of each that one may possess. For 
example, it would seem conceptually impossible to set out three different levels of 
understanding, such as very high, moderate, and low, and expect that each and every 
person will fall neatly within one of those three categories. Indeed many individuals may 
fall somewhere between such categories. However, despite this we shall proceed by 
highlighting six different levels along the spectrum for each element of competence. 
Though individuals may not fall neatly into any one of these six categories, such a 
detailed overview of the spectrums of the elements of competence will enable us to note a 
threshold level, below which a person can be said to be lacking that necessary component 
of competence needed to be substantially competent to consent to the medical research 
trial.
327
 We shall proceed by analyzing each element of competence in turn, beginning 
with appreciation.
328
   
                                                 
327
 While it has been acknowledged that three levels, nor six, nor any other number could completely 
outline every potential level of a sub-ability of competence that a person may possess, in what follows, 
using six separate levels to map out the spectrum for each sub-ability will prove to strike an appropriate 
balance between practicality and comprehensiveness. 
328
 It should be noted that the following spectrums of the four elements of competence and more 
importantly the determination of the minimum level of each that is required for competent consent to 
research, will only apply to terminally ill subjects of research. As previously noted, the context and factors 
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The Spectrums of the Four Elements of Competence 
 
 In what follows, six different levels of ability will be identified for each of the 
elements or sub-abilities that comprise competence, namely understanding, appreciation, 
reasoning, and voluntariness. See figure 1 below for a chart outlining the six levels of each 
sub-ability. Though the levels discussed will fail to identify every possible level of ability, 
for such would be impossible, it will provide the basis needed to attempt to ascertain to what 
degree a terminally ill person must be capable of the sub-abilities in order to be considered 
competent for consent to medical research. This will be compared and contrasted with the 
level often thought necessary for the therapeutic context. The establishment of a minimum 
level necessary of each of the four sub-abilities will be influenced by the three relevant 
differences between the research and medical practice context that warrant a greater level of 
competence for consent in the former, as was argued in Chapter Three.
329
 We may recall that 
these three differences were the difference in the nature of the researcher/subject 
relationship as opposed to the physician/patient relationship, the higher potential for 
exploitation of the situation or mental state of terminally ill subjects, and the presence of 
the therapeutic misconception. Each of these differences will play a vital role in 
determining how much understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness ought 
to be necessary for competent consent to medical research for terminally ill persons. 
                                                                                                                                                 
surrounding terminally ill persons participating in research are such that the appropriate level of 
competence that they ought to possess for research participation may be radically different than the level of 
competence that ought to be required for consent in other research contexts with other populations, and as 
argued in Chapter Three, quite different from the level of competence required to consent to treatment. 
329
 It is important to reaffirm that current law, the courts, and existing literature on the topic, fails to detail 
the extent to which each of the abilities that comprise competence is necessary for the research context, 
especially with terminally ill subjects. Even literature that acknowledges the different elements of 
competence and explains their importance for medical treatment decision making with patients, often 
ignores the task of determining how great an ability to appreciate, or reason…etc. is needed for ethical 
consent. This fact coupled with the inconsistencies that exist between jurisdictions in dealing with 
competence overall, forces us to wade through some uncharted territory as we proceed. 
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Fig. 1 Different Levels of Competence Sub-Abilities
330
 
 
Only by establishing such sub-ability requirements can we ensure the ethicality of medical 
research trials by ensuring that the terminally ill potential subjects possess a sufficient level 
of competence necessary for truly autonomous consent. 
 Recalling the first difference specifically, between the research and medical practice 
context, namely that the nature of the relationship between the research investigator and 
subject is fundamentally different than that between a physician and patient, it becomes 
clear that both the appreciation and reasoning elements of competence may become more 
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the following sections. 
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difficult to satisfy in the research context. As such, we shall proceed by dealing with these 
elements first.
331
  
 
Appreciation 
 
 We may recall that appreciation involves the ability to realize the significance and 
implications of different potential alternatives for one’s own life. More specifically, this 
criterion of competence requires that one be able to somewhat foresee and grasp what it 
might be like to be in possible future states and to incorporate that into one’s decision 
making. Furthermore, as previously stated, “this criterion of competence emphasizes the 
significance of grasping the relevance of certain information and decisions for one’s own 
personal circumstances.”332 Given this definition, the highest level of appreciation on our 
spectrum would be the ability to foresee every direct and indirect consequence of every 
possible decision a person may make, and to know how those consequences will affect 
one’s self. Conversely, the lowest level of appreciation on our spectrum would involve a 
complete inability to have any insight into the consequences of a decision. See Spec. 1 
below for the full six level spectrum of appreciation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
331
 In what follows, it will be imperative to first establish the spectrums for appreciation and reasoning, and then 
demonstrate where along those spectrums lies the minimum threshold necessary for competence in the research 
setting with terminally ill subjects. 
332
 See Chapter One, p.19. For a more detailed explanation of appreciation, refer back to Chapter One. 
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Spec. 1 Appreciation Spectrum
333
 
1. Perfect Appreciation – The ability to foresee every direct and indirect consequence of 
every possible decision. This level of appreciation would further enable one to know how 
those consequences will affect her, given her own unique situation and individual needs, 
and be able to include that in her decision making in such a way so as to make the 
decision that brings about the most desirable future state of affairs possible.  Such perfect 
appreciation is impossible and thus shall only serve as the upper limit on the appreciation 
spectrum.  
 
2. Expert Appreciation – Often capable of foreseeing most consequences, and especially 
the most likely consequences, of one’s decisions, with consistent accuracy. Moreover, 
this level of appreciation would entail that a person would in most cases be able to know 
how she would feel in the various possible future states where those consequences were 
actualized. Such appreciation may not be as conceptually impossible as perfect 
appreciation, but is still likely to be unattainable by most persons in most situations. 
Therefore, this level of ability to appreciate might only be possible by certain experts 
making decisions within the field in which they are experts, for example a researcher 
deciding to test a new experimental intervention on herself.  
 
3. Imperfect, but Independent Appreciation – This level of appreciation involves being 
able to foresee the more likely consequences of one’s decision and to be able to ascertain 
how one might feel in the possible future states where those consequences are actualized. 
Such a level of appreciation might be imperfect, as one might not be able to fully grasp 
exactly how she will feel in certain future states, especially those with which she has had 
no prior experiences, but is still often effective in assisting one in making good choices. 
Most importantly, someone who is capable of this level of appreciation is able to arrive at 
her insights on her own without assistance from others.  
 
4. Dependent Appreciation – Capable of grasping the consequences of a decision and 
what those consequences may mean for one’s self, but usually only once someone else 
has described them. Such a person may be able to realize the significance, for one’s own 
personal circumstances, of a decision, and even will be able to effectively incorporate 
that into the decision making process, but usually only once it is pointed out by another. 
An example of this may involve an athlete who consents to surgery to repair a torn ACL 
(Anterior Cruciate Ligament), and only begins to question such a decision once someone 
else points out that the lengthy recovery from such a procedure would keep the athlete 
out of sports for the remainder of the year. It should be noted that it is likely this level of 
appreciation that is considered adequate in the medical practice setting where physicians 
often presume the competence of their patients. A patient is probably capable of this level 
                                                 
333
 It should be noted that all four of the spectrums will be designed in an ordinal fashion as opposed to 
interval. That is to state that the relative degree of difference between each of the levels should not be 
assumed to be the exact same as the relative difference between any other levels on the spectrum. It is 
important to note that the ordinal ranking will be sufficient to accomplish our current purpose, namely to 
establish qualitative descriptions of various levels within each sub-ability of competence such that 
arguments regarding minimum threshold levels required for a competent consent to research may be 
presented. 
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of appreciation so long as she can acknowledge her condition and grasp the consequences 
of it and available treatment options as explained by the physician. A patient might only 
fail to demonstrate this level of appreciation if she holds beliefs that are “substantially 
irrational, unrealistic, or a considerable distortion of reality.”334  
 
5. Low Ability to Appreciate – Often incapable or unwilling to attempt to foresee even 
the more likely consequences of one’s decision. Even once the potential consequences of 
a decision are realized by the person, she will still likely not engage in the process of 
attempting to determine how she might feel in the possible future states where those 
consequences are actualized. This level of appreciation may apply to many young 
children, as it is often thought that their ability to appreciate is hindered “by the lack of 
sufficient life experience.”335 Such a low level of appreciation is sometimes assumed of 
juvenile criminals who perhaps did not attempt to grasp the significance for themselves 
of the longer term consequences of committing the crime.  
 
6. Complete Inability to Appreciate – Lacks any insight into the consequences of one’s 
actions. A person with such little ability to appreciate would likely be unable to engage in 
any meaningful decision making. Such a level of inability is unlikely in most adults, as 
typically only infants will lack the ability to appreciate to this extent. However, this level 
of appreciation may be present in some patients with severe mental cognitive 
impairments, who cannot recognize how their mental illness affects them, rendering them 
unable to competently make treatment decisions. As the courts have recognized, if a 
“patient’s condition results in him being unable to recognize that he is affected by its 
manifestations, he will be unable to apply the relevant information to his circumstances, 
and unable to appreciate the consequences of his decision.”336 In such cases surrogate 
decision makers or the practice of involuntary commitment are sometimes utilized.
 337
 
 
 As already demonstrated, the requisite level of competence, and more specifically 
of each of the four sub-abilities of competence, is greater in the research context with 
terminally ill subjects than in the medical practice context. However, given this six 
leveled spectrum of appreciation, it now becomes possible to ascertain how great a level 
specifically is necessary for terminally ill subjects for competent consent to medical 
research. It might be noted that typically the medical practice context seems to require 
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 It is important to note that the above spectrum is not meant to be comprehensive or exhaustive of all 
possible levels of appreciation, nor is it meant to add any profound details as to the definition of 
appreciation. Rather, it is only meant to serve as a general outline that will be sufficient for constructing a 
minimum threshold that ought to be required for competence for terminally ill research subjects. 
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only, what I have referred to as Dependent Appreciation, that is, the ability to grasp the 
consequences for one’s self, even if only once explained by the healthcare 
professional.
338
 However, by applying our three relevant differences between the research 
and medical practice context, and most specifically in the case of appreciation, the first 
difference regarding the nature of the relationship between the researcher and subject, it 
will be argued that we ought to require at least what I have referred to as Imperfect, but 
Independent Appreciation for the research context with terminally ill subjects.  
 We may recall from Chapter Three that the first fundamental difference between 
the medical practice and medical research context that was discussed revolved around the 
nature of the relationship between a physician and patient compared to that between a 
researcher and subject. Whereas the former is generally viewed, though with some 
exceptions, as a relationship involving a certain degree of loyalty and obligation of 
fidelity,
339
 the same could not be said regarding the researcher and subject relationship. 
As previously discussed, as a result of the diverging goals between research and therapy, 
the interests of physicians and researchers are radically different, and thus, while the 
physician’s and patient’s interests are thought to align, a researcher’s and subject’s may 
actually conflict. The type of methodologies and approaches used in conducting research 
are indicative of such a lack of alignment between the interests of the researcher and 
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 For a more detailed depiction of the requisite level of appreciation, or of the other sub-abilities of 
competence required in the medical practice context, see: Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998. Unfortunately 
apart from this text and some similar works by these authors, there is little to no established guidelines or 
laws on exactly how much appreciation, or competence overall, should be required of a patient. Instead, it 
is often generally accepted practice that determinations of incompetence are made by individual physicians 
if they notice something amiss with their patient. The problem with such idiosyncratic clinical competency 
evaluations will be explored in the following chapter. However, it should be noted, that as a result of the 
current lack of literature, it is impossible to refer to precise laws or guidelines that would assist in noting 
the exact place on the appreciation or other spectrums that is currently required of patients in the medical 
practice setting. 
339
 Consult Chapter Three for a discussion of some exceptions. 
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subject.
340
 Such methodologies that do not appear to be in the subject’s interest, but are 
used in order to ensure the integrity of the research, include randomization, placebo 
controls, and double blinding, which all demonstrate that in research as opposed to 
medical practice, the subject’s wellbeing and interests are not primary, but are made 
secondary to the goals of the research trial. This appears especially true with terminally 
ill subjects of research who may be seeking a last hope miracle cure when participating in 
research, but where the research trial design is not created or carried out in such a manner 
so as to make such a hope realistic.
341
  
                                                 
340
 For a full discussion regarding the methodologies applied in research that demonstrate that the interests 
of research and the researcher can in fact conflict with the subject’s interests, refer back to Chapter Three. 
341
 This is particularly apparent in phase I oncology trials, which as previously mentioned, are designed to 
test the toxicity and highest tolerable doses of the anticancer drugs or interventions under clinical 
investigation. In fact in an examination of 272 consent forms Horng et al. found that “only 1 of the 272 
consent forms stated that subjects were ‘expected’ to benefit” (Horng et al., 2002, p. 2136). Furthermore, 
there is only “an overall complete response rate of 0.5 per cent and a partial response rate of 1.5 per cent 
(total response rate two per cent) in phase I oncology trials” (W. Glannon. “Phase I Oncology Trials: Why 
the Therapeutic Misconception Will Not Go Away” Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 32(5), pp. 252-255, 
2006, p. 252). Others have placed the potential chance of therapeutic benefit as being less than 5% 
(Christopher K. Daugherty, Donald M. Banik, Linda Janish and Mark J. Ratain. “Quantitative Analysis of 
Ethical Issues in Phase I Trials: A Survey Interview Study of 144 Advanced Cancer Patients” IRB: Ethics 
and Human Research, Vol. 22(3), pp. 6-14, 2000, p.11). Nonetheless, it is clear that these types of trials are 
designed with the subject’s interest being placed second to the goals of the research. Some have recently 
argued that despite the various studies that claim such low response rates for phase I oncology trials, a more 
critical analysis may reveal otherwise. Manish Agrawal and Ezekiel Emanuel claim that many phase I 
oncology research trials involve “vaccines, immune modulators, antiangiogenesis factors, and signal 
transduction agents [and that] these agents are widely perceived to be less toxic than chemotherapeutic 
agents” (Manish Agrawal and Ezekiel Emanuel. “Phase 1 Oncology Research” In The Oxford Textbook of 
Clinical Research Ethics, Ezekial J. Emanuel, Christine Grady, Robert A. Crouch, Reidar K. Lie, Franklin 
G. Miller, and  David Wendler, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 356-366, 2008) p. 358). 
Additionally, they claim their benefits “may not be appropriately measured by evaluating tumor response 
[since] these agents usually control cancer growth rather than kill cancer cells” (Agrawal and Emanuel, 
p.358). Once this is accounted for, the authors contend that the overall response rate becomes 10.6%, which 
includes both complete and partial responses, and that 34.1% of subjects had some form of disease 
stabilization, although they admit that “the significance of stable disease as a response to an investigational 
intervention is controversial” (Agrawal and Emanuel, p. 359). However, despite even these more optimistic 
figures, the authors still admit death from toxicity in phase I trials still occurs. They cite a few studies that 
seem to all place the overall toxicity death rate around 0.5% with some studies suggesting the number is as 
high as 0.57% (Agrawal and Emanuel, p. 357). Furthermore, the authors also admit that phase I oncology 
trials have “a rate of 10.3% for serious, that is grade 3 or 4, nonfatal, toxic events... Of these toxic events, 
85% were reported as partially or completely reversible… [with some data showing that] for single 
investigational chemotherapy agents, 15% of patients had a grade 4-life-threatening-toxic event” (Agrawal 
and Emanuel, p. 357). However, more importantly, it must be recognized that even accepting a slightly 
better risk/benefit ratio does not negate or undermine the need for the heightened competence standards. 
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 Without rehashing this issue, it is important that we recall the implications of such 
a realization, namely that as a result of this difference in relationship, a greater level of 
competence is needed for the medical research as opposed to the medical practice 
context. More specifically, this difference significantly impacts the appreciation and 
reasoning elements of competence, though we shall discuss only the former presently. 
While the consequences that one may experience when undergoing medical treatment are 
typically accounted for by the attending physician with the patient’s best interests being 
paramount, the consequences that may ensue to a subject of research will typically not be 
accounted for in the same way.
342
 Thus, while the extent to which a patient must 
appreciate a particular medical procedure for his consent to be competent and ethical 
might be mitigated by the fact that his physician and the therapeutic clinical community 
have accounted for the patient’s best interests prior to making available or proposing a 
certain medical procedure, the same does not hold true in the research context. Instead, it 
is of far greater importance in the research context that a subject be capable of 
appreciating the potential consequences of participation and the various manners in 
which such a decision may impact one’s life since no medical professional may exist in 
this context who attempts to account for that on behalf of the subject. Thus, it should not 
be surprising that the medical practice context may only warrant requiring, what I have 
                                                                                                                                                 
This is especially true since the underlying reasons for the greater competence standards, namely the three 
main differences between the medical practice and research context, persist regardless of an improved 
interpretation of the response rate in phase I oncology trials. Furthermore, and more specifically, the above 
claim that these types of trials are designed with the subject’s interest being placed second to the goals of 
the research also remains intact as it too is unaffected by a slightly improved interpretation of response 
rates.  
342
 Although sometimes ignored, the laws and ethical guidelines in most countries do require that a 
subject’s interest be accounted for at least minimally insofar as that subject is a person and has a certain 
moral standing and inviolable rights. Such standards may require, for example, that a subject cannot be 
subjected to unnecessary or excessive harm. However, such guidelines fall far short of amounting to a 
precept that requires that researchers account for the best interests of a subject.   
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referred to as Dependent Appreciation, since a patient can reasonably trust that any 
proposed medical procedures are recommended with his best interests in mind. However, 
the higher Imperfect, but Independent Appreciation standard, is needed for the research 
context, where subjects are more so left on their own to determine which decision would 
be in their best interest.  
 Secondly, the lack of alignment of interests between researchers and subjects may 
also increase the chance of abuse, corruption and an overall disrespect of one’s autonomy 
in research. Such abuses often occur in research in an attempt to better achieve the goals 
and aims of research.
343
 It is necessary, that such a possibility also be included in one’s 
appreciation. It is important that we not think that only the consequences of the non-
validated medical interventions need to be appreciated, but also a subject must somewhat 
foresee how it will feel to be treated at least in part as a means to someone else’s end, and 
the potential risks that may go along with that. This further demonstrates that Imperfect, 
but Independent Appreciation is needed for the medical research context since it is 
unlikely that anyone else will assist the prospective subject in appreciating such a fact.
344
 
 Thus it can be concluded that the difference in relationship between a researcher 
and subject compared to a physician and patient leads to two reasons for supporting this 
higher standard of appreciation in the medical research setting. First, as was argued, the 
need for a patient to appreciate, for example, a recommended therapeutic procedure, is 
lessened by the fact that in the medical practice context a patient can reasonably trust that 
the methodologies applied by, and recommendations of, her physician are in her best 
                                                 
343
 Refer back to Chapter Three and Chapter One for examples and further discussion of some such cases of 
abuse in research. 
344
 Such a problem will be somewhat mitigated by the proposal that will ultimately be presented in what 
follows. More specifically a proposal will be outlined which suggests that a subject rights advocate be 
employed to assist potential subjects in appreciating certain features of participating in medical research. 
 152 
 
interests, but in medical research, such an assumption would be untenable and unrealistic. 
Instead, it seems appropriate to require that subjects be able to appreciate the 
methodologies applied in research and what being a participant in such methods may 
mean for them. For instance, in a Phase I trial it would be crucial for a research subject to 
appreciate the consequence to her of the fact that the clinical trial is designed to “end just 
at that point where the drug becomes too toxic to administer”345 regardless of whether 
any beneficial effects were beginning to present themselves. Second, the greater 
appreciation recommended for the medical research context is made necessary by the fact 
that unlike in medical practice, the subject must appreciate the significance for herself, of 
being treated, at least in part, as a means to another’s end.   
 Additionally, though related to the third relevant difference between medical practice 
and research, which will be discussed in more detail in the following sections regarding 
understanding and voluntariness, the presence of the therapeutic misconception also affects 
the standard of appreciation required. As Chapter Three noted, the various factors that can 
contribute to the therapeutic misconception all make it more difficult for a prospective 
subject to possess adequate appreciation. It is next to impossible to have a substantial 
appreciation for the consequences of the decision to participate in research, if one is 
confused and considers the research trial their medical therapy instead. Obviously if subjects 
fail to understand that they are participating in research, they will fail to appreciate the 
consequences of such a decision.
346
 Thus, given the various factors that contribute to such a 
misconception, it is further imperative that we require the higher Imperfect, but 
                                                 
345
 Emanuel et al., 2003, p. 101. Also see: Benjamin Freedman. “Cohort-Specific Consent: An Honest 
Approach to Phase 1 Clinical Cancer Studies” IRB: Ethics and Human Research, Vol.12(1), pp. 5-7, 1990. 
346
 This may be a particularly difficult problem in cases where individuals lack medical insurance, thus 
rendering them unable to afford treatment, and therefore seek research trials as their only way of getting 
access to medical therapy. 
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Independent Appreciation standard, since it will be necessary that a subject be capable of 
not allowing such factors to hinder his appreciation of the fact that he is indeed 
participating in research.   
 
Reasoning 
 
 We may recall from Chapter One that reasoning involves the ability to “engage in 
a rational process of manipulating the relevant information.”347 This includes the ability 
to formulate proper interests and ends, effectively employ proper means/ends reasoning 
in pursuing those interests and ends, demonstrate some level of consistency in choices, 
actions and deliberation, as well as the ability to derive the appropriate conclusions from 
premises, and weigh risks and benefits of possible choices. It is through this ability to 
reason that the information we understand and appreciate is able to factor into our final 
decision. That is to say that “without the mental ability to engage in reasoning and 
manipulate information rationally, it is impossible for understanding and appreciation to 
issue in a decision.”348 We may also recall from Chapter One that any analysis of one’s 
reasoning ought to focus on the process by which a decision is made, and not on the 
particular outcome of the decision-making process.
349
 
 Given this characterization of reasoning, the highest level on our spectrum would 
involve the ability to determine one’s best interests in every situation and also know the 
                                                 
347
 Paul Appelbaum. “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment” The New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 357, pp. 1834-1840, 2007, p.1836.  
348
 Louis Charland, "Decision-Making Capacity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/decision-capacity/>. 
349
 We may recall that it is by this principle that disagreements can exist between reasonable people. 
Therefore, as previously discussed, reasonable patients or subjects may indeed disagree with their 
respective physicians and reach different conclusion from them. However, reaching such a conclusion is 
not in itself cause to suspect a flaw in their reasoning since a particular physician or medical personnel’s 
opinion is not exhaustive of the possible opinions of the reasonable individual.  
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most effective means by which to achieve such ends. By contrast, the lowest level of 
reasoning will involve the complete inability to figure out one’s best interests, and to be 
incapable of any means/ends reasoning. See Spec. 2 below for the full six level spectrum 
of reasoning.  
 
Spec. 2 Reasoning Spectrum 
 
1. Perfect Reasoning – Capable of determining one’s absolute best interests, and further 
determining the most effective means by which to achieve those interests. Perfect 
reasoning would also include wholly correct risk/benefit analysis. Put differently, one 
who possesses this level of reasoning would be able to establish that among various 
possibilities, end x would be in his best interest, and that means y would be the most 
effective and efficient manner in which to achieve that end. Such perfect reasoning is not 
only impossible since the reasoning of individuals can never be without flaw, but is 
further impossible since such reasoning would require a complete understanding of all the 
relevant facts and almost infallible foresight. This unattainable level of reasoning shall 
only serve as the upper limit on the spectrum of reasoning. 
 
2. Expert Reasoning – Often capable of determining one’s best interests and the most 
appropriate means of achieving it. Such reasoning may not require an unachievable 
perfect level of knowledge and foresight as was the case with perfect reasoning, but will 
still require an incredibly high amount of both. Therefore, this level of reasoning will 
likely only be possible by certain experts in the field in which they are making a decision. 
Experts will likely possess the amount of knowledge and amount of practice reasoning 
with such knowledge necessary to reason in this manner.
350
 Though not completely 
unattainable, as was perfect reasoning, it is doubtful whether most of us can perform this 
level of reasoning in much of our daily decisions. This is not only due to the fact that we 
may often lack the knowledge necessary in many situations to reason in this manner, but 
also due to the fact that we often fail to engage in the decision making process in a purely 
rational way. As Grisso and Appelbaum point out, “much attention has been devoted in 
recent psychological research to documenting the many ways in which people deviate 
from a purely ‘rational’ model of decision making. The role of emotions in decisional 
processes has been a particular focus of concern.”351    
 
                                                 
350
 It is important to recall that competence and its elements are decision and context relative. Thus, one 
who possesses an expert level of reasoning in one context, may find his ability to reason diminished in a 
radically different context. We may for example envision a biologist attempting to reason through the best 
way to verify a hypothesis regarding cellular structure, as compared to that same biologist attempting to 
reason through the best way to win a formula one race. It should be clear that such an individual may be 
capable of an expert level of reasoning in the first situation, but might be utterly lacking in his ability to 
reason in the second situation. 
351
 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p.55. 
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3. Imperfect, but Largely Independent Reasoning – While reasoning in the medical 
research context by terminally ill possible subjects will to some extent depend on 
material and information provided by the medical professionals involved either in the 
recruitment process, or in the ongoing trial itself, a person capable of this level of 
reasoning will also be capable of researching, and learning on his own, and more 
importantly using any learned facts in his assessment of the situation. Such a reasoner 
will be able to take the advice from medical personnel, and family or friends, as not being 
definitive or absolute, but as requiring one’s own independent analysis. Such an 
evaluation may involve the ability to ascertain whether the reasons and advice of others 
are questionable. A person who has the ability to reason at this level may not know what 
action will be in his absolute best interest with certainty, but is fairly assured that his 
independent analysis can provide him with a high probability of success in his decision 
making. 
 
4. Dependent Reasoning – Capable of following the reasoning as set out by others, but 
often lacking the ability to produce such reasoning on one’s own. An example may 
involve being able to follow the explanations of a medical professional regarding the 
risks and benefits of various treatment options, and following the reasoning behind the 
risk/benefit analysis that would lead the medical professional to select one option over 
the others. Such a reasoner may also be able to recreate the reasoned analysis on his own, 
but will ultimately lack the ability to have produced the analysis, provided by the medical 
professional, on his own in the first place.  
 
5. Low Ability to Reason – Seems to at times lack basic knowledge regarding one’s best 
interests, and struggles to follow means/ends analysis. Such a reasoner may further 
demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to engage with the risks and benefits of 
possible options and evaluate them. As a result, such a person may demonstrate frequent 
reversals of choice, often without basis.  
 
6. Complete Inability to Reason – Unable to grasp one’s best interests, and unable to 
engage in any means/ends reasoning. Individuals with such an inability will likely be 
infants or those with severe mental cognitive impairments. 
 
 While what I have referred to as Dependent Reasoning, is often seen as acceptable 
in the medical practice context,
352
 our first difference between medical research and 
                                                 
352
 Again, as was already mentioned with appreciation, there are little to no established guidelines or laws 
on exactly how much reasoning or competence overall, should be required of a patient in the medical 
practice context. However, we may appropriately assume that all that is typically required is a level of 
reasoning akin to what I have referred to as dependent reasoning, since one’s ability to reason, and indeed 
overall competence, is generally assumed to be intact by physicians in the medical practice context so long 
as the patient appears to follow and agree with the physician’s assessment. As Thomas Grisso and Paul 
Appelbaum elucidate, it seems only when certain indicators are present that a physician may question the 
reasoning, or overall competence of a potential patient. Such indicators may include: abrupt changes in a 
patient’s mental state, a refusal of treatment, and other contextual or situational factors such as a patient’s 
age (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, pp. 61-76). 
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practice shall again serve to demonstrate that this would be an inappropriate standard for 
the medical research context with terminally ill subjects. Just as with appreciation, the 
difference in the nature of the relationship between a physician and patient as compared 
to a researcher and subject will similarly impact the reasoning component of competence. 
 As already discussed, in the medical practice context, physicians and patients “are 
presumed to share the same goal: promoting patients’ health. They may disagree over the 
means, but a general coincidence of interests is ordinarily the rule.”353 Thus, since it is 
reasonable for a patient to trust that a physician’s analysis of treatment options is 
conducted with her best interests in mind, being able to follow and ultimately accept the 
analysis of the physician might be wholly appropriate in the medical practice setting, and 
a greater level of reasoning may not be required to provide consent to treatment. 
However, as already discussed, unlike the physician and patient whose interests will 
likely align, the researcher and subject can be expected to have interests that may 
conflict. The researcher’s interest is in the research, while the subject’s interests will 
likely be her own wellbeing. As previously noted, the procedures applied in research 
reveal the issue with such a conflict since the methods used to conduct research, such as 
randomization, double blinding, phase I trial designs…etc., conflict with best care 
standards that a patient would ordinarily receive. 
 Though this conflict is one that seems to occur inherently given the nature of 
research as contrasted with medical practice, the problem of conflict of interest in 
research is further exacerbated by the presence of corruption.
354
 Apart from the 
                                                 
353
 Berg et al., 2001, p. 279. 
354
 It is important to note that corruption and abuse, often of a financial nature, is certainly also possible in 
the medical practice context. (See: Dennis Thompson. “Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest” The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 329(8), pp. 573-576, 1993). However, as previously stated the 
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seemingly naturally occurring conflict issue in research that has already been discussed, 
as was previously briefly mentioned in Chapter Three there is unfortunately the potential 
for more sinister types of conflicts of interest,
355
 often of a financial nature. This 
difference between the two types of conflict is sometimes referred to as the distinction 
between conflicts of commitment and conflicts of interest,
356
 whereby the former only 
refers to the type of naturally occurring conflict that has been the main focus of much of 
the discussion thus far. However, with the commercialization of scientific discoveries 
there “has been a growing link between researchers and industry, leading to a profusion 
of reports about researchers’ conflicts of interest and the potential adverse consequences 
for research participants.”357 
 A previously mentioned example from Chapter Three included the case of Dr. 
Nancy Olivieri, the University of Toronto, the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
medical research context has inbuilt conflicts stemming from its very nature. This makes it easier for 
financial conflicts and corruption to appear, sometimes inconspicuously, in medical research than in 
medical practice since we already expect research to be conducted without an alignment of interests 
between the researchers and subjects.  
355
 See Chapter Three. 
356
 Emanuel et al., 2003, p. 370. 
357
 Emanuel et al., 2003, p. 369. Though for our current purposes the focus on these conflicts of interest will 
deal with their impact on subjects, it should also be noted that substantial studies have demonstrated that 
the sources of funding for research can greatly influence the outcome of the research. For instance, in a 
study of 349 cardiovascular clinical trials, Ridker and Torres found that “Among not-for profit trials, 51 
(49%) of 104 reported evidence significantly favoring newer treatments...By contrast, among for-profit 
trials, 92 (67.2%) of 137 reported evidence significantly favoring newer treatments...The proportion of 
trials significantly favoring new treatments for studies jointly funded by for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations was approximately midway between these 2 values (56.5%)…[Additionally] for randomized 
trials evaluating drugs, the proportions favoring newer agents were 39.5% for not-for-profit, 54.4% for 
jointly sponsored, and 65.5% for for-profit trials” (Paul Ridker and Jose Torres. “Reported Outcomes in 
Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-2005” 
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 295(19), pp. 2270-2274, 2006, p. 2272). This report 
also went on to show that device trials showed the largest discrepancy between not-for-profit and for profit 
trials in terms of outcome. For more on the manner in which research results can be biased see: Marcia 
Angell. The Truth About the Drug Companies (New York: Random House Inc., 2004). Also for a more 
current and detailed analysis of the consequences of industry funding on the results of clinical trials, see: 
Andreas Lundh, Sergio Sismondo, Joel Lexchin, Octavian Busuioc, and Lisa Bero. “Industry Sponsorship 
and Research Outcome” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Issue 12, Dec. 2012. This analysis 
provides an examination of a variety of factors including, efficacy results, risk ratio, and harm results, in 
order to demonstrate the disparity in results and conclusions between industry sponsored studies and those 
sponsored by other means. 
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pharmaceutical company Apotex, where Apotex insisted that Dr. Olivieri not inform 
research subjects of her concerns regarding the toxicity of the experimental drug being 
administered.
358
 Another example previously discussed involved the death of Jesse 
Gelsinger who was a subject of a Phase I gene therapy trial. Jesse was subjected to 
various unethical practices including being exposed to inappropriately high doses of the 
non-validated treatment and being included as a subject to the non-validated treatment 
despite the fact that “his ammonia levels fell outside the protocol’s safety limit.”359 
Additionally, it was discovered that an overarching financial conflict of interest likely 
played a role in such unethical conduct. Specifically, “after Jesse's death, the media 
reported that one researcher, Dr. James Wilson, held shares in a biotech company, 
Genovo, which stood to gain from the research’s outcome.”360 Apart from these two 
cases, there exist many more instances of financial conflicts of interests present in 
medical research. However, it should be noted that these types of harmful conflicts of 
interest need not necessarily be driven by personal financial gain. For instance other 
conflicts of interests in research may emerge as a result of a “preference for family and 
friends or the desire for prestige and power...[as well as the possible] interest in obtaining 
provocative results or pressure to favor previously published findings of colleagues, 
friends, or researchers in collaborating groups.”361 
 Given the conflicting interests that naturally occur due to the nature in which 
research is conducted, as well as the potential for these more sinister, often financial, 
                                                 
358
 J. Thompson, P. Baird & J. Downie. The Olivieri Report: The Complete Text of the Report of the 
Independent Inquiry Commissioned by the Canadian Association of University Teachers (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2001). 
359
 Robin Fretwell Wilson. “The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of Money and 
Prestige in Human Research” American Journal of Law & Medicine, Vol. 36, pp. 295-325, 2010, p 300.  
360
 Wilson, 2010, pp. 295-296. 
361
 Thompson, 1993, p.573.  
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conflicts of interests that may arise, it becomes apparent that a terminally ill research 
subject should require at least Imperfect, but Largely Independent Reasoning, for 
competent consent. Such an individual need not be able to research and analyze their 
predicament and choices at the level of a scholar or expert, but should be capable of 
largely independent analysis, which will include the ability to receive what a researcher 
tells her with a healthy skepticism, to effectively evaluate the situation on her own, and 
be sufficiently confident with her knowledge of the situation to be able to challenge a 
researcher’s advice or opinion should the situation warrant it.362 
 Though as already mentioned, the therapeutic misconception will be discussed 
more fully in the proceeding conversation regarding understanding and voluntariness, it is 
important to realize that any factors that contribute to such a misconception, will also 
present themselves as obstacles to proper reasoning. It thus remains imperative that this 
higher level of independent reasoning be required, since one who is capable of such 
reasoning, will also be far more likely to steer clear of the therapeutic misconception and 
will have her reasoning less impacted by those factors that contribute to such a 
misconception. 
 
 
                                                 
362
 Others have hinted at a similar notion. For example, in a discussion regarding the conflicting interests 
between researchers and subjects, Berg et al. state that “the need to take this conflict into account in the 
decisionmaking process is largely responsible for the differences between consent to research and consent to 
treatment” (Berg et al., 2001, p. 280). As has been suggested here, the best way in which to account for this 
difference between the research context and the treatment context and possibly remedy the potential 
damage that may occur to prospective subjects as a result of conflicting interests, is to require what I have 
referred to as Imperfect, but Largely Independent Reasoning in the research context, while only requiring 
what I have referred to as Dependent Reasoning in the therapeutic context. It is important to note that in the 
research context, the conflicting interests between researcher and subject must not only be appreciated by the 
potential subject as previously argued, but since what this means for the subject is that she may not be able to 
fully trust everything the researcher tells her as being in her best interest, must now also be prepared to reason 
through the advice of the researchers on her own without their assistance or interference, and question anything 
that appears dubious.    
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Understanding 
 
 Thus far we have mainly only dealt with our first difference between medical 
research and medical practice, namely the difference in relationship between a researcher 
and subject as compared to that between a physician and patient. This difference assisted in 
determining how much higher a standard of appreciation and reasoning ought to be required 
for the medical research context as opposed to the medical practice context with terminally 
ill individuals. However, the other two differences, namely the presence of the therapeutic 
misconception, along with the potential for exploitation of the mental state and situation of 
the terminally ill subject will be shown to similarly impact the understanding and 
voluntariness components of competence respectively. 
 We may recall that the understanding component of competence requires both being 
in possession of and comprehending the salient information needed for a particular decision. 
We shall presently only be concerned with the latter. In the medical context, being in 
possession of the relevant information is largely a function of the medical professionals’ 
willingness to share and impart the information. However, as mentioned at the onset of this 
chapter, our goal is not to determine what particular information ought to be considered 
material information and thus a necessary part of disclosure; such an issue has been debated 
in the literature and by the courts on numerous occasions.
363
 Instead, as was the case with 
appreciation and reasoning, we shall seek the appropriate level of understanding that a 
terminally ill person ought to be capable of in order to be considered competent to consent 
to medical research.  
                                                 
363
 Refer back to Chapter One for a discussion on the elements of disclosure and some of the controversies 
surrounding it. 
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 Though the concept of understanding may seem basic, an analysis regarding the 
ability to comprehend and 
 the psychological processes related to it are not easily defined. A person’s accurate 
 assimilation of information involves a complex series of events. First the 
 information must be received as presented, a process that is influenced not only by 
 sensory integrity, but also by perceptual functions such as attention and selective 
 awareness. Whatever is received then undergoes cognitive processing and is 
 encoded in a manner consistent with the person’s existing fund of information and 
 concepts, which in turn influences how, and how well, the message is recorded and 
 stored in memory.
364
  
 
However, given that some of these more intricate details surrounding our ability to 
understand are not vital to the present issue, it may be prudent to leave them aside and 
construct our understanding spectrum using only general terms such as high, basic and low 
understanding. While this terminological issue may appear to render the various standards of 
understanding that will be laid out in our spectrum as somewhat vague, such an issue will be 
remedied by providing a specific example for each level of understanding. The example will 
involve a newly diagnosed type II diabetic patient attempting to decide whether to take a 
particular medication for his ailment as suggested by his physician. Through such an 
example, the various differences and distinctions between the levels of understanding in our 
spectrum will be highlighted. See Spec. 3 below for the full six level spectrum of 
understanding. 
 
Spec. 3 Understanding Spectrum 
 
1. Perfect Understanding – Capable of comprehending everything regarding the particular 
issue that may factor into one’s decision. Such an individual would be able to grasp all 
possible information and would not be lacking in any knowledge on the matter before him 
and thus such a level of understanding is impossible to achieve.  
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 With perfect understanding our diabetic patient would be capable of knowing 
 everything related to his illness as well as the various treatment options. This would 
                                                 
364
 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p.38.  
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 include being able to fully grasp all knowledge related to:  i) the nature or causes of 
 his illness, ii) the illness’ effects on him both in terms of physically evident 
 symptoms as well as the internal biological and chemical effects on his body, and iii) 
 how the various treatment options work, including the pharmacokinetics and 
 pharmacodynamics
365
 of any drug and the likelihood of success related to the 
 various treatment options.
366
  
 
2. Expert Understanding – Capable of comprehending most of the current information 
regarding a particular issue that may factor into one’s decision. This would include the 
ability to grasp even the more obscure and esoteric information often only assumed 
comprehensible to scholars, specialists and experts on the matter. 
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 With expert understanding abilities, our diabetic patient would be capable of availing 
 herself of all current knowledge on the topic. This would not require perfect 
 understanding, as some matters in the medical sciences remain beyond even the 
 experts, but would require an ability to understand at the level of a medical specialist 
 in the field of diabetes. Such a person for example would need to be able to 
 understand not only that diabetes is a disease related to sugar, but more specifically 
 that it involves the body’s inability to either produce insulin or properly use insulin, 
 and the relation of this to the resulting high levels of glucose in the blood. Similarly, 
 such a person would be able to understand not only that this is dangerous, but also 
 why and how it is dangerous at an expert level. For instance, such a person would be 
 able to comprehend specifically how this ailment relates to a decrease in quality of 
 life by decreasing mobility, increasing the chance for other health complications 
 such as stroke, heart disease, kidney disease, blindness, amputation…etc. as well as 
 increase the chance of mortality.
367
 Similarly an expert understander would be able 
 to comprehend, not only that some treatment options might be helpful for him, but 
 more specifically the effects and risks of varying options and how they compare. For 
 example, this may include understanding that “as compared with standard therapy, 
 the use of intensive therapy to target normal glycated hemoglobin levels ... increased 
 mortality and did not significantly reduce major cardiovascular events.”368 
 Obviously such a level of understanding is generally lacking in daily decision 
 making and should not be deemed necessary for competence in most cases. 
 
                                                 
365
 We may recall from Chapter One that pharmacokinetics involves studying the bodily absorption, 
distribution, metabolism, and excretion of an agent, whereas pharmacodynamics are the “pharmacologic 
effects of the drug on the body (eg, nadir neutrophil or platelet count, nonhematologic toxicity, molecular 
correlates, imaging endpoints)” (Christophe Le Tourneau, J. Jack Lee, and Lillian L. Siu. “Dose Escalation 
Methods in Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials” J Natl Cancer Inst, Vol. 101(10), pp. 708-720, 2009, p. 709). 
366
 As we proceed through the understanding spectrum it will be precisely the ability to understand matters 
regarding these three types of issues that will aid in demonstrating the different levels of understanding 
with our diabetic case example.  
367
 Canadian Diabetes Association, Last accessed: 2014. <http://www.diabetes.ca/diabetes-and-
you/what/prevalence/>. 
368
 Brillon, Cordero, Richardson, Ganz et al. “Effects of Intensive Glucose Lowering in Type 2 Diabetes” 
The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 358(24), pp. 2545-2559, 2008, p. 2545. 
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3. High Understanding – Capable of comprehending much of the current and common 
information regarding a particular issue that may factor into one’s decision. This would 
include the ability to grasp some of the complicated information surrounding a decision, but 
would not involve the ability to comprehend some of the more obscure and esoteric 
information that was the case with the expert level of understanding. 
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 For our diabetic patient, a high level of understanding would not involve being able 
 to grasp the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of possible drug treatments, 
 as was the case with both higher levels of understanding. Such a person may not 
 even be able to fully comprehend the internal biological and chemical effects of 
 the disease. However, the patient will be capable of a high level of understanding 
 if they can understand the likely causes, symptoms, implications and possible 
 treatment options of the disease beyond a merely superficial level. Such a person 
 for instance should be able to grasp not only that a sedentary lifestyle and high 
 sugar and high fat diet contribute to the disease but would also be able to 
 understand how this occurs. This may include, for instance, being able to 
 understand some of the more intricate details such as which types of fats are 
 particularly harmful and which can be helpful in a proper diet.
369
  
 
4. Basic Understanding - Capable of comprehending some of the current and common 
information regarding a particular issue that may factor into one’s decision. Such a person 
may lack the ability to understand some of the complexities surrounding the decision as a 
high level understander might, but would nevertheless be capable of grasping the 
rudimentary facts necessary to still be able to engage in a meaningful discussion on the 
topic. 
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 For example a person with diabetes may possess basic understanding if he can only 
 grasp the more commonly known causes, symptoms, and treatment options. This 
 individual may be able to comprehend that poor diet and lack of exercise can 
 contribute to obesity which is related to the disease, that the disease can impact one’s 
 quality of life, and that certain medications and lifestyle changes can better the 
 situation, but not understand much more than that. Such a person may also only 
 understand that the medication may help decrease the probability of further harmful 
 effects associated with the disease, even if the person cannot fully grasp what those 
 effects might be.
370
  
                                                 
369
 For instance it has been demonstrated that saturated fat may be a key contributor to type II diabetes, 
while unsaturated fat is not (Haitao Wen, Denis Gris, Yu Lei, Sushmita Jha, Lu Zhang, Max Tze-Han 
Huang, Willie June Brickey and Jenny P-Y Ting. “Fatty acid–induced NLRP3-ASC inflammasome 
activation interferes with insulin signaling” Nature Immunology, Vol. 12, 2011, pp.408–415). 
370
 It should be noted that one of the main differences between the high level and basic level of 
understanding is that while a person who possesses the latter may understand that a disease will have x 
effects or that treatment option z will likely result in y consequences, a person with a high level of 
understanding will further be able to comprehend how the disease and treatment options function. For a 
patient dealing with a disease, understanding how the disease impacts one’s life can better assist him in 
making life choices and preparing accordingly. For instance understanding how diabetes develops may 
allow one to make better diet decisions. Although, as will be argued in what follows, this may be especially 
crucial for terminally ill subjects of research, since how research is conducted and not just that research is 
being conducted will be imperative to avoiding the therapeutic misconception. 
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5. Low Understanding - Barely capable of comprehending the current and common 
information regarding a particular issue that one may reasonably expect to factor into one’s 
decision. For such an individual, even rudimentary facts surrounding a particular decision 
may be beyond one’s abilities.  
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 For our diabetic patient, such a level of understanding may entail that he only be 
 able to grasp that his disease is related to unhealthiness, that it is bad for him and that 
 medicine is thought to help, though he may perhaps even struggle to fully 
 acknowledge those facts. Such an individual may be convinced for instance that 
 medicine or any medical intervention cannot aid him and that his disease was 
 obtained by purely random chance and cannot be alleviated or cured. 
 
6. Complete Inability to Understand - Incapable of comprehending any of the information 
regarding a particular decision. Individuals with such an inability will likely be infants or 
those with severe mental cognitive impairments. 
 Diabetic Example Case: 
 A person with a complete inability to understand will likely not even be able to grasp 
 that he has a disease. 
 
 In medical practice “patients are expected to be able to understand that information 
which must be disclosed under the law of informed consent.”371 Often, though there may 
sometimes be slight variations between jurisdictions, disclosure requires at least that the 
health professional “describe the disorder, potential ways to treat it, and their benefits and 
disadvantages...”372 Thus it can be stated that in medical practice, possessing sufficient 
competence for making treatment decisions requires being able to understand the nature of 
one’s ailment, sometimes including its cause, symptoms and long term consequences, if 
known, as well as some details surrounding the particular treatment options such as their 
risks and benefits and the associated likelihood of each. However, the extent to which such 
information must be comprehended is usually at a fairly basic level scientifically. That is to 
state that we do not require that patients have the ability to understand the cellular or 
molecular behaviour of their disease, nor the biological and chemical ways that their body 
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 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p. 38. 
372
 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, pp. 37-38. 
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will react to various treatment options. However, patients should be aware of the more 
apparent outward manifestations of their disease and treatment options. For example, we 
would not demand that a patient diagnosed with a sinus infection understand that the 
bacteria that often causes acute sinusitis includes Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus 
influenzae, and Moraxella catarrhalis, but we would require that they comprehend that this 
ailment has symptoms that may include headache, facial tenderness and pain in the sinuses, 
fever, feeling stuffy, sore throat…etc and that antibiotics may help cure it. Thus, the level of 
understanding needed of patients is certainly not that at the level of an expert, but will often 
be at best what I have referred to as a basic level of understanding.
373
  
 Furthermore, in the medical practice setting “understanding choice can also be 
reconciled with a decision to let a trusted physician decide what is the best treatment. Such a 
choice... may be made for good reasons and represent a decision in favor of one set of values 
(safety or anxiety reduction) over another (independence and personal initiative).”374 
However, it must be clear that this would not be appropriate in the medical research setting 
with research investigators. As previously argued, decisions to place one’s trust in one’s 
physician may be well grounded and based on the foundations of fidelity and an alignment 
of interests that physicians are often thought to have with their patients. However, as already 
discussed, this is not present in the researcher/subject relationship and thus any similar 
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 In some cases of routine procedures even a low level of understanding has generally been accepted. For 
example in consenting to a routine blood test in order to determine one’s cholesterol, a procedure that a patient 
may already be quite familure and comfortable with, current standards seem to allow for a patient to consent 
knowing only that there are little to no risks from a blood test, and that 1-2 weeks from giving blood they will 
have the data they seek. In such a case an ability to understand more complex information such as how the 
cholesterol numbers are determined using the blood sample as well as the existence and consequences of 
varying treatment options should the cholesterol be deemed too high, may not be necessary for a competent 
consent to a blood test, and as such, a low ability to understand has often been deemed appropriate. It should be 
pointed out though that despite the fact that such low levels of understanding may have become commonplace 
for many patients consenting to routine procedures, an argument may be made as to whether or not such low 
levels of understanding should be appropriate for even routine diagnostic procedures such as blood tests. 
374
 James Drane. “The Many Faces of Competency” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 15(2), pp.17-21, 1985, 
p.20. 
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relinquishing of decisional control to an investigator in a medical research trial may not be 
deemed competent or be ethically permissible. Thus while basic understanding and allowing 
a family physician to determine the best course of action, might often be seen as appropriate 
in the medical practice setting, its supporting reasons cannot similarly be applied in the 
medical research context with terminally ill subjects. 
 Instead, what is referred to in the understanding spectrum as a high level of 
understanding appears ethically necessary in the research context with terminally ill 
subjects, especially given the presence of the therapeutic misconception. As previously 
mentioned the main difference between the high level and basic level of understanding is 
that the former involves grasping how something occurs, while the latter may simply 
involve recognizing that something is occurring. For our diabetic example case, high 
understanding involved the patient being able to grasp not only that a sedentary lifestyle 
and high sugar and high fat diet contribute to the disease but also how. Understanding 
how, for example, his diet relates to the disease better enables him to make certain 
decisions such as deciding which types of fats should be avoided and which are more 
permissible. This distinction between the high and basic levels of understanding might be 
particularly important to terminally ill medical research subjects.  
 Though basic or in some cases even a low level of understanding may be generally 
appropriate in the medical practice setting, in the medical research context with terminally 
ill individuals the presence of the therapeutic misconception creates a need for a greater 
level of understanding. We may recall that the presence of the therapeutic misconception can 
severely hinder one’s understanding in a way that would render it insufficient for competent 
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decision making.
375
 Thus, if we hope for potential research subjects to be able to steer clear 
of such a misconception, it is imperative that we require high understanding, which would 
thus involve being able to grasp how research is conducted and not just that research is 
being conducted. This seemingly small distinction is imperative in avoiding the 
therapeutic misconception. For instance, being able to grasp how a Phase I trial functions; 
that it, for example, ends once the MTD (maximum tolerable dose) is discovered despite 
any possible benefits from receiving the non-validated drug, can greatly aid a potential 
subject in combating the therapeutic misconception, thus enabling her to make a 
competent decision. Similarly it will be imperative for competent decision making that 
potential subjects understand the other aspects surrounding how research functions. This 
will include grasping some of the methods applied in research such as randomization, 
double-blinding, and placebo controls, the grasping of which will aid a potential subject 
in avoiding the therapeutic misconception since understanding such methods will enable 
one to see the significant departure from standard therapy that medical research 
represents.  
 In addition it will be crucial that subjects also have a high level of understanding 
regarding the therapeutic misconception itself, and thus be able to grasp not just that a 
phenomenon such as the therapeutic misconception exists, but more specifically how. Most 
notably this will involve grasping at least some of the more common factors that contribute 
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 We must recall that the presence of the therapeutic misconception is not a rare occurrence that arises 
only with unintelligent individuals, for as studies have demonstrated this has become a pervasive problem 
in how, many subjects including those with high levels of education and intelligence understand their 
research trials. As has been documented, “when not given information about how treatment decisions 
would be made, subjects fabricated reasonable-sounding explanations that placed their therapeutic interests 
first. Even when information was offered about the procedures that would be employed (e.g., 
randomization, double-blind, placebos), many subjects failed to acknowledge what they had heard, to apply 
it to their own circumstances, or to admit that the procedures served any interests other than their personal 
care” (Berg et al., 2001, p.288). For further examples regarding the pervasiveness of the therapeutic 
misconception and to what extent it afflicts subjects, refer back to Chapter Three.   
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to the misconception, including: manipulative tactics employed by researchers, for example 
by brand naming clinical trials with names such as MIRACL, or SAVED, improper use of 
language in literature and by researchers, for example terms such as “therapeutic research”, 
or suggesting that clinical trials all have “therapeutic intent”, as well as the confusion that 
seems to exist in distinguishing between a physician and a researcher.
376
 
 Given this, it is imperative that subjects be capable of comprehending something in 
addition to what is required of them in the medical practice setting, namely these factors that 
may potentially hinder understanding. This may be quite difficult to grasp in light of all the 
opportunities for misconceptions in the research setting. However, how the therapeutic 
misconception functions and thus the presence of these types of factors should be 
understood by prospective subjects if we hope for them to make a competent decision based 
on a comprehension of the correct information. This means that unlike in the routine blood 
test case, or even in the sinus infection case, there exists a body of knowledge, some of 
which will be new and complex for terminally ill individuals, which must be understood in 
order to possess a level of understanding needed for competent consent to medical research. 
 It is crucial that we recognize that this requirement involves far more than a basic 
understanding that research is being conducted or that the therapeutic misconception exists, 
but also how research is conducted and how the therapeutic misconception exists and can 
impact one’s ability to correctly understand the nature of the research trial. The ability to 
understand must be great enough so as to have a reasonable expectation that potential 
subjects will not be making decisions based upon a therapeutic misconception. Thus, a high 
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 Refer back to Chapter Three for a more detailed analysis regarding the factors that contribute to the 
therapeutic misconception. 
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level of understanding should be necessary for competent decision making in the medical 
research context with terminally ill subjects.
377
   
 
Voluntariness 
 
 We may recall that unlike some current literature, Chapter One demonstrated the 
need to reformulate the voluntary choice criterion of competence as requiring something 
other than merely being able to express a choice.
378
 Instead the voluntariness necessary 
for competent decision making refers to an individual’s ability to make a decision that 
follows freely from her understanding, appreciation and reasoning.
379
 This is crucial since 
even if a person is capable of sufficient levels of understanding, appreciation and 
reasoning, but fails to make her final decision based on those considerations, then such a 
decision may be a severely incompetent one. As previously expressed, the ability to 
understand, appreciate, and reason are futile if they do not factor into the final decision 
being made. Unfortunately such a situation may very well present itself in cases whereby 
individuals feel weak, insecure, lack emotional strength, lack confidence in themselves or 
                                                 
377
 It should further be noted that requiring a high level of understanding from prospective subjects 
increases the likelihood that the subject will be able to grasp any new relevant information that arises as the 
clinical trial proceeds. Continued understanding, as previously mentioned, is necessary for true 
competence, since competence to consent is best thought of as an ongoing process and thus the need for a 
high level of understanding requirement appears all the more necessary.   
378
 See Chapter One. 
379 It is important to note that a voluntary decision need not proceed from only adequate levels of 
understanding, appreciation, or reasoning. That is, the voluntariness condition only requires that the 
decision made stems from one’s own understanding, appreciation, and reasoning, and that influences not 
hinder one’s ability to make such a free decision. We can imagine for instance an individual who is 
convinced that vaccinations are a conspiracy by the government to inject mind control devices into the 
population. Such an individual may choose to avoid receiving vaccinations, and does so freely and 
voluntarily since his decision stemmed from his own understanding, appreciation and reasoning, as 
mistaken as they may be. Such a decision would still qualify as incompetent for failing the first three 
criteria of competence, but not voluntariness. Therefore, a satisfaction of the first three elements of 
competence is not necessary for the voluntariness criterion to be satisfied. 
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their knowledge.
380
 “As a result, they may become overly susceptible to external 
influences that would otherwise not be considered undue. They may, for example, be 
overawed by the prestige of medical professionals or defer to an authority figure in their 
family.”381 This may be particularly important in the medical, and specifically the 
medical research, context with terminally ill individuals where decisions may be of an 
emotionally taxing nature and may require a certain confidence and strength of will.
382
   
 Prior to constructing a spectrum for voluntariness and determining the level 
appropriate for the research context with terminally ill subjects, it must be acknowledged 
that true voluntary action cannot be construed as an action done without any influencing 
factors.
383
 For instance, we would be remiss if we were to consider certain parental 
                                                 
380
 It should be recognized that the characterization of voluntariness as a certain type of ability represents a 
striking divergence from some current literature on the matter which attempts to identify voluntariness as 
more of a legal condition fulfilled by the absence of certain types of coercive forces. As Appelbaum, Lidz, 
and Klitzman state, “for legal purposes, a decision is presumed voluntary if no evidence exists that 
someone else has unduly influenced it or coerced the person deciding” (Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, and 
Robert Klitzman. “Voluntariness of Consent to Research: a conceptual model” The Hastings Center 
Report, Vol. 39(1), pp. 30-39, 2009, p. 32). The authors then continue on to explain the types of influences 
that may constrain voluntariness. Beauchamp and Childress similarly focus on attempting to identify undue 
forms of influence that would inappropriately control one’s decision (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, 
p.133-134). However, while a large focus here will indeed be on the types of influence that can be exerted 
on terminally ill prospective subjects, and determining which ones are inappropriate and how best to 
protect against them, there is also the added depiction of voluntariness as an ability, namely the ability to 
freely make a choice that follows from one’s own understanding, appreciation and reasoning, which will 
likely require a certain level of confidence in one’s self, emotional stability, and courage. Though 
approached slightly differently, Laura Weiss Roberts has suggested a similar approach to the 
conceptualization of voluntariness. She argues that volutariness should be defined “as ideally encompassing 
the individual’s ability to act in accordance with one’s authentic sense of what is good, right, and best in 
light of one’s situation, values, and prior history. Voluntarism involves the capacity to make this choice 
freely and in the absence of coercion” (Laura Weiss Roberts. “Informed Consent and the Capacity for 
Voluntarism” The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 159(5), pp.705-712, 2002, p.707). The recognition 
of voluntariness as an ability similar to the other elements of competence is vital since it better enables 
researchers and any competence assessors to pinpoint those who may be particularly vulnerable to making 
an involuntary decision. Identifying those who may be particularly at risk of making involuntary decisions 
and further knowing the specific qualities that contribute to making one prone to involuntary decision 
making is a key step in both being able to assess the voluntariness needed for competence, and creating an 
environment that is more likely to facilitate voluntary decision-making.  
381
 Berg et al., 2001, p. 25. 
382
 Again, refer back to Chapter One for a more detailed depiction of voluntariness.  
383
 It should be recognized that the conversation here regarding voluntariness will not delve into the deeper 
metaphysical questions surrounding the freewill/determinism controversy. Instead, for pragmatic purposes, 
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decisions, such as those that pose financial burdens as lacking in voluntariness because 
such decisions were influenced by concern for those parents’ children. Similarly we 
would not necessarily wish to consider a spouse’s decision to refuse a career opportunity 
abroad in order to remain with her husband as lacking voluntariness. It seems that we 
often allow for, and rightly so, certain influences to factor into voluntary decision-
making. It would be practically absurd to demand that voluntariness require a complete 
absence of any and all influences, for that would render it meaningless in the real world 
where often proper moral and prudential decision-making appears to warrant 
consideration of those with whom we have certain relationships. 
 Conversely, it is clear that not all influences are appropriate as some may indeed 
undermine the voluntariness of the decision. The following discussion will identify some 
specific examples of such undue influences, but for now, it suffices to state that some of 
the more commonly acknowledged ones include intimidation/bullying, deceit, 
manipulation, or any actions and behaviours that place excessive duress on the decision-
maker with the intent to coerce or control him. Others have noted this distinction between 
influences that hinder voluntariness and those that leave voluntariness intact. As 
Appelbaum, Lidz, and Klitzman note, “the presence of influences does not mean that a 
decision is not voluntary. A decision is involuntary only if it is subject to a particular type 
of influence that is external, intentional, illegitimate, and causally linked to the choice of 
the research subject.”384   
 Thus voluntariness proves to be difficult conceptually as it requires that a certain 
degree of controlling influences not be present while at the same time accepting that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the same metaphysical capacity for voluntary choice and action that is assumed in our laws will similarly 
be assumed as possible here and in what follows. 
384
 Appelbaum, Lidz, and Klitzman, 2009, p. 33. 
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certain degree of influences ranging from considerations of other persons to contextual 
factors may all legitimately figure into a voluntary decision. Therefore, voluntary 
decision making depends on one’s ability to take only appropriate influences into account 
and to account for them only up to a reasonable extent. Most importantly, the final 
decision made must be one that follows from the decision-maker’s own understanding, 
appreciation and reasoning.
385
 Given this understanding of voluntariness, see Spec. 4 
below for the full voluntariness spectrum. 
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 Some instances of pressure and coercion may clearly constitute undue influence. Extreme intimidation 
may represent such an example. However, there exist many situations whereby it will be difficult to 
determine whether or not an influence qualifies as undue. One often suggested way to characterize the 
distinction between influences that are undue and those that are appropriate in competent decision making 
is to determine whether or not the influence controls the decision-maker. For instance, “if a physician 
orders a reluctant patient to undergo cardiac catheterization and coerces the patient into compliance through 
a threat of abandonment, then the physician’s influence controls the patient. If, by contrast, a physician 
persuades the patient to undergo the procedure when the patient is at first reluctant to do so [by using 
convincing well reasoned arguments], then the physician’s actions influence, but do not control, the 
patient” (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009, p.133). One upshot of the explanation of voluntariness offered 
here is that it provides a method to assist in making these determinations. That is, it can be said that once it 
becomes clear that the influence in question has compromised the decision-maker’s ability to make a 
decision based on his understanding, appreciation and reasoning of the situation, then it is likely that the 
influence has become undue. In the above example, the threat of abandonment by the physician would 
clearly count as an undue influence since the patient’s decision would no longer be made based on his own 
understanding, appreciation, or reasoning of cardiac catheterization, but instead on fear. Whereas, 
appropriate persuasion through well reasoned arguments may enable the patient to better develop his own 
understanding and appreciation and ultimately still make a voluntary decision based on those 
considerations. Chapters Five and Six will delve more deeply into how to best test for an adequate level of 
volutariness and the other elements of competence.  
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Spec. 4 Voluntariness Spectrum
386
 
 
1. Perfect Voluntariness- This may be difficult to envision, but would essentially involve 
an individual who was completely impervious to any forms of undue influences or 
coercion.
387
 Such a person would be able to perfectly balance the extent to which any 
external influences should factor into her final decision and thus could never be 
controlled by others.  
 
2. Extremely High Voluntariness- Very often capable of reaching a decision for one’s self 
based upon his own understanding, appreciation and reasoning regarding the situation. 
Such an individual should not be characterized as being insensitive to other’s interests or 
as never taking others into account, but rather as never being controlled by influences 
such that any decision made would fail to follow from his own understanding, 
appreciation or reasoning. Thus such a person can be persuaded with reason, and is 
willing to take the advice and interests of others into consideration, but only up to an 
appropriate extent and will ultimately possess the confidence needed to make the decision 
for himself. This person would likely be secure and confident enough in his own decision 
making so as to be able to resist even strong pressures and coercive attempts from others 
such as excessive appeals to emotion, or exploitative and manipulative tactics. 
 
3. High Voluntariness- Often able to reach a decision for one’s self based upon her own 
understanding, appreciation and reasoning regarding the situation. Such a person may 
still at times be susceptible to emotional pleas,
388
 and manipulative or exploitative tactics, 
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 It should be noted that “until recently, there has been a remarkable paucity of empirical research on the 
capacity for voluntary choice in the context of consent, and the means to assess it” (Charland Louis. 
"Decision-Making Capacity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/decision-capacity/>). Though this 
situation is beginning to shift as more scholars in the field recognize the complexities surrounding 
voluntariness and its significance for competence and informed consent, we are far from a general 
consensus on the appropriate characterization of it, as well as the best way to test for and protect it.  
387
 It is important to note that coercion as it is used within this context applies only to situations whereby 
another human agent attempts to gain control of the decision maker. This contrasts with the broader and 
sometimes common usage of the term “coercion” as referring to any scenario where the decision maker has 
her options limited, which could then include cases where a person’s choices are limited though chance and 
states of affairs unrelated to any other person. However, coercion in any morally significant sense should 
be defined more narrowly and can be properly characterized by the “following definition: A person is 
coerced when her choices are unfavorably narrowed by someone who is trying to get her to do something 
she would not otherwise do” (Jennifer Hawkins and Ezekiel Emanuel. “Clarifying Confusions about 
Coercion” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 35(5), pp.16-19, 2005, p.17). Refer back to Chapter Three for 
a further explanation of the difference between a morally significant coercion and choice constraining 
natural states of affairs. 
388
 This is not to suggest that emotions can never factor reasonably into a decision. Indeed given that often 
to be human may involve possession of moral sentiments and feelings of compassion and generosity, it is 
clear that competent and voluntary decisions may often in daily lives be persuaded by emotions. Person A’s 
decision to skip a concert she had be looking forward to for months to tend to a grieving friend who 
recently lost a loved one would and should certainly count as a voluntary decision. However, it is important 
to note that emotional dispositions may only form a part of a voluntary decision, as the moment a decision 
is made purely on emotional grounds with little to no application of the understanding, appreciation, and 
reasoning that comprise competent and thus autonomous decision making, it can be seriously questioned 
whether or not such a decision flowed voluntarily from the person making it. We can imagine person B, 
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but will often likely have the confidence in her own decision making abilities that she can 
filter out most voluntariness hindering influences.  
 
4. Medium Voluntariness- Sometimes able to reach a decision for one’s self based upon 
his own understanding, appreciation, and reasoning. Such a person may be capable of 
making decisions, but may sometimes lack the confidence in himself to do so without the 
support of others. Such an individual may not always trust his own knowledge or 
judgments and may thus rely too heavily on the advice of others, or may find it difficult 
to resist pressure from others as well.  
 
5. Low Voluntariness- A person who possessed this level of voluntariness may be 
unlikely to reach a decision that stemmed from her own understanding, appreciation and 
reasoning. Often individuals who are afflicted with extreme fears, phobias, addictions, or 
anxiety may be more susceptible to exploitative tactics that use those fears or anxieties in 
order to gain controlling influence over the person. Persons may also qualify as 
possessing only a low level of voluntariness if they see themselves as too ignorant or too 
emotionally weak to make certain decisions and may thus excessively appeal to authority 
figures, or may at times even be easily swayed by the mere suggestion of another.   
 
6. No Voluntariness- Similar to perfect voluntariness, it is difficult to imagine what this 
may look like in an adult. Those who are completely incapable of making any voluntary 
decisions will likely only represent newborns, very young children,
389
 and the extremely 
mentally disabled. 
 
 The recognition of the significance of voluntariness in medical research 
participation decision making is fairly ubiquitous. In fact the first line of The Nuremberg 
Code states: “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”390 
Sometimes it is assumed that voluntariness merely requires that a person not be 
                                                                                                                                                 
who though capable of high levels of understanding, appreciation and reasoning, lacks confidence in 
himself, and is often fearful of confrontation or disappointing others. As a result person B may make 
decisions that may not follow from his ability to understand, appreciate or reason; instead he may be easily 
persuaded to do things out of fear of disappointing others, or he may feel pressured by others and fearing 
confrontation may make decisions that are not really his. Peer pressure may indeed be the most apt example 
to describe this phenomenon, since adolescents may often make decisions due to feelings of pressure and 
fears of not “fitting in”, that they otherwise would not make. Depending on the circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to consider some such decisions as lacking in voluntariness. 
389
 Some have suggested that “an individual’s capacity for voluntarism is affected by the person’s 
development in terms of cognitive abilities, emotional maturity, and moral character” (Roberts, 2002, 
p.707) which may all be fairly minimal at young ages. A greater capacity to make voluntary choices 
“accompanies the older adolescent’s emerging abilities to think abstractly, to recognize personal values in 
relation to those of others, to reflect on one’s place in the world, and to begin to consider the repercussions 
of a decision based on some accumulated personal life experience” (Roberts, 2002, pp.707-708). 
390
 U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt et al. In Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law, Vol. 2, No. 10, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 
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physically forced into any decision or action. However, the nature of voluntariness and its 
fulfillment as a criterion of competence are far more complicated. The Nuremberg Code 
briefly elucidates this point by stating that subjects “should be so situated as to be able to 
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, 
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion…”391 
Unfortunately, we may recall that our second significant difference from Chapter Three 
between the medical practice and medical research context significantly impacts 
voluntariness. This second significant difference between the two contexts, and the only 
one that has yet to be discussed presently, namely the potential for exploitation of the 
situation or mental state of terminally ill subjects, demonstrates the increased concern 
regarding voluntariness in the medical research context. 
 As elucidated in Chapter Three, terminally ill subjects may often be in pain, 
desperate, unrealistically hopeful, and anxious about financial concerns related to the cost 
of treatment, along with dealing with other possible stresses as well. While unfortunate 
situations alone are not sufficient to deem decision making involuntary, it does suggest 
that these individuals may be additionally susceptible to enticements of hope, possible 
deceit, manipulation or pressures.
392
 Terminally ill potential subjects are vulnerable to 
having their situation exploited by those interested in admitting research subjects into 
clinical trials. Thus while situations and states of affairs do not in themselves diminish 
voluntariness, they can make it more likely that something else will.  
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 U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt et al. In Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law, Vol. 2, No. 10, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 
392
 Appelbaum, Lidz and Klitzman offer a similar point suggesting that “situational constraints may set the 
stage for intentional efforts to influence decisions (including intentional manipulation of the situation 
created by the constraints) and may make intentional efforts both easier to engage in and harder to detect” 
(Appelbaum, Lidz and Klitzman, 2009, p. 33). 
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 As Chapter Three highlighted, various methods and approaches are often 
employed by researchers that would seem to exploit the situation and mental state
393
 of 
the terminally ill prospective subject and thus undermine voluntariness. This included 
tactics such as brand naming clinical trials with names that suggest miraculous cures, 
employing recruitment strategies that use the hopeful and desperate mindset of 
individuals in order to make the clinical trial appear in an unrealistically positive light, or 
even applying pressure on potential subjects who may not have the confidence to 
resist.
394
 Even power relationships and feelings of trust and dependency can be exploited 
in this context.
395
 As the Tri-Council Policy Statement notes, IRBs and REBs should “pay 
particular attention to the elements of trust and dependency - for example, within 
doctor/patient… relationships - because these can constitute undue influence on the 
patient to participate in research projects, especially those involving residents in long-
term care facilities or psychiatric institutions.”396 This may be especially problematic 
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 It should be noted that the mental state of some terminally ill individuals may render them, at least at 
certain times, with a very low ability for voluntariness and thus extremely susceptible to influence that may 
have otherwise not necessarily been excessive or undue. Physical illnesses, for instance, may sometimes be 
accompanied by depression and since “ambivalence and indecisiveness, poor energy, and negative thoughts 
are among the elements that define depression and physical disorders” (Roberts, 2002, p.708), it becomes 
clear that illness may severely impact one’s ability for voluntariness. As previously noted, pain may also 
affect the mental state of terminally ill individuals as it may create a greater sense of desperation further 
making one vulnerable to influences that may lead to making an involuntary choice. Refer back to Chapter 
Three for further detail regarding pain’s potential role in the mental state of individuals considering medical 
research participation. 
394
 As previously discussed, some of these tactics also contribute to the therapeutic misconception and thus 
may also undermine other elements of competence.  
395
 See: Nancy Kass, Jeremy Sugarman, Ruth Faden, and Monica Schoch-Spana. “Trust: The Fragile 
Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 26(5), pp.25-29, 
1996, for more on how trust relationships specifically with one’s physician can impact the decision-making 
process. 
396
 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans. 1998 (with 2000, 2002 and 2005 amendments) p.2.4. 
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with a terminally ill patient whose physician also recruits subjects for certain research 
trials.
397
 
 Apart from the actions and behaviours of physician recruiters and of research 
investigators, Chapter Three had further mentioned the potential for certain familial 
pressure which can create undue influence. Many ill subjects’ struggle to afford the costs 
of their health care leads them to enroll in clinical trials.
398
 Again, though such a situation 
may not necessarily deem a choice as lacking voluntariness, it may if the ill individual 
feels unduly pressured by his family into participating in a clinical trial in order to 
unburden them with the financial costs.   
 Thus it appears that the situation and mental state of terminally ill individuals can 
be such that they are susceptible to controlling influences that will have them make 
decisions that did not freely follow from their own understanding, appreciation, or 
reasoning of the situation. If a terminally ill individual adequately understands, 
appreciates and reasons about whether or not to participate in a medical trial, but 
ultimately makes her decision to participate during a period of desperation that was 
unfairly exploited by research recruiters, due to pressure from trusted physicians or 
family members, or even during a phase where the individual lacked the emotional 
strength or confidence needed to resist certain influences, then such a decision may lack 
the voluntariness necessary for competence.    
                                                 
397
 As previously mentioned this situation can also add to the confusion that already exists when 
distinguishing between researcher and doctor and the differing roles of each and thus may contribute to the 
therapeutic misconception. Refer back to Chapter Three for more on this issue. 
398
 See: The President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, “Chapter 16: Subject 
Interview Study,” Endnote 47, in Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995); and Kolata and Eichenwald. 
“Stopgap Medicine: For the Uninsured, Experiments may Provide the Only Treatment” New York Times, 
June 22, 1999. Also refer back to Chapter Three for further details relating to the significance of monetary 
issues in clinical trial participation decisions.  
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 Though the previous sections employed the differences between medical practice 
and medical research in order to demonstrate that a specifically higher level of 
appreciation, reasoning, and understanding respectively are necessary in the medical 
research context with terminally ill individuals, the same approach would seem odd with 
voluntariness. As previously argued, a terminally ill subject should require what I have 
referred to as imperfect but independent appreciation, imperfect but independent 
reasoning, and a high level of understanding in order to make a competent decision 
regarding medical research participation. Possessing lesser abilities in any of those 
categories would render one’s decision incompetent. However, requiring a specific level 
of ability related to voluntariness from our spectrum would be inappropriate since being 
susceptible to manipulation, deceit, exploitation, or lacking in confidence in one’s self or 
one’s knowledge does not itself necessitate that someone will be manipulated, deceived, 
exploited, or pressured and thus make an involuntary choice; it rather just increases the 
probability of such events. We would rightly hesitate to consider voluntary the decision 
of a terminally ill person to participate in research if she possessed anything less than 
what I have referred to as medium voluntariness, but otherwise the differences between 
the other levels of voluntariness seem only to affect the likelihood that someone’s 
decision will be involuntary.  
 Thus we should always hope for the utmost ability to make a voluntary decision 
from our decision makers, in this case terminally ill potential subjects of research, while 
at the same time realizing that a lesser ability to do this does not automatically disqualify 
one from competent decision making. Therefore, instead of recommending a specific 
level of voluntariness that is appropriate for the medical research context with terminally 
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ill subjects, we shall instead employ Hans Jonas’ descending order of permissibility 
concept, along with a recognition that the recruitment process of terminally ill subjects 
should be conducted in such as way so as to prevent involuntary choices from being 
made.  
 Hans Jonas was fairly skeptical regarding allowing the ill to participate in clinical 
trials, for as he states, their “physical state, psychic preoccupation, dependent relation to 
the doctor, the submissive attitude induced by treatment- everything connected with his 
condition and situation makes the sick person inherently less of a sovereign person than 
the healthy one.”399 However, what has been presented thus far here is far less 
pessimistic. Indeed, the arguments advanced presume that the terminally ill may still 
make competent and autonomous choices, it may just be more difficult to do so given the 
context. However, despite Jonas’ pessimism, he offers a useful concept for the 
recruitment of subjects. He suggests that recruitment be done by applying his rule of the 
descending order of permissibility, whereby “those patients who most identify with and 
are cognizant of the cause of research-members of the medical profession (who after all 
are sometimes patients themselves)-come first; the highly motivated and educated, also 
least dependent, among the lay patients come next; and so on down the line.”400 The idea 
here being to attempt to admit only those subjects into research for whom it would seem 
the least unethical to recruit. Though as a whole such an approach may seem problematic 
since it may appear to restrict recruitment too far
401
 or lack specified categories along the 
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 Hans Jonas. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects” Daedalus, Vol. 98(2), 
pp.219-247, 1969, p.239. 
400
 Jonas, 1969, p.239-240. 
401
 Though Jonas suggests that such a problem can be alleviated by continuing down the order of 
permissibility, he appears to recognize that such a procedure may indeed lead to slower recruitment. 
However, he does not allow this to deter his ethical outlook as he states that we must “remember that a 
slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten society, grievous as it is to those who have to 
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order of permissibility such that it could be practically applied, it may be reconstructed 
and applied to our voluntariness spectrum.    
 Obviously we desire that potential subjects be the type of individuals who possess 
what I have labeled as an extremely high ability for voluntariness. This would entail that 
they be confident in their own decision making and so cannot be easily swayed by undue 
appeals to emotion, authority figures, or manipulative, deceitful and exploitative tactics. 
We would further hope that a potential subject of research be secure enough in her own 
abilities and emotionally stable enough such that she would feel comfortable stating and 
defending her position/decision against undue pressure and furthermore be able to resist 
any coercive tactics. However, since voluntary choice is still possible for those who 
possess lesser abilities in this regard, we may appropriately accept that they too can 
competently decide to participate in a trial and move down the voluntariness spectrum via 
the decreasing order of permissibility concept until the clinical trial has been filled. 
However, given that this approach might still ultimately permit some individuals who 
possess only a medium ability for voluntary decision making to enroll in clinical trials, it 
becomes incumbent upon us to ensure that the environment in which they make the 
decision to participate fosters a voluntary decision making process. As the final section of 
this chapter will elucidate, this is likely best achieved through the employment of a 
subject’s rights/competency advocate whose role it will be to both assess and bolster the 
elements of competence with prospective terminally ill subjects. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
deplore that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but that society would indeed be threatened by 
the erosion of those moral values whose loss, possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific 
progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having” (Jonas, 1969, p. 245). 
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Freedman Revisited  
 Before proceeding with an explanation of such a strategy, it would be prudent to 
note a departure from some current thought. As previously mentioned in Chapter Three, 
Benjamin Freedman maintained that an ignorant consent to research participation may be 
ethically permissible. It was then argued that the three arguments Freedman presented in 
favour of such an account were each flawed for a variety of reasons.
402
 
 However, here again, we may note a strict departure from Freedman’s approach. 
While it has presently been argued that a terminally ill potential subject of research ought 
to possess certain required levels of the sub-abilities of competence in order to be able to 
ethically consent to participate in the research, Freedman instead offers his requirement 
of responsibility condition.
403
 This suggestion states that we ought to only require that a 
potential subject make a responsible, even if uninformed and ignorant, choice. More 
specifically, Freedman asserts that the responsibility:  
 which we require is to be predicated not on the nature of the particular choice, but 
 on the nature of the patient/subject. What we need to know is whether he is a 
 responsible man (‘in general,’ so to speak), not whether the choice which has 
 been made is responsible... In this sense, responsibility is a dispositional 
 characteristic. To say that someone is a responsible individual means that he 
 makes choices, typically, on the basis of reasons, arguments, or beliefs-and that he 
 remains open to the claims of reason, so that further rational argument might lead 
 him to change his mind.
404
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 More specifically it was argued that the differences between the research and medical practice context, 
especially the difference relating to the nature of the relationship between a physician and patient as 
compared to that between a researcher and subject, the fact that Freedman’s examples failed to be actual 
examples of ignorant consent, and the fact that at least in this particular context, ignorance, even if willful, 
renders one incompetent to make a decision, all demonstrated that Freedman’s proposal and its underlying 
arguments were untenable. Refer back to Chapter Three for the entire objection to Freedman’s proposal. 
403
 It should be noted that Freedman additionally includes a voluntarism condition for proper consent. 
However, we shall presently only be concerned with Freedman’s argument regarding permitting an 
ignorant but responsible consent. Freedman’s account of voluntarism and more specifically the manner in 
which it may differ from our account of voluntariness will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
404
 Benjamin Freedman. “A Moral Theory of Informed Consent” Hastings Center Report, Vol.5(4), pp.32-
39, 1975, p. 35. 
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It is important to recognize that Freedman characterizes his responsible choice condition 
in this manner in order to avoid permitting overly paternalistic actions toward potential 
subjects. By suggesting that we only consider whether the person is typically responsible, 
and not consider whether the particular choice itself is a responsible one, Freedman hopes 
that we have prevented those inclined to behave paternalistically from being able to 
refuse another’s choice merely because they deemed it to be a bad or irresponsible 
choice. However, despite this alleged upshot, permitting ignorant consent to research and 
applying this responsible choice condition, instead of requiring a more typical informed 
consent procedure, or the more rigorous competence requirements that have been argued 
for in this chapter, proves to be a flawed proposal. 
 First, a proper understanding of competence and the medical research context 
reveals that it is ethically irrelevant whether or not a potential subject of research has 
previously demonstrated responsible decision making in other aspects of his life and may 
therefore be assumed to be a responsible person. As has already been argued, competence 
to consent is task and context relative. Similarly, it may be argued that one’s ability to 
make a responsible choice is relative to the demands of the particular context. A person 
may possess a great level of understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and voluntariness 
and thus be able to engage in a meaningful and responsible decision making process in 
one context, but be utterly lacking in some or all of those abilities in another context. 
Contexts that are overly emotional, stressful, or complicated, for instance, may make 
responsible decision making more difficult. Thus, in assessing whether one’s consent to 
participate in research is competent or responsible, it would be prudent to examine the 
choice being made within the actual context within which it is being made, as opposed to 
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determining whether the decision-maker has made responsible choices in the past in other 
contexts. This is to state that past decision-making performance, in separate unrelated 
decision-making contexts, fails to be a good indicator of performance in new contexts. 
Even Freedman admits that “all responsible people are at times pigheaded, at times short-
sighted, at times flighty. That is to say, all responsible men at times act irresponsibly.” 405 
 The difficulty in extrapolating from past decision-making performances might be 
especially true for the medical research context with terminally ill subjects, since as has 
been demonstrated, this context allows for many otherwise previously competent and 
responsible individuals to make less than competent and responsible decisions. This, as 
previously explained, is due to the myriad of factors, including possible desperation, the 
presence of pain, the potential for exploitation, and the therapeutic misconception along 
with all of its possible contributing factors, which make this context a particularly 
difficult one for decision-makers. 
 A second issue with Freedman’s proposal is that it remains unclear how one is 
ever able to determine that a person is by nature a “responsible person”. The problem is 
that the term “responsibility” is ambiguous and Freedman fails to provide any concrete 
criteria for who may qualify as being responsible.
406
 It may be reasonable to suggest that 
responsible decision-making requires that one be able to make a choice having 
understood the relevant facts related to the decision, been able to somewhat foresee what 
it may be like to live with the consequences of the decision, and to be able to compare 
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 Freedman, 1975, p. 35. 
406
 It should also be acknowledged that even if Freedman provided some criteria for responsibility, it would 
still remain unclear who would decide whether the decision-maker is a responsible person. Certainly 
researchers would typically not have the type of longstanding relationship with prospective subjects that 
would be needed in order to note a past pattern of responsible decision-making. In fact, in many instances 
the informed consent process is delegated to someone on the clinical team who is a stranger to the 
prospective subject, and who will likely not even be the primary investigating physician. (I am grateful to 
Professor Duff Waring at York University for bringing this point to my attention). 
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and contrast possible choices through a risk/benefit analysis. However, this would entail 
that responsible decision-making may require some level of understanding, appreciation, 
reasoning, and thus competence, and if so, then Freedman would be left with the same 
question which began this current project, namely determining how much competence 
ought to be required for subjects to be able to consent to participate in research. Though 
Freedman may not wish to construe responsibility in this fashion, it remains unclear how 
else to define it,
407
 and given this ambiguity, it thus further remains uncertain how one 
will be able to determine whether or not a person satisfies this responsibility condition.   
 Given these two issues, it becomes clear that such an approach is not practically 
tenable, nor would it aid in improving the ethicality of research. We ought thus to 
proceed acknowledging that the competence sub-ability requirements previously set out, 
are likely to be a better way forward in order to ensure that prospective terminally ill 
subjects of research can ethically provide consent to participate, and that their autonomy 
is protected. 
 
The Strategy going Forward 
 
 Given that we have now established a minimum level of ability for all four 
elements of competence, it can be stated that thus the minimum level of competence 
required for a terminally ill subject to consent to participate in research would be the 
amalgamation of these four minimum standards. That is, only by satisfying the minimum 
                                                 
407
 It would be difficult to argue that a responsible decision can be made if a decision-maker is unable to 
understand any of the relevant facts, appreciate the consequences of the decision, or be able to reason 
through the pros and cons of possible choices. Indeed, without at least some minimum level of ability to do 
this, it becomes difficult to imagine what responsible decision-making would look like. 
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levels of each of these four sub-abilities can one be said to truly be substantially 
competent in order to be able to provide consent in this medical research context.
408
  
 How ought policy to proceed then with terminally ill research subjects? It should 
be apparent by now that merely requiring that an informed consent form be signed 
without an adequate determination of competence represents too lax and ethically 
perilous a standard.
409
 Ensuring a sufficient level of competence is paramount in 
informed consent, since any informed consent without competence fails to be any real 
expression of a person’s autonomy. This chapter has already demonstrated how much 
competence one should possess in order to be able to provide consent to medical research 
for terminally ill subjects. However, the question remains regarding the specific policies 
that ought to be enacted in order to best protect terminally ill potential subjects of 
                                                 
408
 It must be realized that two separate recommendations have actually been proposed by the preceding 
arguments. The explicit recommendation is precisely what has been stated, namely that the four elements of 
competence should be required at the levels I have specified, and that a descending order of permissibility 
should be utilized for voluntariness. However, there is an implicit recommendation here as well, namely 
that there must be an overall shift in mentality and approach when addressing competence in this setting. In 
a discussion regarding competence to consent to treatment, Grisso and Appelbaum point out that we tend to 
“all assume, appropriately, that the people with whom we deal are competent to make decisions about their 
own lives- indeed, the law makes a similar assumption- only when our unconscious monitoring detects 
something unexpected do we attend to it directly” (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p.61). This statement 
refers to the fact that in medicine, as in most other facets of life, we assume others to be competent, unless 
we are given a particular reason to suspect otherwise. However, though the proposal here stops well short 
of assuming incompetence for potential subjects, it does suggest that in the medical research setting with 
terminally ill persons, it would be inappropriate to simply assume competence. Thus, some measures and 
assessments ought to be implemented that may assist in bolstering the competence of prospective subjects 
as well as ultimately testing for the required levels of the four sub-abilities in order to ensure sufficient 
competence to consent to the research trial. Specifics regarding such measures and assessments will be 
explored in the following chapters. 
409
 This further represents a departure from current practice in the therapeutic setting since in typical 
medical practice a patient is presumed to be competent unless there are good reasons to suspect otherwise 
and thus actual determinations of competence are not generally thought necessary. For example, the Health 
Care Consent Act of Ontario states that “a person is entitled to rely on the presumption of capacity with 
respect to another person unless he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that the other person is 
incapable with respect to the treatment…” (Health Care Consent Act, S.O. 1996, CHAPTER 2 Schedule A, 
S. 4 (3)). However, peoples’ competence “will depend in part on the demands of the specific task that they 
face” (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p. 21) and as previously argued the task of consent and the context 
within which that task must be performed for terminally ill research subjects is radically different from the 
task of consent in the medical practice setting for patients, such that automatic presumptions of competence 
in the medical research context with terminally ill individuals would be ethically inappropriate. 
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research. In a discussion regarding phase I trials on the terminally ill, George Annas 
suggests a threefold approach. He asserts that: 
 In addition to all other legal and ethical requirements for the approval of a 
 research protocol by national and local scientific and ethical review boards 
 (including IRBs), research in which terminally ill patients participate as research 
 subjects shall be approved only if the review board specifically finds that: 
 (a) The research, if it carries any risk, has the intent and reasonable probability 
 (based on scientific data) of improving the health or well-being of the subject, or 
 of significantly increasing the subject’s length of life without significantly 
 decreasing its quality; 
 (b) There is no a priori reason to believe that the research intervention will 
 significantly decrease the subject’s quality of life because of suffering, pain, or 
 indignity attributable to the research; and, 
 (c) Written informed consent…may be solicited only by a physician acting as a 
 patient rights advocate who is appointed by the review committee, is independent 
 of the researcher, and whose duty it is to fully and objectively inform the potential 
 subject of all reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits inherent in the research 
 protocol.
410
 
 
Though such a proposal might indeed protect terminally ill research subjects, it is 
important to note that it is not overly realistic. Both conditions (a) and (b) may seem not 
only too difficult to satisfy, but condition (a) specifically might prove to be impossible. 
 Condition (a) which requires that the research must have the intent and reasonable 
probability of improving the health or well-being of the subject is somewhat ambiguous. 
It could imply that the primary intent of the research must be the health interest of the 
subject. However, as was previously argued, given the methodologies employed in 
medical research, namely randomization, placebo controls, and double blinding,
411
 
research cannot be viewed as having the primary intent of achieving the well-being and 
health interests of its subjects. We may instead though interpret this condition to imply 
merely that some intent, and not necessarily the primary intent, must be the improvement 
                                                 
410
 George Annas. “The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, Helsinki, and 
Beyond” Health Matrix, Vol. 2, pp. 119-140, 1992, p. 138. 
411
 As previously argued these methods applied in research demonstrate a strict departure from best care 
standards for patients.  
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of the health or well-being of the subject. However, this interpretation would similarly 
not suffice as it would render phase I trials impossible.
412
 Phase I trials are designed 
specifically to test toxicity and cannot be misconstrued as having any type of therapeutic 
intent. Furthermore, given the incredibly low response rate
413
 and the fact that the trial 
will end once the maximum tolerable dose is determined regardless of any therapeutic 
benefit, phase I trials cannot have any reasonable probability of improving one’s health. 
Annas’ policy would thus essentially prohibit phase I trials on the terminally ill. It is then 
unclear how the data obtained from these trials would ever be obtained and how the other 
phases of the clinical trial could ever proceed.  
 Though critics may point to the flaws in Annas’ overall proposal, we would be 
remiss if we abandoned all three of his conditions as a result of some difficulties we see 
in the first. Indeed, his condition (c) may prove particularly useful as the starting point to 
the type of policy that can protect terminally ill subjects by ensuring their competence. 
Annas’ condition (c) can be reformulated as requiring that a third party patient/subject 
rights advocate, who is completely unrelated with the research, be charged with the task 
of attempting to bolster some of the sub-abilities of competence with potential subjects 
and ultimately be able to test those abilities to ensure that subjects are sufficiently 
competent to consent. This third party individual should be the sole party soliciting the 
consent from terminally ill potential research subjects. As a result of the various tasks and 
obligations this competence assessor and consent solicitor will undertake, such a position 
                                                 
412
 Annas admits this as a consequence of his recommendations, but fails to provide a method by which 
research could then continue without the information derived from phase I trials. 
413
 Refer back to earlier in this chapter where the response rate in phase I trials was discussed. 
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should only be filled by one qualified in competency assessment and knowledgeable in 
the specific issues revolving around terminally ill subjects of research.
414
  
 Prior to a discussion of the more specific duties of such an individual, it should be 
noted that this process appears to suggest that the competency assessment be done 
verbally through communication instead of being written. Though assessing competency, 
especially the understanding or comprehension portion of it, could be attempted through 
the use of written questionnaires, and for certain medical contexts such a tactic has been 
suggested for decades,
415
 it would seem that communication based approaches may better 
achieve the desired aim. Firstly, as was already mentioned earlier in this chapter, verbal 
communication better facilitates comprehension and information retention than do 
written documents.
416
 Secondly, it has also been argued that “the use of a questionnaire 
may embarrass those who feel they are being ‘tested’ and could miss barriers to 
understanding that are not included on the form…In like manner, patients who ‘pass the 
test’ may feel falsely reassured of their understanding and be reluctant to raise additional 
                                                 
414
 It should be noted that such a strategy may have the added upshot of quelling one of the concerns that 
might be associated with requiring an increased level of competence for research participation. Namely, 
even though the approach advocated for here has not been to engage in any hard paternalism by prohibiting 
research on the terminally ill, as was previously noted in Chapter Three, the revelation that a greater level 
of competence should be required in the medical research context has the consequence that many of the 
subjects who may have previously been thought of as competent to consent to medical research would now 
fall below the new minimum threshold. Thus, enrollment may decrease in certain medical trials. Though 
this may be the unfortunate result of conducting ethical research on the terminally ill, employing the 
reformulated version of Annas’ condition (c) may mitigate such consequences by bolstering the 
competence of potential subjects of research. 
415
 See for instance: R. Miller and H.S. Wilner. “The Two-Part Consent Form: a suggestion for promoting 
free and informed consent” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 290(17), pp.964-966, 1974. Miller and 
Wilner suggest replacing the typical consent form with a two part version. The first part consists of the 
typical informational disclosure, while the second part consists of a questionnaire that attempts to assess 
patient’s comprehension. 
416
 Refer back to the onset of this chapter for further information regarding the superiority of verbal 
communication compared to a written format. 
 189 
 
questions.”417 Thus, it would seem wise to pursue oral competency testing procedures as 
opposed to the more typical written methods.
418
 
 Though the next chapter will delve into the issue of how to specifically test for 
our newly defined minimum level of competence, it would be prudent to discuss 
generally some of the tactics and approaches the third party competence 
bolsterer/assessor should employ.    
 This patient/subject rights advocate would likely be more effective in bolstering 
competency if she began by discussing those areas in medical research that are often the 
hindrances to adequate competency. To such an end, the first task would be to adequately 
explain the therapeutic misconception, and be prepared to attempt to dispel it if the 
individual indeed has the misconception. This may involve a discussion regarding some 
of the misleading terminology and brand naming used by researchers and research 
companies, or it may involve an explicit statement that the primary purpose of medical 
research is non-therapeutic. Some of the specifics of the conversation would of course be 
dependent on the research trial itself.  
 The second task, related to the first, would involve explaining the difference 
between medical research and medical practice, specifically the difference in the goals 
and aims of a research trial and the researcher himself compared to the aims of a 
physician in ordinary medical practice. With the goals and aims of research being not 
only explicitly stated, but contrasted with the goals and aims of medical practice, the 
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 Berg et al., 2001, p.198. 
418
 Additionally it would likely be difficult to devise a questionnaire that could appropriately evaluate the 
voluntariness of one’s decision. The conversational method would fare far better in this endeavour as “an 
assessment of voluntariness might [best] begin with a general inquiry into the motivations for a person's 
decision” (Appelbaum, Lidz and Klitzman, 2009, p. 35). Such a simple approach might serve the assessor 
well in attempting to determine the presence of any undue and controlling influences.  
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potential subject will be put in a position to be more competent going forward since she 
will be less likely to confuse the researcher with her physician throughout the research 
trial. Thus, the subject is given a warning that will allow her to be more cautious and 
approach any advice from researchers, during the medical research trial, with the healthy 
skepticism quintessential of the competent research subject.  
 Through a discussion of the therapeutic misconception and an explicit statement 
regarding the differences between research and therapy as well as the differences between 
a researcher and one’s physician, potential subjects may have a better understanding, 
might better be able to reason through their situation, and will more likely be able to 
make a voluntary choice. However, the consent solicitor must also attempt to bolster the 
appreciation of the potential research subject. Such an endeavor may prove quite difficult 
and will likely vary, sometimes greatly from subject to subject. The reason for this is that, 
as previously stated, appreciation is mainly centered on the particulars of a person’s life, 
and specifically the way in which participation in research will affect those particulars. 
Thus, since such particulars will vary from person to person, the approach and discussion 
the consent solicitor engages in will have to vary as well in order to meet the specific 
needs of the subject.
419
 The general aim of such a discussion would be to attempt to 
facilitate a conversation that enables potential subjects to engage with the ways in which 
participation in the research trial could impact their lives and the various ways in which 
those impacts would affect them personally.   
 Finally after the initial consultation and any subsequent conversations that may be 
requested by the potential subject, at a separate time and date the subject may request to 
                                                 
419
 Something similar can be said in regards to voluntariness as well since the potential mental states that 
may reduce one’s ability to make a voluntary choice will likely vary, sometimes to a great extent, between 
individuals. 
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sign the informed consent form.
420
 Prior to this though, the consent solicitor shall have 
one last task, which will be to verbally test the overall competence of the subject. This 
shall be done through one final conversation where the consent solicitor will ask a variety 
of questions and through a qualitative analysis will determine whether the subject is 
sufficiently competent to consent to the research trial. The specifics and details of such a 
competency assessment is the issue to which we may now turn. 
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 The time in between the initial consultation and the actual signing of the consent forms does not need to 
be a lengthy one, for even a day or two may suffice. Such a requirement is deemed necessary in order to 
enable the prospective subject to digest the information that has been provided, reflect on the conversation 
had with the patient/subject rights advocate, read through any of the literature that may have been provided, 
and discuss the situation with friends and family as the person sees fit. In a discussion regarding 
competency for treatment decisions, Grisso and Appelbaum also suggest that a delay in assessing 
competence may be helpful in “distinguishing between time-limited and permanent impairments… [This 
may be especially appropriate for subjects] who have just learned that they have a life-threatening illness” 
(Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p. 92) or even for those who may simply become over stressed and overly 
anxious when presented with the details of the research trial. In these types of cases, delaying the 
competence assessment may give the potential subject some time to adapt to their situation and to the 
information provided to them regarding the research trial.  
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Chapter Five: Assessing the Competence of Terminally Ill Subjects of Research  
 
 
 Though a minimum requirement for each sub-ability of competence and thus 
competence overall has been established for the medical research context with terminally 
ill subjects, it still remains necessary to determine how to best test for such a level of 
competence. It is insufficient to merely provide a standard, but with no possible way of 
knowing whether a subject satisfies such a standard since then such a standard would be 
rendered meaningless and have little to no real effect. Hence, we must consider the issue 
of evidence of competence.  
 As previously stated, it is ethically inappropriate to merely assume that 
prospective subjects will possess sufficient competence to consent to participate in 
research, especially in this particular context fraught with numerous competence 
hindering factors such as the therapeutic misconception and its various causes. Without 
an appropriate testing method, a minimum standard of competence for a particular task 
becomes futile since we will never properly determine whether or not a person meets the 
necessary criteria and is thus capable of competent decision making. Failing in this 
manner would ultimately undermine the principle of respecting autonomy. The reason for 
this is twofold. First, it must be recognized that without testing for competence from our 
potential subjects, we may inadvertently permit incompetent participation decisions and 
as Chapter One discussed, incompetent decision making fails to be an exercise of real 
autonomous decision making. Second, without competence testing, we never give 
ourselves the opportunity to see when and how competence might be lacking and thus 
deprive ourselves of the opportunity to make attempts to enhance and bolster it where 
necessary. However, any true respect for autonomy compels us to do more than merely 
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avoid intentionally violating the autonomy of others, but to also make attempts to 
promote autonomous decision making.
421
 To that end, it is imperative that we not only 
uphold an appropriate competence standard, but devise a testing method for it as well and 
attempt to enhance competence
422
 where possible.  
 Developing a competence assessment method for our medical research context 
with terminally ill individuals is also necessary so that there can be consistency between 
institutions such that any determinations of competence or incompetence do not appear 
arbitrary. Allowing medical professionals to make subjective competence assessments 
leads to a lack of uniformity between institutions and the appearance that competence 
determinations are random. This is not merely fearful speculation, since as studies and 
reports have demonstrated, “clinical assessments of decisional capacity have shown poor 
interrater reliability.”423 Such a lack of uniformity may further lead to a lack of trust in 
those institutions. 
 While interrater consistency is likely more easily achieved in cases where the 
subjects of the competence assessment are healthy and well, typical medical contexts and 
specifically our medical research context with terminally ill subjects will only further 
hinder interrater agreement. As Marson et al. demonstrated in a study of physicians’ 
competency evaluations, competency judgments of physicians showed low agreement 
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when assessing patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease. More specifically physicians 
achieved only 56% competency judgment agreement with such patients.
424
 Such findings 
make the need for some type of structured instrument to test competence more 
apparent.
425
  
 Unfortunately while a commonly recognized instrument and method to test 
competence would prove helpful in both the treatment and research setting, “one 
universally accepted assessment does not currently exist.”426 This should not come as a 
surprise since there is still dispute on how to best define competency, though as 
previously mentioned most current analyses assume some form of the four elements that 
have been identified here as being necessary for competence.  
 Devising an entirely new competence assessment instrument would prove to be a 
lengthy and rigorous process, likely requiring its own entirely separate study and analysis 
apart from the one undertaken presently. This is partly due to the fact that such a creation 
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would require not only a comprehensive review of current standardized assessment tools, 
but also mainly because it would involve implementing and testing the assessment tool in 
actual practice, then reassessing and modifying where necessary. While such an 
endeavour cannot currently be undertaken, it will be imperative to acknowledge that a 
few testing methods have been developed and used, some with moderate success, and 
examine a couple of the more current seemingly successful ones. This will be followed 
with suggestions regarding how to improve upon such instruments in a manner that 
respects the necessary standards of competence for the research context with the 
terminally ill as discussed in Chapter Four. 
 Thus, in what follows, first, some general remarks will be necessary as to where 
most competence assessment methods and instruments err. Second, a closer and more 
detailed analysis of one of the most current, complete, and successful attempts at 
competence assessment will be undertaken, namely the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR). However, it will ultimately be 
demonstrated that while this instrument certainly represents a step in the right direction, it 
too suffers from some fundamental flaws that render it inadequate for our current 
purpose. More specifically, such an instrument falls prey to some of the common 
objections leveled against competence assessment instruments generally, inadequately 
assesses voluntariness, is unable to provide cut-off scores or standards that would aid a 
competence assessor in her competency determination, and also fails to adequately 
account for and combat the therapeutic misconception. Third, while developing a full 
competence assessment instrument remains beyond the scope of this work, ultimately, in 
Chapter Six, a methodological approach on how to conduct a competency assessment 
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procedure that builds on the foundations of the minimum requirements of the four sub-
abilities of competence from Chapter Four shall be proposed. Such an approach will be 
labeled as the Subject Rights Advocate (SRA) Conversational approach, since it will 
involve both the employment of a particular type of patient/subject rights advocate, along 
with a conversational procedure for the competency evaluation. The approach will be 
tailored specifically for the research context with terminally ill subjects, though some of 
its features may be appropriately extrapolated to other contexts as well. The main feature 
of this proposal will involve embracing a fully conversational qualitative approach to 
competency assessment, which separately tests for the four sub-abilities of competence 
and has the potential to reveal possible unexpected competency hindering factors, while 
also attempting to bolster and enhance certain aspects of a potential research subject’s 
competence. After such an approach is described, it will then be compared and contrasted 
with the MacCAT-CR and ultimately shown to succeed precisely where the MacCAT-CR 
has failed. Finally a couple of hypothetical case studies will be provided to demonstrate 
how the implementation of the SRA Conversational approach would function in the 
research context with terminally ill subjects. 
  
Existing Competency Assessment Instruments 
 While there have been a variety of proposed competency assessment tools and 
approaches, with varied success, many of these prove to be inadequate given the account 
of competence provided in the preceding chapters. It is not merely that many of the 
competency assessment tools fail to recognize minimum standards for each element of 
competence needed for a particular context, such as those developed in Chapter Four, but 
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that many assessment tools fail to even acknowledge the existence of one or more of the 
elements of competence.  That is to state that many past competency evaluations 
frequently ignored and thus did not test for one or more of the components of 
competence. It was most often the case that some combination of appreciation, reasoning, 
or voluntariness would be disregarded, while the understanding element of competence 
was given full attention. In some cases competency assessment tools and questionnaires 
appeared to only attempt to test for patient or subject understanding, and even then a 
number of which did so only superficially. For the sake of brevity, we shall only take a 
brief look at two instruments, namely The Evaluation to Sign Consent (ESC) and Aid to 
Capacity Evaluation (ACE), which while possessing certain advantages, reveal such 
inadequacies in previously developed competence assessments. 
 The ESC “was developed by Love in 1988 (unpublished; as cited in Deronzo, 
Conley, & Love, 1998
427)… and assesses the factual understanding of subjects and is 
composed of only five items.”428 It is likely its two greatest assets make it attractive as a 
tool for research investigators, namely, that it is quite short and quick to administer, 
consisting of only five items, and second that it is easily adjustable to fit with any 
research trial. This second feature is a function of the wording of the items found within 
the evaluation tool, including, “Items 1 (describing two risks to participation in the study) 
and 2 (knowing what is associated with participation).”429 Such items easily lend 
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themselves to be appropriate for a wide variety of different research trials and subject 
populations. 
 However, as admitted by the author, the “ESC may not be sufficiently rigorous... 
[and] it is highly likely that the ESC will be deemed too easy to pass.”430 More 
importantly and for our purposes, the ESC could never provide a proper competence 
assessment as it is only constructed to test for understanding. In a study examining the 
competence of subjects with schizophrenia and HIV, Moser et al. noted that the ESC 
disregards the other elements of competence and only “assesses understanding of consent 
form information.”431 Thus, even if this instrument proved to have great interrater 
reliability, it fails to test for appreciation, reasoning or voluntariness. It thus may be a 
useful tool in testing for understanding, but ultimately cannot be employed as a 
competence assessment tool, at least not on its own. 
 Many other assessment instruments do not fare much better, several of which 
similarly focus on understanding while ignoring the other elements of competence.
432
  
Some assessment methods and tools attempted to improve on this and were constructed 
to account for some form of the other elements, but in many cases did so only cursorily, 
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still maintaining focus on the understanding component. One of the better developed and 
more current tools that attempted to improve on this issue was the Aid to Capacity 
Evaluation (ACE) which redirected its focus on the appreciation criterion of competence. 
This assessment tool is a bit more in depth than the ESC, involving an approximately 15 
minute “semi-structured test that enables clinicians to rate patients as: definitely 
incapable, probably incapable, probably capable, and definitely capable.”433 Though this 
tool was constructed specifically for assessing a patient’s capacity to consent to 
treatment, with some moderate adjustment it may be equally appropriate for ill subjects 
of research. The largest advantage of this assessment tool is that it can be tailored to 
account for the particular patient’s, or subject’s disorder. It does so by inquiring into a 
patient’s or subject’s “ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
accepting treatment... [and] ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of refusing proposed treatment,”434 with questions forcing the patient to explain what 
consequences he thinks may occur if he consents to the treatment in question and what 
consequences may occur should he refuse the treatment. This tool further attempts to 
ascertain whether the patient or subject is making decisions based on delusions or 
depression, something which is often overlooked by assessment tools that focus solely on 
understanding. However, despite such improvements, as well as the high interrater 
reliability that the ACE has demonstrated,
435
 this tool as well ignores elements of 
competence, focusing primarily on appreciation. Even if modified to test research 
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subjects,
436
 such an instrument would still leave out a proper evaluation for one’s ability 
to reason or make choices voluntarily.  
 Given the full conceptualization of competence and its constituent parts, such 
testing methods can be deemed insufficient at determining a patient or subject’s 
competence. Any adequate competence assessment method or instrument must recognize 
and test for all the elements of competence. In addition, though not entirely unrelated to 
this, many of the past competence assessment tools tend to fall prey to four general 
criticisms.  
 First, in terms of the understanding component, patients may repeat or paraphrase 
 details about their treatment even though they have little real understanding.
437
 If 
 they lack scientific or medical knowledge, [or if they have been misled,] then 
 misunderstandings or mistaken beliefs are possible. Second, the reasoning 
 component requires patients to recall the mental processes they used in arriving at 
 a decision but these types of self-reports have been found to be inaccurate and 
 patients will not really be able to perform this task (although it may provide other 
 valuable information such as knowledge of important details that should go into a 
 decision). Third, patients who perform poorly in terms of the abilities measured 
 do not necessarily lack these same abilities. Performance could be affected by 
 numerous factors such as lack of motivation, inattention, mistrust, [desperation, 
 depression, anxiety, insecurity,] or a misunderstanding of expectations. Finally, a 
 savvy patient can tell investigators what he/she wants to hear, despite having a 
 markedly different reasoning process (e.g., anorexic patients).
438
  
 
We may refer to these issues as: the problem with repetition, the difficulty of self-
reporting, the multi-factor hindrances to competence, and the problem of patient/subject 
deception, respectively. Further in this chapter we shall return to these four criticisms in 
order to ensure that the SRA Conversational approach that will ultimately be suggested 
here, steers clear of such issues. It should be noted that a proper competence assessment 
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method that accounts for, and attempts to test for all four elements of competence may 
potentially mitigate if not completely eliminate some of these issues.  
 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR) 
 The importance of implementing a competence assessment tool that accounts for 
all four elements of competence cannot be understated. This is due to the fact that often, a 
person who may appear to excel in one area of competence may still have a significant 
deficiency in the others. We may recall from Chapter Three the story of the twenty-five-
year-old women entering a research trial who demonstrated excellent understanding of 
the research aims and methods.  
 She recognized that the purpose of the project was to find out which treatment 
 worked best for her group of patients. She spontaneously described the three 
 groups, including the placebo group, and indicated that assignment would be at 
 random. She understood that dosages would be adjusted according to blood levels 
 and that a double blind would be used. When asked directly, however, how 
 her medicine would be selected, she said she had no idea. She then added, “I hope 
 it isn’t by chance,” and suggested that each subject would probably receive 
 the medication she needed.
439
 
 
This person clearly exhibited a very high level of understanding in regards to the research 
trial, but was unable to appreciate what that information meant for her. Thus, such a case 
demonstrates that a person may possess, even to a high degree, one of the sub-abilities of 
competence, in this case understanding, but may still significantly lack one or more of the 
other sub-abilities, in this case appreciation. Thus, it is crucial that a competence 
assessment tool only declare a person competent if that person has demonstrated a 
sufficient level of ability relating to all four sub-abilities of competence. 
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 In light of this fact, one of the better, if not the best, competence assessment 
instruments thus far is the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical 
Research (MacCAT-CR). Developed by Paul S. Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, this 
instrument is actually a modified version of their earlier MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), initially “developed to assist clinicians in 
making”440 competency evaluations with patients. The advantages of the MacCAT-CR 
instrument over its predecessors have not gone unnoticed. In comparison with other 
competence assessment instruments, Dunn et al. asserted that:  
 the best choices for measuring capacity to consent to research and treatment, 
 given their comprehensiveness and supporting psychometric data, will frequently 
 be the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools for Clinical Research and for 
 Treatment, respectively. Of the instruments we examined that focus on research, 
 the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool for Clinical Research has been the 
 most widely adopted, and, as a result, numerous lines of evidence supporting its 
 reliability and construct validity have accumulated.”441 
 
 The MacCAT-CR is provided in a semi-structured interview format that allows 
itself to be “customized to reflect the details of the particular research project to which 
subjects are being asked to consent.”442 It does so by establishing various general 
categories of questions under each of the four elements of competence and allowing the 
interviewer to fill in the specific details related to the actual clinical trial. For instance, 
the understanding section has 5 different subsections within it, each dedicated to 
assessing a different portion of what ought to be understood. As the MacCAT-CR 
specifies, the first subsection relates to assessing the: 
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 understanding of disclosed information about the nature of the research project. 
 This includes the objective of the project and three of its most important 
 procedural elements, that is, those procedures experienced by subjects who 
 participate in the study (e.g., duration, daily doses of medication, every-other-day 
 interviews, and weekly blood drawing).
443
 
 
Such a subsection is specific enough to inform a competence assessor specifically of 
what information a prospective subject must demonstrate to have an adequate 
understanding, while still maintaining the necessary flexibility to allow itself to adapt to 
varying clinical trials which may have very different procedural elements. 
 The remaining subsections of understanding are listed in the MacCAT-CR manual 
in a similar fashion and the assessment interview procedures for the other three elements 
of competence the MacCAT-CR tests for, namely appreciation, reasoning, and expression 
of choice, are conducted similarly as well. Without providing, in full, each category of 
inquiry with each element of competence that the MacCAT-CR tests for, a brief overview 
may prove helpful. Once the interview is completed the potential subject will allegedly 
have been assessed with regard to her:  
 understanding of:  
 i) the nature and procedures in the trial,  
 ii) the primary purpose of the project,  
 iii) the effect of research methods on personal care,  
 iv) the potential benefits and risks/discomforts associated with participation in the 
 research,  
 v) matters relating to refusal to participate as well as withdrawing during the trial;  
 
 appreciation of:  
 i) the purpose of her being recruited,  
 ii) the methods actually involved in the study and their use over typical methods 
 applied in the individualized care setting,  
 iii) the ability to decline participation or to withdraw at a later date without 
 penalty,  
 
 reasoning relating to:  
 i) the consequences of potential choices,  
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 ii) comparisons between various advantages and disadvantages of choices,  
 iii) anticipating consequences to everyday life,
444
  
 iv) the logical consistency of the choice,
445
  
 
 and the ability to express a clear choice.
446
   
 
 
 In addition to making these various inquiries, the interviewer is given space on the 
forms provided by the MacCAT-CR to record answers to the varying questions asked of 
the potential subject. Then, the interviewer is to rate each response between 0 and 2 for 
each of the subparts of each of the elements of competence. The MacCAT-CR provides 
guidelines that enable an interviewer to provide such ratings. For instance the guideline 
for the portion of the appreciation section that inquires into one’s ability to appreciate 
why she has been recruited for the study suggests the following: 
 Rating    Guidelines 
     2    Subject acknowledges that he or she is being  
     recruited for a valid reason unrelated to potential  
     personal benefit from being in the study (e.g.,  
     because he or she has a condition of relevance to the 
     study; because he or she has previously indicated a  
     willingness to help with studies of this sort, etc.). 
 
    
    1    Subject acknowledges being recruited for reasons  
     both related to and unrelated to potential personal  
     benefit. 
        OR 
                                                 
444
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     Subject maintains he or she is being recruited for a  
     reason related only to potential personal benefit, but 
     has a plausible explanation for why this is the case. 
  
 
    0    Subject maintains he or she is being recruited for a  
     reason related only to potential personal benefit, but 
     does not have a plausible explanation for why this is 
     the case. 
        OR 
     Subject offers response that is unrelated to the  
     question or unintelligible.
447
 
 
 Given all of this, it is clear that the MacCAT-CR certainly represents one of the 
more rigorous and comprehensive competence assessment instruments available. Its 
recognition of the various elements of competence, and attempt to assess them in light of 
the specific factors revolving around the research context, allows it to correct for many of 
the issues related to past competence assessment instruments. Thus, this assessment tool 
represents significant progress in the field which can be highlighted by four of its main 
attractive features. 
 
Advantages of the MacCAT-CR  
 First, it is important to note that a crucially important step in competence 
assessment made by Appelbaum and Grisso in both the MacCAT-T and MacCAT-CR, is 
to test for the sub-abilities of competence separately.
448
 As they note, “how well patients 
performed in any one of these areas tended not to be a very good indicator of their 
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performance on the other abilities.”449 Indeed, as previously mentioned, a person may 
possess a very high level of understanding, but lack appreciation, or other elements of 
competence. Thus for our purposes, it must be stressed that understanding, appreciation, 
reasoning and voluntariness should be each evaluated separately from one another, and 
that a demonstration of a high level of ability in any one category of competence should 
not be taken as evidence of ability in any other category. 
 A second advantage of the MacCAT-CR, not unrelated to the first, is the fact that 
it does not provide an overall score of competence. While this may seem like a defect of 
the competence instrument, it is actually designed specifically in this manner because the 
authors recognize that to sum up the rating or scores of the varying elements of 
competence into one overall score would be inappropriate. This is due to the fact that “in 
some cases, a serious deficit in ability in any one of the four areas may translate to a 
clinical opinion of incompetence, even if the subject’s capacities in the other three areas 
are quite adequate.”450 The SRA Conversational proposal that will ultimately be 
presented here will similarly take this into account and thus it will be the case that 
sufficiently lacking in any one of the elements of competence, below the minimum 
requirements as set out in Chapter Four, may render one’s decision incompetent. 
 Third, the MacCAT-CR attempts to identify and assess one’s ability to understand 
the difference between research and treatment, thus making some effort to account for 
and possibly combat the therapeutic misconception. It accomplishes this goal by going 
beyond the mere disclosure that the purpose of research is primarily the acquisition of 
generalizable knowledge as opposed to patient treatment. Instead, the MacCAT-CR goes 
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into some detail assessing a potential subject’s competence concerning the “effect of 
research methods on individualized care, that is, how the research project differs from 
ordinary treatment.”451 This involves asking potential subjects to explain particular 
methods of the research protocol that represent a contrast to ordinary best care standards, 
including the use of placebos, randomization, and double-blinding. As argued in previous 
chapters, the identification of specific research methods that differ from ordinary 
therapeutic methods is a necessary step in combating the potential for prospective 
subjects to consent to a clinical trial under the assumption that it will be, or at least be 
like, therapy. In addition to identifying the use of placebos, randomized assignments, and 
double-blinding, I have previously also suggested that Phase I trial protocols be identified 
and accounted for in a competence assessment for much the same reason. Given the 
flexible nature of the MacCAT-CR, this is something that could easily be included when 
the instrument is being used for a Phase I trial.    
 One final improvement made by the MacCAT-CR relates to one of the more 
general problems with competency assessment tools, namely that they fail to account for 
the differing standards of competence that may be needed given the context. As 
previously argued, since competence is task and therefore context dependent, a person 
may be competent to make a decision in one context, but given certain factors in another 
context may be appropriately deemed incompetent to make a decision. Any assessment or 
evaluation tool or method must be sufficiently versatile so as to be able to account for the 
context dependent nature of competence. Thus any adequate:  
 determination of competency requires a proper assessment that incorporates many 
 factors relevant to the unique circumstances of the patient [or subject] and cannot 
 be ascertained on the basis of test scores alone… In addition to functional 
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 abilities, a determination of competence or incompetence must take into account 
 the decision-making demands placed on a patient [or subject], which include 
 different situational and social factors, as well as the consequences of a judgement 
 in terms of beneficence and autonomy.
452
    
 
While one might claim that the MacCAT-CR does not go far enough in this endeavour, it 
must be noted that it certainly represents a step forward from past competency 
evaluations by attempting to account for various situational factors that may relate to the 
decision-making ability of the prospective subject. It does so through its appreciation and 
reasoning assessment methods, specifically by inquiring into such matters as one’s ability 
to appreciate what participation in a particular research project may mean for her, and to 
relate that to her reasoning about whether or not to participate. This somewhat involves 
identifying certain particulars related both to the decision making context and the 
individual person. Such an approach thus enables, at least some of, the context and 
individual dependent factors in this type of scenario to properly factor into the 
competence assessment. 
 Given these various advantages, it can be stated that the MacCAT-CR certainly 
represents progress in the field of competence assessment with prospective research 
subjects. 
 
Issues with the MacCAT-CR  
 Despite these undeniable upshots of the MacCAT-CR, it must still be noted that it 
too suffers some significant shortfalls. First, it does not fully address all four of the 
previously mentioned Sturman criticisms adequately. These were: i) the problem with 
repetition, ii) the difficulty of self-reporting, iii) the multi-factor hindrances to 
                                                 
452
 Sturman, 2005, p. 956.  
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competence, and iv) the problem of patient/subject deception, respectively. Though, as 
will be argued, the MacCAT-CR is able to solve the second and third issues, it still 
struggles with the first and fourth. In addition to these general criticisms often levied 
against competence assessment instruments, there are three additional objections specific 
to the MacCAT-CR that will be raised. These will include that the MacCAT-CR fails to 
take voluntariness into account, is unable to provide cut-offs or standards that would aid a 
competence assessor in her competency determination, and that a greater attempt at 
combating the therapeutic misconception is needed specifically for terminally ill subjects 
of research.  
 We may proceed by first examining each of the four Sturman criticisms. As 
already mentioned, the second and third criticisms do not cause any real dilemma for the 
MacCAT-CR. These were the difficulty of self-reporting, and the multi-factor hindrances 
to competence issues. The first of these states that when assessing a patient’s or subject’s 
reasoning by asking them to recollect the mental processes used in their decision-making 
process, the answers given are often inaccurate. This is not likely due to any purposeful 
deception by the patient or subject, but rather relates to the difficulty of the task of 
identifying and recalling one’s past mental processes when making a decision. However, 
the MacCAT-CR ameliorates this issue, that is to the extent to which it can be 
ameliorated, by engaging in a series of questions, none of which directly ask the potential 
subject to merely remember her reasoning, but rather which will have her engage in the 
reasoning process right there, in front of and with the interviewer. Thus, the issue that 
arises with the inaccuracy of self-reporting is to a large extent alleviated.  
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 Similarly, the MacCAT-CR is also able to handle the third of the Sturman 
criticisms quite well. This criticism suggested that given the many possible factors in a 
certain context that may hinder competence, one who fails to demonstrate an adequate 
level of any of the sub-abilities of competence is not necessarily a person who may 
generally lack that sub-ability, or competence overall, in life.  However, the MacCAT-CR 
acknowledges this and is meant to assess competence only in the specific context for 
which its line of questioning is geared. It is not meant to provide blanket determinations 
of competence for a person. Furthermore, as already discussed, it attempts to account for 
at least some of the factors specific to the research context that may pose a hindrance to 
competence by attempting to identify them and test a person’s competence in light of 
them.  
 Though the MacCAT-CR adequately overcomes these two of the four Sturman 
issues, it fails to do so with the remaining two. These were the problem of repetition and 
the problem of patient/subject deception. 
 The problem of repetition is concerned primarily with the understanding 
component of competence, though it may also indirectly relate to appreciation and 
reasoning as well. This issue is related to the fact that patients or subjects may be capable 
of merely repeating the consent-related information without any actual understanding of 
it.
453
 This may lead to improper determinations of competence, especially for those who 
                                                 
453
 Though the concern here will be related to the research context, such an issue is also quite problematic 
with patient populations in the therapeutic context. In order to combat the issue in the therapeutic context 
some have suggested that physicians should be required to “ask questions that compel the patient to 
demonstrate a deeper understanding of the treatment proposals, not merely prompt the patient to parrot 
information back” (Jorie Epstein. “How Reliable is the Competency Assessment Process?” Virtual Mentor: 
American Medical Association Journal of Ethics, Vol. 10(8), pp. 511-515, 2008, p.513). However, it should 
be noted that there is currently little research on how to best accomplish this goal.  
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are able to memorize information well without ever comprehending it. Unfortunately the 
MacCAT-CR does little to rectify this issue. 
 The format of the semi-structured interview may pose as a particular problem 
given this type of criticism. The interview is conducted such that the interviewer asks 
direct questions pertaining to a specific element of competence immediately following 
the disclosure of the information necessary for that element of competence. This process 
increases the chance that a prospective subject will be able to memorize and only repeat 
back the information without adequate understanding. In fact the MacCAT-CR process 
states that a: 
 Subject should be given a card containing the disclosure for each section and 
 asked to read along as the disclosure is read to him or her… [Following this, the 
 interviewer is instructed to] take the card from the subject. Tell the subject that 
 you want to make sure he or she has understood what you have described. Ask the 
 subject to describe to you his or her understanding of the information…454   
 
This very process enables pure memorization of the disclosed information, and then tests 
for that information immediately after the subject was given the chance to memorize it. 
While the MacCAT-CR is right to include a verbal response procedure as opposed to 
merely a written one in an attempt to improve understanding and be better able to detect 
and combat issues such as this, the process of the interview, specifically having the 
inquiry follow immediately after the disclosure, enables this problem. It is odd that the 
MacCAT-CR would be conducted in this manner given that as mentioned in Chapter 
Four, in a discussion regarding competency for treatment decisions, Grisso and 
Appelbaum suggest that a delay in assessing competence may be helpful in 
“distinguishing between time-limited and permanent impairments… [which may be 
especially appropriate for those] who have just learned that they have a life-threatening 
                                                 
454
 Appelbaum and Grisso, 2001, p. 14. 
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illness”455 or even for those who may simply become over stressed and overly anxious 
when presented with the details of their suggested treatment. Such reasoning not only 
similarly applies to the research context, but the delay in assessing competence may also 
greatly prevent this restating/memorization problem.
456
 
 The MacCAT-CR does not fare much better against the fourth Sturman criticism, 
namely that a patient or subject may deceive the assessor affecting his ability to 
accurately judge competence. More specifically, patients or subjects may say what they 
think a competence assessor will want to hear, despite possessing beliefs to the contrary. 
As Edward Sturman states, “what seems to be at issue are ‘patently false beliefs,’ held by 
patients who are motivated to hide these from health care professionals and have the 
presence of mind to do so. Thus, it is [likely] the appreciation component that is 
problematic.”457 
 Some empirical evidence already exists demonstrating such a flaw with the 
MacCAT-T and the treatment decisions of certain types of patients. In one study 
examining the competence results of anorexic patients, it was found that “the participants 
performed on the MacCAT-T to a high standard, which was comparable to the healthy 
population control group in a previous study using the MacCAT-T.”458 However, the 
study argued that three potentially competence hindering factors were present with this 
population, namely the “impact of anorexia nervosa on attitudes to death and disability; 
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 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p. 92. 
456
 The concern of restating disclosed information as opposed to actually understanding it will reemerge 
later on when ultimately a proposal will be given as to how to best structure a competence assessment 
approach with terminally ill prospective subjects of research.  
457
 Sturman, 2005, p. 966.  
458
 Jacinta Tan, Tony Hope, and Anne Stewart. “Competence to Refuse Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa” 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 26, pp. 697-707, 2003, p.704. For the most part this 
population was already quite knowledgeable about anorexia and the information relating to treatment 
options, and thus was capable of scoring well especially in the understanding portion. 
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impact of anorexia nervosa on values and personal identity; and ambivalence to treatment 
and recovery.... [the authors concluded that] all these factors are relevant to the 
participants’ decisions about treatment and raise questions about their competence to 
refuse treatment”459 despite being deemed competent by the MacCAT-T.  
 In addition, due to the nature of anorexia, these patients have patently false 
beliefs, but do not have any significant mental impairment such that they would be 
unable to understand the information and answer questions in such a manner so as to tell 
the interviewer what she wants to hear.  
 It would therefore be possible for a grossly underweight anorexic patient to be 
 fully capable [according to the MacCAT-T] of refusing treatment, despite having 
 distorted or false beliefs about their self-image and the necessity of treatment. It 
 should be noted that this patient would likely have adequate capacity on every 
 component, save for appreciation, but this one deficit could be hidden and have a 
 profound impact on the choice of the patient. This is a limitation that holds little 
 promise of being solved because self-report measures, even diagnostic interviews, 
 are easily manipulated by clever and motivated individuals.
460
 
 
This issue may similarly apply with certain terminally ill individuals in the research 
context who are either desperate for a cure, or depressed due to their situation. Neither 
desperation nor depression would necessarily cognitively impair persons to the extent 
that they would be incapable of understanding the disclosed material, or of detecting what 
the interviewer may wish to hear during the MacCAT-CR interview. The ability for 
persons suffering from depression to have high cognitive abilities and have a high 
potential for understanding, is nothing surprising. In a study utilizing the MacCAT-CR to 
assess the competence of depressed persons for consenting to research, it was found that 
“the great majority of subjects performed very well on the measures of all three 
                                                 
459
 Tan et al., 2003, p.706. 
460
 Sturman, 2005, p. 966. 
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abilities”461 tested, namely understanding, appreciation and reasoning. Thus, similar to 
the anorexic patients, these individuals might have a high capacity for understanding, and 
might be able to figure out exactly what the interviewer will need to hear in order for 
them to score well on the MacCAT-CR. This combined with a potentially desperate 
mental state,
462
 which may contribute to one’s desire to view research as therapy, may 
cause one to attempt to deceive the interviewer in order to ensure admittance into the 
trial.  
 Such a problem is exacerbated by the style of questioning in the MacCAT-CR, 
which asks questions that are transparent enough so as to allow subjects to potentially 
decipher optimal answers. For instance the MacCAT-CR manual suggests the following 
questions for an interviewer assessing appreciation in a hypothetical double-blind, 
placebo-controlled study of a new medication for schizophrenia: “Do you believe that 
you have been asked to be in this study primarily for your personal benefit? [and] “Do 
you believe that you could get the sugar pill?”463 This line of questioning, while correct in 
attempting to ascertain answers to questions that significantly relate to one’s competence 
to consent to research, somewhat makes the correct answers obvious to the potential 
subject. The first question specifies personal benefit in a way that may make it clear to a 
clever interviewee that it is not the correct answer. The second question suffers a similar 
                                                 
461
 Paul Appelbaum, Thomas Grisso, Ellen Frank, Sandra O'Donnell, and David Kupfer. “Competence of 
Depressed Patients for Consent to Research” The American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 156, pp. 1380-
1384, 1999, p. 1381-1382. Additionally, the study showed that subjects maintained this high level of 
performance over an extended period of time and that “there was no correlation between performance and 
degree of depressive symptoms” (Appelbaum et al., 1999, p. 1380). 
462
 Refer back to Chapter Three for a discussion of the role that desperation and even pain can play in a 
potential subject’s decision-making process. We may recall that The President’s Advisory Committee on 
Human Radiation Experiments, “Chapter 16: Subject Interview Study” in Final Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) 
provided ample examples of desperation in terminally ill subjects consenting to research. Furthermore, we 
may recall that desperation may make a person vulnerable to manipulations of hope and the therapeutic 
misconception. 
463
 Appelbaum and Grisso, 2001, p. 36. 
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flaw, specifically pointing out the placebo to the prospective subject and possibly tipping 
him off that a good answer will involve admitting that receiving the placebo is always a 
possibility.
464
 It thus may be better to, for instance, reword the question as: “What 
treatment or medications might you receive in this trial?” In this manner, the potential 
subject is not guided toward any answer by the question itself.  
 Thus, given the problem of subject deception that may occur with this population, 
the fact that the MacCAT-T has proven to be capable of falling prey to it, and that the 
MacCAT-CR interview questions somewhat enable it, depressed and desperate terminally 
ill prospective subjects might be able to score well on the MacCAT-CR despite holding 
onto unrealistic expectations and ultimately false beliefs regarding the curative potential 
of the clinical trial. 
 In addition to being unable to rectify the first and fourth of the Sturman criticisms, 
the MacCAT-CR suffers three additional flaws. This includes the MacCAT-CR’s failure 
to take voluntariness into account, its inability to provide cut-off scores or standards that 
would aid a competence assessor in her competency determination, and that a greater 
                                                 
464
 Though it may seem somewhat self-contradictory, it is possible for the potential subject to state that 
receiving the placebo is a possibility to the interviewer all the while believing that he will not receive it. 
Such a distinction partially highlights the difference between understanding and appreciation and the 
difficultly that may exist in applying understood knowledge to one’s self. We previously noted such an 
example with the story of the twenty-five-year-old women entering a research trial who demonstrated 
excellent understanding of the research aims and methods, but when asked how her treatment would be 
selected, she claimed that she hoped it would be based on need. (Refer back to the beginning of the 
MacCAT-CR section in this chapter for more on this case). Similar issues have been noticed in other 
populations as well. For instance, as the previously mentioned study on anorexic patients discusses, 
anorexic patients, may score well on the MacCAT-T, may fully understand the nature of the disease, 
perhaps even believe that they have it, but fail to truly appreciate the consequences as applying to them, 
even if they claim otherwise. The study showed for example, that when asked about death and disability 
related to the disease, some participants said “I didn't think it applied to me at all”…[and another replied 
that] although logic tells me I’m underweight, but I don't feel it” (Jacinta Tan, Anne Stewart, Ray 
Fitzpatrick, and R.A. Hope. “Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking 
Processes and Values” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Vol. 13(4), pp.267-282, 2006, pp.271-272). 
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attempt at combating the therapeutic misconception is needed specifically for terminally 
ill subjects of research. We may consider each in turn. 
 First, while the account of competence provided by Appelbaum and Grisso proves 
to be one of the more comprehensive accounts of competence in current literature, and 
indeed much of the account of competence presented in Chapter One relied to some 
extent on such literature, one crucial dissimilarity exists. The most strikingly different 
feature between our account of competence and theirs, relates to the fourth criterion of 
competence. The MacCAT-CR and indeed much literature on competence includes: 
“expressing a choice, referring to the patient’s ability to state a preference”465 as a 
criterion. However, as argued in chapter one, this is an inappropriate and incomplete 
condition of competence. We may recall that it was previously argued that:  
 The ability to express a choice is morally irrelevant if the choice itself cannot be 
 made voluntarily. Even if a person is expressing a choice but is unable to mentally 
 overcome a coercive environment, as would be the case if the person made a 
 choice while being deceived or manipulated, then the expression of the choice 
 was certainly not a true satisfaction of this fourth requirement of decision-making 
 capacity.
466
  
 
It was additionally further argued that an individual who possesses the requisite 
understanding, appreciation and reasoning, but who lacks confidence in himself to such 
an extent that his opinion can be swayed by the mere suggestion of another, may also be 
unable to make competent decisions, even if he was physically capable of expressing a 
choice.
467
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 Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998, p. 58. 
466
 Alessandro Manduca-Barone. “Including Appreciation and Voluntariness: The other two elements of 
decision-making capacity” American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience, Vol. 2(1), pp. 43-45, 2011, p. 43. 
467
 We should recall that this was not merely an unlikely hypothetical, but may be particularly true in the 
medical decision making context where decisions may be of a complex and emotionally taxing nature and 
may require a certain confidence and strength of will. As previously quoted, Jessica Berg et al. express a 
similar sentiment in a discussion of autonomy claiming that “people who feel they are too ignorant or too 
weak to make choices, or who cannot find the emotional strength to do so, are not capable of acting 
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  The MacCAT-CR tests for this fourth criterion of competence by merely asking 
the interviewee to state their choice and then rates that decision according to the 
following:  
 Rating    Guidelines 
     2    Subject states a choice 
     1    Subject states more than one choice, seems   
     ambivalent. 
      0    Subject does not state a choice.
468
 
 
Such a condition and rating system fails to truly relate to competence, and the condition 
is far too easily satisfied. Likely only the “presence of certain psychiatric conditions may 
make it more difficult (e.g., mutism due to catatonia or severe depression, mania, thought 
disorder stemming from psychosis, etc...).”469 The need to include voluntariness as one of 
the mental sub-abilities in competence has already been demonstrated, but is further 
revealed in the context of clinical research. As chapter 4 explained, the ability to 
understand, appreciate, and reason through a decision, would still not be sufficient for 
competence to make that decision if the person was unable to make a decision that 
stemmed from such understanding, appreciation, and reasoning. This additional ability, 
labeled voluntariness throughout this work, is necessary, especially in this context given 
that some individuals may lack the confidence in themselves to make the right decision, 
                                                                                                                                                 
autonomously. As a result, they may become overly susceptible to external influences that would otherwise 
not be considered undue. They may, for example, be overawed by the prestige of medical professionals or 
defer to an authority figure in their family. Some people may suffer from phobias or other internal 
constraints that overwhelm their wills so they cannot freely choose an option they would otherwise desire. 
A patient who has been sexually abused, for example, might feel incapable of having a physical exam 
despite intellectually recognizing the health- related benefits it may afford” (Jessica Berg, Paul Appelbaum, 
Charles Lids and Lisa Parker. Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 2
nd
 edition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 25). Refer back to Chapter One and Chapter Four for more on the 
voluntariness component of competence as well as the inadequacy of the expressing a choice component. 
468
 Appelbaum and Grisso, 2001, p.25. 
469
 Sturman, 2005, p. 955. 
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may be in an overly emotional state, may be desperate, and may thus be easily and 
unduly swayed by the suggestions of others, including recruiters for the trial or even 
close family members. Therefore the MacCAT-CR can be deemed inadequate as it fails 
to account for this crucial component of competence.  
 Second, as admitted by the authors, “the MacCAT-CR does not provide ‘cut-off 
scores’ that represent ‘competence’ or ‘incompetence’ on the four abilities. This is 
because the MacCAT-CR was designed to be consistent with a basic maxim in the legal 
definition of competence: No particular level of ability is always determinative of 
competence or incompetence across all subjects, all disorders, and all medical or research 
situations.”470 While the authors are correct in such an assertion, and indeed the account 
of competence put forth here has acknowledged that competence is task relative and thus 
no specific level of competence would be appropriate for all contexts, since we are 
presently only concerned with one specific context, namely the participation decisions of 
terminally ill subjects of research, we are in a position to provide cut-offs, and thus 
further aid those making the final determination of competence.
471
 This was done 
previously in Chapter Four, when the minimum required levels of each of the four sub-
abilities of competence were established. Though Appelbaum and Grisso are correct, and 
in fact these minimum requirements for competence may not be applicable in other 
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 Appelbaum and Grisso, 2001, p. 3.  
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 It should be acknowledged that while I have referred to the participation of terminally ill persons in 
research as one specific context for the sake of simplicity, there may still exist a large variety of contextual 
and situational differences even between different types of terminally ill subjects and different types of 
clinical trials. However, the proposal that will ultimately be suggested in what follows will be designed so 
as to accommodate the wide variety of potential situational differences that may arise with different 
terminally ill research subjects. Nonetheless, despite the possibility of some situational differences, as 
previously noted, the participation of terminally ill research subjects in clinical trials represents a distinct 
context that contains certain factors that may compromise competence, such as a high potential for the 
therapeutic misconception. Thus it remains appropriate to speak of research participation by the terminally 
ill as a certain type of context, while also acknowledging that any competence assessment or enhancement 
techniques should also account for possible situational differences that may exist between such individuals.   
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contexts, they represent a step forward in being able to approach both competence 
assessment and competence bolstering for this specific population. Indeed it may be the 
case that past work and research on this topic has struggled due to the fact that many 
attempted to view and subsequently assess competence broadly, without accounting for 
context and task specific factors that would enable the type of comprehensive approach 
and minimum requirements established here that will ultimately fuel the SRA 
Conversational competence assessment method that will be explained in the following 
section. Thus though the MacCAT-CR’s lack of cut-offs or minimum standards is not 
entirely inappropriate, it does demonstrate some room for improvement, particularly 
when dealing with certain populations.  
 The third issue with the MacCAT-CR relates to the need for a greater attempt at 
combating the therapeutic misconception, specifically in the context of clinical trials with 
terminally ill research subjects. As already stated, the MacCAT-CR does make 
significant strides in this goal by being one of the only competence assessment 
instruments that attempts to both ensure understanding of the difference between research 
and treatment, but also attempts to ensure and test for a subject’s understanding of the 
particular methods of the research protocol that represent a contrast to ordinary best care 
standards, including the use of placebos, randomization, and double-blinding. Inclusion 
of such criteria better enables a prospective subject to steer clear of the therapeutic 
misconception. However, as previously argued, the pervasiveness of such a 
misconception still requires even more than this step. While attempting to have subjects 
understand certain research methods represents an improvement, it does not go far 
enough in accomplishing the goal of combating the therapeutic misconception. Any 
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attempt to do so must also include ensuring that a subject appreciates what the difference 
between research and treatment means for her case specifically.
472
 Unfortunately the 
MacCAT-CR still falls short in this endeavor. This was confirmed by a study that used 
the MacCAT-CR in order to test the competence of depressed individuals to consent to 
research.
473
 According to the study:  
 the great majority of subjects performed very well on the measures of all three 
 abilities related to capacity to decide... The mean score on the understanding scale 
 was 23.33 (SD=2.84) out of a maximum of 26, with no subject scoring below 
 20... Similarly, the mean score on the appreciation scale was 4.89 (SD=1.21) out 
 of a maximum of 6, and the mean score on the reasoning scale was 6.50 
 (SD=1.75) out of a maximum of 8. Approximately 65%-75% of the subjects 
 received full credit on most of the appreciation and reasoning items; scores of 0 
 were rare.”474 
 
However, despite scoring this well on the MacCAT-CR, further investigation revealed 
that there remained issues regarding subjects’ actual appreciation of the research 
protocol. For instance, “some subjects appeared confused about the extent to which 
decisions about assignment to treatment groups would be made on the basis of their 
clinical condition rather than randomly.”475 There was additional concern regarding the 
adequacy of the:  
 appreciation questions for assessing subjects’ grasp of the implications of research 
 involvement. When asked why others would participate in the research, one-third 
 to one-half of the subjects mentioned one or more of three reasons: financial 
 advantages (i.e., the therapy was free), higher anticipated quality of treatment at 
 this well-known center, and obtaining help. Only one subject mentioned altruistic 
 reasons (i.e., to help other depressed women by contributing to the advancement 
 of knowledge about treatment of the disorder). When asked why they themselves 
 had decided to participate, in contrast, 80% of the subjects mentioned the desire to 
 obtain help for their depression, and roughly one-third of the subjects offered only 
                                                 
472
 This may include having insight into the impacts of research participation on matters such as one’s 
health, ability to function, romantic relationships, career, passions/hobbies, family or any activities that 
may give one’s life meaning or joy. 
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 Appelbaum et al., 1999, pp. 1380-1384. 
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 Appelbaum et al., 1999, pp. 1381-1382. 
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 Appelbaum et al., 1999, p. 1380. 
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 this reason. [The report goes on to state that such results raise concern over the] 
 subjects’ abilities to distinguish between reasons for seeking ordinary clinical 
 care... and for participation in research studies.
476
 
 
This further demonstrates that the MacCAT-CR is inadequate to properly deal with 
combating the therapeutic misconception in subjects, particularly in regards to the 
appreciation component of competence. Despite the fact that a large portion of the 
subjects in this study clearly remained confused over the difference between research and 
treatment, and more specifically did not seem to appreciate what the difference meant for 
them personally, they were able to score quite high on the MacCAT-CR. However, the 
therapeutic misconception poses a serious problem to the potential competence of 
subjects, and the inability of any competence assessment tool to adequately account for it 
renders such an instrument insufficient. Given the pervasiveness of this misconception, 
and the myriad of factors associated with it,
477
 much more must be done to remedy the 
issue. It would for instance be prudent, not only to discuss the difference between therapy 
and research, but actually explain the existence of the therapeutic misconception itself, 
how ubiquitous it is, and some of the factors that may contribute to it, including possible 
deceptive tactics by researchers,
478
 overly hopeful/optimistic recruitment procedures, 
general confusion between one’s doctor and a research investigator, especially if they are 
one and the same, as well as a general confusion between a treatment facility and 
research facility, again especially if they are one and the same.
479
 It is only in this manner 
that we may actually hope that potential research subjects will be able to understand the 
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 Refer back to Chapter Three for a full account of the various contributing factors to the misconception.  
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 We may recall from Chapter Three the brand naming of pharmaceutical trials was an example of this 
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 Refer back to Chapter Three for a more full account of the therapeutic misconception.  
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differences between research and therapy, apply that knowledge to their own situation, 
and ultimately ward off the therapeutic misconception.  
 
Introducing the Subject Rights Advocate Conversational Approach 
 While much research has been dedicated to determining a proper method with 
which to test people’s competence, it should be noted that the necessary ethical work in 
this field lies in developing an appropriate and comprehensive account of competence, as 
well as determining how much competence should be required of a person for a particular 
context. Many of the flaws and issues with past proposals, suggestions and research on 
this topic may stem from the fact that these two steps were either ignored, or at least dealt 
with only superficially. However, both of these objectives were met in the previous 
chapters, with Chapter 4 specifically outlining to what degree each element of 
competence should be required of terminally ill subjects of research prior to consenting to 
participate in a clinical trial.  
 Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the task of developing a brand new 
assessment tool cannot presently be undertaken. Any adequate attempt would require 
research and analysis above and beyond the scope of this present work. For instance, such 
an attempt would require that whatever assessment procedure was developed, be tested 
and rated for its internal consistency,
480
 interrater reliability,
481
 concurrent validity,
482
 
                                                 
480
 Internal consistency typically measures the consistency between different items on the same test that are 
all directed at measuring the same phenomenon. Given that, as already previously mentioned, one’s ability 
in one of the elements of competence do not necessarily correlate with ability in any of the other elements, 
internal consistency may best be used only to evaluate the items/questions within each element of 
competence. That is to suggest that it would be inappropriate to rate the internal consistency between the 
items related to understanding and those related to any other element of competence. Instead only the 
internal consistency between items related to the same element of competence should be rated for internal 
consistency.    
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sensitivity
483
 and specificity.
484
 Some may suggest that test-retest reliability should also 
be examined.
485
 Then, the assessment procedure or instrument may require adjustments 
and modifications as may be warranted based upon the results of such testing. Such an 
undertaking would alone comprise an entire work, and thus will not be attempted here. 
However, given what has already been argued, a path forward may presently be 
suggested and a general methodological approach to competence assessment and consent 
solicitation for terminally ill prospective subjects of research that can account for the four 
requirements as set out in Chapter Four will be proposed.
486
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 Interrater reliability is sometimes also referred to as interrater agreement or interrater consistency. It 
refers to the ability of a test or procedure to provide consistent results between different evaluators. In the 
case of a competence assessment instrument, strong interrater reliability would involve a competence 
instrument producing similar results regardless of who administers the instrument. 
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 Concurrent validity measures “the degree to which scores on a scale are associated with an accepted 
concurrent standard” (Dunn et al., 2006, p. 1328). This is a particularly difficult measure for competence 
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concurrent validity by showing the association with general functional or cognitive measures... because 
decisional capacity is context-and decision-specific, such correlations are not fully germane” (Dunn et al., 
2006, p. 1329). Secondly, given the lack of a gold standard for competence assessment, “most commonly, 
validity has been established by comparing the various instruments with expert psychiatric opinion... 
However, psychiatrists’ assessments may be idiosyncratic and pose a problem for the reliability of 
findings” (Sturman, 2005, p. 966). Indeed as previously mentioned clinical assessments of capacity have 
often lacked interrater consistency. 
483
 Sensitivity refers to the proportion of positive findings that are correctly identified by the test in 
question. This is often referred to as a true positive. Since a competence assessment tool is testing for 
incompetence, a true positive would refer to a competence instrument’s finding of incompetence with a 
subject who is indeed incompetent. 
484
 Specificity refers to the proportion of negative findings that are correctly identified by the test in 
question. This is often referred to as a true negative. Since a competence assessment tool is testing for 
incompetence, a true negative would refer to an instrument’s finding of competence with a subject who is 
indeed competent. Both sensitivity and specificity reflect the ability of a test to make accurate predictions. 
485
 This is due to the fact that “to the degree that a person’s decisional capacity is stable over brief spans of 
time, scores [of competence assessment instruments] should be consistent over brief follow-up intervals” 
(Dunn et al., 2006, p. 1325). 
486
 “IRBs generally do not regulate the day-to-day practice of how consent information is actually 
delivered. This can, therefore, vary from handing the potential participant the form and asking for a 
signature to much more thorough procedures…” (Lisa Eyler and Dilip Jeste. “Enhancing the Informed 
Consent Process: A Conceptual Overview” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 24, pp.553-568, 2006, p. 
559). However, while much research and IRB review has been and continues to be spent on the structure of 
the consent form documents, as discussed in Chapter Four, such a document’s real contribution to aiding 
subjects in making informed and competent decisions is questionable. Indeed as was previously suggested, 
it may be wise to refocus our attention on other aspects of the informed consent process which may 
themselves significantly impact competent decision making, including the delivery of the consent 
information, the assessment of competency, and the final solicitation of consent. The authors of the 
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Chapter Six: The Subject Rights Advocate Conversational Approach 
  
 The approach to competence assessment will involve two distinct features. First, 
that the administration of the competency evaluation and consent solicitation be 
conducted by a third party terminally ill subject’s rights advocate (SRA), and second, that 
the competency evaluation take on a conversational approach as opposed to a structured 
interview, written test or questionnaire method. Before examining how this approach may 
rectify the previously mentioned issues with prior competence assessment methods, we 
may first briefly describe these two features of this proposal in turn. 
 The need for expert opinion within this field should be apparent. In a discussion 
regarding how well IRB’s are equipped to analyze studies involving vulnerable persons, 
the NIH has suggested that a proper course of action: 
 might be to involve the following individuals:  
 professionals with the appropriate background, knowledge and experience in 
working with individuals with impaired consent capacity;  
 representatives of patient advocacy groups;
487
  
 experts in the assessment of consent capacity; and/or 
 experts on the scientific and ethical issues relevant to studies involving vulnerable 
populations.
488
 
Though lacking in more specific details, the 45 CFR 46 recognizes something similar 
stating that “if an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable category of 
                                                                                                                                                 
MacCAT-CR similarly acknowledge “the possibility that subjects’ performances can be improved by 
modifying informational procedures” (Paul S. Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso. MacCAT-CR: MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Exchange, Inc., 
2001) p.2). Thus though a general methodological approach will be suggested in what follows as opposed 
to a formal assessment tool, it is worth noting that a proper approach to such aspects of the subject 
recruitment process may themselves prove to be quite helpful in ensuring the preservation of autonomy 
among the potential subjects.    
487
 This may also include individuals who had previously been part of a vulnerable category, such as ex-
prisoners. 
488
 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Office of Extramural Research, National Institutes of 
Health, Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider, 
November 2009, <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm#_ftn26>. 
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subjects, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or handicapped or mentally 
disabled persons, consideration shall be given to the inclusion [into the IRB] of one or 
more individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these 
subjects.”489  
 These types of suggestions correctly point to the fact that the use of some 
vulnerable populations in research will likely present certain ethical challenges and 
obstacles, specifically regarding competence to consent, that may require oversight by 
persons with certain expertise. This is due to the fact that certain issues may arise that are 
specific to the vulnerable population in question, and that would not otherwise arise with 
other subject populations. An expert in the field may be better equipped to anticipate and 
deal with these types of issues specific to a vulnerable population. Though not 
acknowledged by many ethical guidelines and laws concerning clinical trials, in prior 
chapters I have established that the terminally ill constitute such a vulnerable population. 
Their use in research brings with it a variety of ethical challenges related to their ability 
to consent to participation. Without rehashing the arguments from prior chapters, factors 
such as depression, desperation, the therapeutic misconception (both naturally occurring 
as well as misconceptions created through manipulation and deception) all uniquely 
target a terminally ill prospective subject’s ability to consent competently. Given this, the 
creation of a new position, a terminally ill subject rights advocate (SRA), is ethically 
necessary. This person will be a third-party individual, independent of the research trial, 
employed by the IRB or REB, who must possess the background knowledge in these 
issues with terminally ill subjects, and thus will be well equipped to be able to anticipate 
                                                 
489
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, and Office for Protection 
from Research Risks, Title 45 (Public Welfare), Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 (Protection of 
Human Subjects) Washington, D.C.: Revised January 15, 2009 (Effective July 14, 2009) Section 46.107. 
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and combat these and other competence hindering factors. Perhaps the most important 
part of this proposal is that this person not only be the competence assessor, but will be 
charged with two other tasks as well. This will include acting as both a competence 
enhancer, delivering necessary information to the potential subject as well as attempting 
to correct for any competence hindering factors, and as the consent solicitor. It is often 
typical that someone associated with the research trial solicits the consent from potential 
subjects. This may involve either the primary investigator, the nurse coordinator, or even 
a person hired by the research facility specifically for this purpose. However, who solicits 
consent can play a large role in the competence of the possible subject. First, the fact that 
those individuals, including physicians and nurses, working for the research institution 
will have their own interests in recruiting subjects that may conflict with a subject’s best 
interest, could lead to unethical recruitment tactics.
490
 Second, it is also the case that a 
potential subject will be less likely to confuse the setting of talking with a subject’s rights 
advocate with a therapeutic medical practice setting, than if a medical professional 
solicited the consent.
491
 Thus, the tactic of employing an SRA diminishes the potential 
for the therapeutic misconception from the onset. 
 The second feature of the proposal being suggested here relates specifically to 
how this SRA goes about enhancing/assessing competence and obtaining consent. The 
manner in which this is accomplished will utilize a conversational method and must 
                                                 
490
 As previously argued, two examples of this include manipulative brand naming of clinical trials, and 
having recruiters and consent solicitors present consent related information in the best possible light while 
downplaying any of the negatives associated with research participation. Refer back to Chapter Three for a 
more detailed discussion regarding ethical issues with recruitment practices. 
491
 We may recall from Chapter Three the discussion regarding the difficulty for subjects to realize the 
difference between one’s physician in the therapeutic setting, and the physician investigator conducting the 
research trial, especially in cases where they are one in the same. As was previously pointed out, physicians 
often, though sometimes unwittingly, become “double agents” and the distinction between research and 
therapy may become even further obfuscated.  
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relate specifically to the minimum requirements of the four sub-abilities of competence 
established in Chapter Four.  
 It should be noted that this conversational method is at least a two stage approach. 
The initial conversation will be based on competence bolstering which itself will involve 
delivering consent related information regarding the research trial, as well as having the 
prospective subject consider personal issues that would appropriately factor into the final 
decision. Then, as mentioned at the end of Chapter Four, after some brief time has 
passed, the SRA will engage in another conversation that will be more so dedicated to 
assessing competence and supervising the consent signing. This conversation will require 
the SRA to evaluate the potential subject with respect to all four sub-abilities of 
competence. This will involve a dialogue whereby the SRA may have to probe, with the 
use of various questions, into the mental processes of the subject upon making the 
decision to participate in the clinical trial.  
 Though a structured competence assessment instrument will not be provided, it 
would be prudent to discuss, in general terms, how this approach may be executed in 
light of the four elements of competence as well as the minimum standards established in 
Chapter Four. We may briefly examine the application of this approach with each 
element of competence in turn. 
 Understanding  
 The understanding element of competence will likely be the easiest one for the 
SRA to enhance and then subsequently test. Having an SRA as opposed to medical 
personnel, such as a physician investigator, provide an accurate disclosure of the consent 
related material within the context of a back and forth conversation will likely better 
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enable the potential subject to feel comfortable in asking questions. This is crucial as the 
type of questions asked by a potential candidate will likely signal the SRA as to which 
aspects of the clinical trial a particular individual may be struggling to understand. Given 
the SRA’s already existing expertise with this type of population and context, she will be 
able to then focus any additional needed time and attention on addressing those specific 
aspects of the trial that may be most problematic. 
 Though the approach may be different, for the most part, the important 
components for adequate understanding during this process will not deviate substantially 
from other disclosure processes such as those found in the MacCAT-CR. More 
specifically, the conversation should revolve around a discussion regarding the difference 
between research and treatment, any actual specific procedural elements of the trial that 
the subject will have to undergo, the possible effects (both benefits and harms) associated 
with the various elements of the trial, the likelihood of both the risks and benefits of 
participation, the existence of the therapeutic misconception, the means by which such a 
misconception is able to spread, and that subjects of research are free to leave during the 
trial at any time without reprisal. However, the nature and focus of the conversation will 
likely differ depending on the potential subject and the SRA’s ongoing analysis. For 
instance, if the SRA detects that the subject seems to understand the risks associated with 
the actual drug or agent being administered in the trial, but seems to be confused over the 
extent to which the research specific procedures such as randomization may affect her, 
then the SRA should steer the conversation towards addressing that feature. 
 Apart from the necessary disclosure that will occur, ultimately the SRA will have 
to test for an adequate level of understanding. We may recall from Chapter Four that an 
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appropriate level of understanding for terminally ill subjects of research is, what was 
previously labeled, a high level of understanding on the spectrum of understanding 
formerly outlined. This level of understanding required that subjects understand not 
merely that research differed from treatment, or that the therapeutic misconception exists, 
but also how. For instance, as previously argued it is imperative that certain clinical trial 
procedures that demonstrate how the research context differs from the therapeutic context 
be understood. This may, for example, involve ensuring that a potential subject grasp how 
a Phase I trial functions; that it, for example, ends once the MTD (maximum tolerable 
dose) is discovered despite any possible benefits from receiving the non-validated drug. 
This would also apply to the other features of research trials, including randomization, 
double-blinding, and the use of placebos. 
 Similarly, during the conversation, the SRA should ask questions regarding the 
existence of the therapeutic misconception. Given the high level of understanding 
standard, it will be imperative that the SRA determine whether the potential subject is 
able to grasp not only that such a misconception exists, but also how it exists. As Chapter 
Four elucidated, this will require comprehending some of the manipulative tactics that 
often fuel the misconception
492
 as well as some of the naturally occurring ambiguities 
between physicians and investigators or between research facilities and medical practice 
facilities that seem to exist.
493
 
                                                 
492
 Refer back to Chapter Three for details regarding the factors that contribute to the therapeutic 
misconception, including misleading brand naming, deceptive language use, as well as overly optimistic 
rhetoric by recruiters.  
493
 For a more full discussion regarding the importance of understanding how research is conducted and 
how the therapeutic misconception exists, refer back to Chapter Four. 
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 Once this portion of the conversation is completed, the SRA should begin to steer 
the exchange towards a discussion related more so to the appreciation element of 
competence.
494
 
 Appreciation  
 We should recall that as argued in Chapter Four, the minimum standard of 
appreciation for a terminally ill subject of research will be what was referred to as 
Imperfect, but Independent Appreciation. This will involve the SRA ensuring that the 
potential subject be able to foresee at least some of the ways in which research 
participation will affect her and have the insight into how she may feel in those future 
states where those effects might be occurring.  
 The conversations related to appreciation will thus largely revolve around 
ensuring that potential subjects appreciate the purpose/methods of research and how its 
differences from ordinary treatment will affect them. Additionally, and the aspect of 
appreciation that is often neglected, the discussion will also require engagement with the 
various ways in which research participation may impact one’s life specifically. As 
previously mentioned this may include wading through how participation will affect 
one’s health, ability to function, romantic relationships, career, passions/hobbies, goals, 
family, or any activities that may give one’s life meaning or joy. We may recall both the 
athlete example
495
 and the Reibl v. Hughes case
496
 provided in prior chapters, where 
                                                 
494
 It is important to recognize however, that in many cases the conversation will not be neatly divided into 
the four separate elements of competence. That is to suggest that while the SRA is probing into the 
understanding of the potential subject, the subject may make statements that will alert the SRA to possible 
issues with other elements of competence such as appreciation. Similarly the subject may make statements 
that already begin to demonstrate adequate levels of the other elements of competence without the SRA 
having to probe or steer the conversation. Either way, the SRA will have to recognize and account for this 
throughout the course of the conversational evaluation. 
495
 This was the hypothetical case described in Chapter One regarding two separate patients who were both 
diagnosed with a gangrenous leg and each told that amputation would be required. We may further recall 
 231 
 
appreciation was discussed in regards to treatment decisions. These types of cases 
demonstrate the unique nature of the conversation that the SRA will need to have with 
different individuals. Therefore a true assessment of appreciation in our terminally ill 
research context will involve much more than merely acknowledging the relevance of 
one’s illness, and the possible medical/health effects of research, but also further how 
those matters may affect one’s personal life. To what extent mobility, or eyesight, or 
hearing …etc is important in one’s life may be radically different from person to person 
depending on the particulars of their life. Any adequate competency evaluation must 
account for appreciation in this manner. It is only through this type of conversation that 
somewhat forces potential subjects to consider their choices with respect to the various 
particulars of their lives that we can truly hope for potential subjects to make competent 
participation decisions. 
 Probing into one’s ability to appreciate may be more difficult than probing into 
one’s ability to understand. The SRA should remember some standard questions that may 
aid in his evaluation such as:  
 1. How do you think this medical research trial will affect you? 
 
 2. How will the procedure employed in a Phase I trial impact you? (Similar types 
 of questions may be required in relation to other procedural aspects of the trial)  
                                                                                                                                                 
that one patient was a professional basketball player, while the other was an author. Though their disease 
and treatment would be identical, it was previously recognized that what they needed to appreciate would 
be vastly different due to the different lives they led and how amputation would impact those lives.  
496
 Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880. As explained in Chapter One, this case described Mr. Reibl who 
“elected to undergo an internal carotid endarterectomy to remove an occlusion in an artery near his brain… 
However, following the procedure, Reibl suffered a massive stroke, resulting in the paralysis of his entire 
right side…The risk of stroke, in the absence of surgery, had not been imminent… The only risks Mr. Reibl 
was cognizant of were those inherent in any surgical procedure, such as infection. Had he known of the 
more serious risks, Mr. Reibl claimed he would not have gone ahead with the operation, especially in light 
of the fact that he was only one and a half years away from being eligible for pension benefits from his 
employer” (Francoise Baylis, Jocelyn Downie, Barry Hoffmaster, & Susan Sherwin. Health Care Ethics in 
Canada 2
nd
 edition (Toronto: Nelson Ltd., 2004) p. 245). Ultimately, it was decided that risks that are 
particularly relevant given the specific circumstances of a patient needed to be disclosed, in this case that 
would have included any possible occurrences that may threaten Mr. Reibl’s pension benefits.   
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 3. How will this medical research trial affect any personal circumstance you are in 
 (e.g. age, retirement…etc)? 
 
 4. How may this medical research trial affect personal or career goals (e.g. travel 
 goals, completion of long term work projects, or athletic goals)? 
 
 5. How may this medical research trial affect others close to you (e.g. spouse, 
 children, parents, close friends…etc)?   
 
 Reasoning 
 Given that some conversation related to understanding and appreciation has 
already taken place, the reasoning element of competence can be bolstered by attempting 
to engage the prospective subject in a conversation about the relative utility she might 
assign to her various options, which may include a comparison between entering the 
research study, pursuing other treatment options, or doing neither. Such conversations 
may “force individuals to examine trade-offs, which tend to improve the quality of 
decisions made. They also may be particularly useful in situations with high levels of 
emotion.”497 
 We may recall that our minimum standard of reasoning established in Chapter 
Four was Imperfect, but Largely Independent Reasoning. This required that subjects be 
able to engage in effective means/ends reasoning, which includes being able to formulate 
appropriate ends for one’s self as well as being able to compare and contrast different 
means to such an end. Furthermore, such reasoning requires that a person be able to 
pursue knowledge that would likely factor into such reasoning. This may involve a 
potential subject asking certain questions, reading the consent related material carefully, 
or even doing some independent research. Attempts to test for reasoning may involve the 
                                                 
497
 Lisa Eyler and Dilip Jeste. “Enhancing the Informed Consent Process: A Conceptual Overview” 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, Vol. 24, pp.553-568, 2006, p.563. 
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SRA directing the conversation in such a way that enables her to ask for the main goals 
or aims of the potential subject, for a comparison between possible options, including an 
assessment of the risks/benefits of each, and which feature(s) of the option ultimately 
chosen made the subject choose that way. 
 Though there may be no strict guidelines and quantitative rating system, by the 
end of the conversation, the SRA should have taken “stock of the degree to which… 
[subjects] appear to consider the range of options, how they have weighted or evaluated 
the desirability of various consequences of these options, and whether their final choices 
appear to flow logically from their views of the consequences.”498 
 Voluntariness 
 Bolstering and assessing voluntariness may be the most difficult tasks for the 
SRA. We may recall from Chapter Four that voluntariness requires that the final decision 
made be one that freely stems from one’s own understanding, appreciation and reasoning. 
However, as argued, this should not exclude any and all influences from factoring into 
one’s decision. Indeed, including some influences into competent decision making may 
be wholly appropriate, such a spouse’s opinion on how a decision may affect one’s 
family.
499
 Nonetheless, as the previous chapters noted, various types of influences may 
                                                 
498
 Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for 
Physicians and Other Health Professionals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.58. 
499
 As previously noted, many others have made a similar point suggesting that “the presence of influences 
does not mean that a decision is not voluntary. A decision is involuntary only if it is subject to a particular 
type of influence…” (Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, and Robert Klitzman. “Voluntariness of Consent to 
Research: a conceptual model” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 39(1), pp. 30-39, 2009, p. 33). Robert 
Nelson et al. have actually differentiated between certain types of influences that would undermine 
voluntariness from those that may be wholly appropriate stating that while coercion and manipulation may 
eradicate voluntariness, persuasion instead may not threaten it at all. They explain that “persuasion means 
rational persuasion, which is consistent with voluntariness. When persuaded, a person believes something 
through the merit of reasons proposed by another person. This is the paradigm of an influence that is both 
noncontrolling and warranted” (Robert Nelson, Tom Beauchamp, Victoria Miller, William Reynolds, 
Richard Ittenbach and Mary Frances Luce. “The Concept of Voluntary Consent” The American Journal of 
Bioethics, Vol. 11(8), pp. 6-16, 2011, p. 7). 
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indeed render a decision involuntary. These include intimidation/bullying, deceit, 
manipulation, or any actions and behaviours that place excessive duress on the decision-
maker with the intent to coerce or control him.  An SRA must walk the fine line when 
determining and distinguishing those influences that do and do not appropriately factor 
into one’s decision. Additionally, an SRA should attempt to detect mental states that may 
make one excessively susceptible to influences. This may include noticing if individuals 
feel weak, insecure, lack emotional strength, lack confidence in themselves or in their 
own knowledge.
500
 
 We may recall that unlike with the other elements of competence, Chapter Four 
did not specify a strict standard for voluntariness, instead opting to employ a descending 
order of permissibility method. This suggested that those possessing extremely high 
voluntariness, as labeled on the voluntariness spectrum, be first to be admitted into 
research, and then gradually descending down the voluntariness spectrum, lower levels 
are permitted down to what was labeled a medium level of voluntariness. The reasoning 
for this was that requiring a specific level of ability related to voluntariness from our 
spectrum would be inappropriate since being susceptible to manipulation, deceit, 
exploitation, or lacking in confidence in one’s self or one’s knowledge does not itself 
necessitate that someone will be manipulated, deceived, exploited, or pressured and thus 
make an involuntary choice; it rather just increases the probability of such events.  
 Such a situation further complicates matters for the SRA who will have to 
determine through a conversation with potential subjects, whether the final decision to 
participate freely flowed from one’s own understanding, appreciation and reasoning. 
                                                 
500
 Refer back to Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion regarding how these may affect one’s ability 
to make decisions voluntarily.  
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Though such a task may be difficult, the conversational nature of the interaction with an 
SRA should better facilitate an environment where personal information is revealed by 
the subject that may alert the SRA to possible obstacles to voluntary decision making, 
than with other competence assessment approaches. Though there is currently very little 
literature on how to evaluate voluntariness, as Appelbaum et al. note, assessment  
 might begin with a general inquiry into the motivations for a person’s decision 
 about enrolling in research...From the list of motives that most people will offer, 
 the evaluator will want to pay particular attention to external and intentional 
 influences that are most likely to impair the voluntariness of consent [as well as 
 attempting to detect certain internal mental states, such as extremely low 
 confidence or insecurity, which as previously mentioned, may make one 
 especially vulnerable to external influences].
501
  
  
 Once the presence of any of these potentially problematic factors have been 
identified, the SRA will next have to determine to what extent these factors actually 
affected the potential subject and undermined voluntariness. The best manner in which 
the SRA will be able to determine this is to see if there is any discrepancy between the 
potential subject’s understanding, appreciation, and reasoning, and the final decision 
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 Appelbaum et al., 2009, p. 37. It should be noted that the authors here seem to focus substantially on 
which external influences may qualify as “illegitimate influence,” stating that the impact of influence “on 
voluntariness is not of concern unless these influences are also illegitimate-that is, the person exerting the 
influence does not have the right to act in this way according to generally accepted moral norms” 
(Appelbaum et al., 2009, p. 33). Such a sentiment is not new and represents a common approach to the 
concept of voluntariness. Benjamin Freedman, for instance, similarly provides a “distinction between 
choices forced by man, and choices forced by nature” where only the former are to be considered relevant, 
and where those choices forced by man are furthermore only relevant if they constitute a certain type of 
immoral/inappropriate pressure (Benjamin Freedman. “A Moral Theory of Informed Consent” Hastings 
Center Report, Vol.5(4), pp.32-39, 1975, p. 36). However, the account of voluntariness presented here 
differs from such accounts since it is admitted that what may undermine voluntariness is not necessarily 
only external and inappropriate influences, but rather influences that exert an excessive amount of control 
over a person’s decision. Such a recognition, as previously discussed in Chapter Four, notes that sometimes 
certain mental states may render one unduly susceptible to influences that may have otherwise not been 
undue. Since an evaluation of competence is concerned with whether or not the actual person is making a 
voluntary choice, and not whether or not moral or legal condemnation is appropriate for those exerting 
influence on the individual, such matters should be accounted for in an account of voluntariness. Nelson et 
al. suggest something similar maintaining that “it is not the condition of being unduly influenced that 
renders an action involuntary; rather, involuntariness is caused by the controlling effect exerted in the 
circumstance of undue influence… Whether an external influence is morally legitimate is conceptually and 
morally distinct from whether the action taken in response to that influence is voluntary or involuntary” 
(Nelson et al., 2011, p. 13). 
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being made. If indeed it appears as though the decision being made is inconsistent with 
these other elements of competence, then the SRA will have to consider if one of the 
potentially problematic factors overly influenced this final decision and undermined 
voluntariness.
502
 
 
Advantages of the SRA Conversational Approach  
 As already argued, the goal of the competence assessment process cannot only be 
to see if a potential subject meets some broad criteria for competence, but must also be to 
“provide information, assess the degree to which it is being adequately processed, and 
then to maximize this ability through further discussion and other remedial efforts on the 
basis of a given subject’s particular areas of difficulty.”503 It is in part to this end that the 
conversational tactic should be utilized by the SRA, who through a conversational 
approach attempts to bolster as well as test a potential subject’s competence. As 
previously admitted, it is beyond the scope of this current work to fully develop a new 
competence assessment tool, however, the implementation of this methodological 
approach will assist in rectifying many of the past problems and flaws with competency 
assessment,  specifically with terminally ill subjects of research. In fact, this approach has 
many advantages and can mitigate if not completely correct for the issues and flaws 
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 It should be noted that while no current accepted empirical measurement of voluntariness exists, there 
have been instruments developed to test for perceived voluntariness. Both the Decision Making Control 
Instrument (DMCI) and The MacArthur Perceived Coercion Scale (PCS) test a person to see their 
perceived level of voluntariness (See: Victoria Miller et al., “The Decision Making Control Instrument to 
Assess Voluntary Consent” Medical Decision Making, Vol. 31(5), pp.730-741, 2011; and Appelbaum et 
al., 2009, p. 36, respectively). However, one’s perceived voluntariness may not always be the greatest 
indicator of actual voluntary decision making. Indeed, that “which is voluntary in fact is to be distinguished 
from that which is perceived as voluntary by the person who decides or acts. Controlling influences are 
sometimes unobservable to a decision maker, and voluntariness is sometimes perceived as present when it 
is not” (Nelson et al., 2011, p. 13). This may be the case when a potential subject is deceived or 
manipulated, or even unable to withstand pressure from others due to a fragile mental state.    
503
 Moser et al., 2002, p. 1205. 
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previously discussed with prior competence assessment methods including the MacCAT-
CR. We may proceed by first looking at some general advantages of the SRA 
conversational approach, and then examine how such an approach also rectifies the 
specific criticisms previously leveled against the MacCAT-CR.  
 First, as studies have demonstrated, “oral consent in combination with written 
consent rather than written consent only has been shown to lead to greater 
understanding.”504 More specifically, some reviews and studies have found that certain 
interventions can greatly improve consent-related information delivery such as requiring 
oral responses by potential subjects, and providing corrective feedback,
505
 both of which 
can be found within the SRA conversational approach.  
 Another feature of the SRA conversational approach worth mentioning is the 
highly interactive framework throughout the process. The delivery of consent related 
information, the competence assessment, and the final act of consent are all done with 
consistent interaction with the SRA. “Interactive questioning during the consent process 
has been shown to increase post-consent subject understanding, and has the added 
benefits of highlighting important elements for the subject to focus on, ensuring 
understanding of earlier material to allow understanding of subsequent information, and 
assessing subject understanding during the process to allow for appropriate explanation 
throughout the process.”506 
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 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Office of Extramural Research, National Institutes of 
Health, Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider. 
November 2009, <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm#_ftn26>. 
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 Eyler and Jeste, 2006, p.561. 
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 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Office of Extramural Research, National Institutes of 
Health, Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider. 
November 2009, <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm#_ftn26>. 
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 A third upshot embedded within this method is that such an approach encourages 
questions from potential subjects. A lack of confidence, overly emotional state, or even 
being overly awed by medical professionals may often lead subjects to avoid asking 
questions. However, the SRA conversational approach should provide a setting that 
empowers potential subjects and invites them to ask any questions, thus enabling them to 
contribute to their own competence bolstering since subjects would best know which 
areas of the research study are most confusing to them and thus most in need of 
explanation. 
 Somewhat related to this previous point, another one of the advantages to the 
conversational approach is that it allows for a malleable environment that can be varied 
as necessary in order to meet the needs of particular potential subjects. In a discussion 
regarding competence to consent to treatment, Thomas Grisso and Paul Appelbaum argue 
that “patients’ difficulties in the consent process can sometimes be ameliorated by 
altering the social context to provide them with additional support. The presence of 
family members, friends, a trusted personal physician, a member of the clergy of the 
patient’s faith, or even just a staff member of the same ethnic group can reduce the level 
of anxiety that patients feel in unfamiliar and threatening medical environments.”507 This 
is similarly true in the research context with potential subjects. Should the situation 
warrant such a change in the social context, the additional person in the conversation, be 
it a spouse, other family member, close friend, or whoever, may assist in bolstering the 
competence of the potential subject in a myriad of ways. The additional person may for 
example assist the prospective subject in processing any information given. This may be 
accomplished simply with the presence of that additional individual since their presence 
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 Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998, p.97. 
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may be of comfort to the potential subject and may thus reduce any anxiety that the 
potential subject might be experiencing, which would then better enable him to receive 
any consent related information. Often the additional person may prove valuable by being 
able to reinterpret information in a language to which the potential subject is more 
accustomed. Furthermore, the more comfortable setting facilitated by the presence of this 
additional person may enable potential subjects to feel more confident in asking any 
questions they may have, further facilitating a better overall understanding.
508
  
 Finally, this approach employs a qualitative as opposed to quantitative analysis. 
Some critics may actually raise this point as an objection to the SRA conversational 
approach. Such a critic may object stating that a qualitative as opposed to quantitative 
approach opens up the possibility for the subjective biases of the evaluator to factor into 
the final determination of competence or incompetence. However, there are two problems 
with such an objection. 
 First, it must be noted, that despite the use of a quantitative competence 
assessment instrument, the manner in which it is administered and by whom, may still 
enable subjective biases. Even the MacCAT-CR, which asks evaluators to score subject 
responses on a scale between 0 and 2 may allow for the evaluator’s subjective biases to 
rate responses too highly or too low. 
 However, the real dilemma with such an objection is not merely that subjective 
bias may still exist with quantitative approaches, but rather that it fails to recognize the 
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 It should be noted that while the presence of an additional person may be helpful in the initial 
conversation with the SRA, when it becomes time to assess the potential subject’s competence, it remains 
imperative that such a conversation occur without the presence of others. The reason for this should be 
clear since the assessment is intended to ensure the competence of the potential subject only, and the 
presence of others, especially if they are involved in the conversation, may hinder the SRA’s ability to 
evaluate the potential subject’s own responses.  
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significant deficiency of quantitative approaches in the first place. Indeed, a quantitative 
method to competence assessment is unlikely to ever be optimally accurate in 
determining one’s competence. The myriad of possible states of mind, influencing 
factors, and reasons for making certain decisions that different potential subjects may 
have, cannot all be accounted for quantitatively. Thus while it may give us a feeling of 
assurance to know that determinations of competence are reducible to seemingly easy 
mathematical computations, it is not realistic. Some studies have already demonstrated 
that qualitative approaches yield more accurate results when testing the competence of 
certain patient populations. “Recall that anorexic patients scored highly on all aspects of 
the MacCAT-T despite the fact that a qualitative analysis revealed ambivalence over 
treatment [among other issues.]”509 One study showed that anorexia nervosa patients who 
were judged competent by the MacCAT-T actually had severe difficulties and defects in 
their thinking processes that are relevant to competence.
510
 Thus, even this feature of the 
SRA conversational approach, namely that it utilizes a qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative method, should be seen as an advantage.
511
 
 We would be remiss though, if we did not recognize the appeal of quantitative 
competence assessments, namely that such approaches are more easily and quickly 
administered.  However, we must not allow our desire for speed or ease to jeopardize the 
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 Edward D. Sturman. “The Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research: A Review of Standardized 
Assessment Tools” Clinical Psychology Review, Vol. 25, pp.954-974, 2005, p. 966. 
510
 Tan et al. “Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and 
Values” Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, Vol. 13(4), pp. 268–282, 2006, p. 279. 
511
 Apart from the fact that qualitative approaches might be more accurate than quantitative ones, the 
concern of subject evaluator bias is largely ameliorated by the employment of a particular kind of expert to 
the SRA position. The SRA’s expertise in dealing with terminally ill patients and subjects, as well as 
training with the four standards described in Chapter Four, should ensure that competency assessments are 
unaffected by any personal biases. It may further be noted that though the SRA conversational approach is 
qualitative in nature, it may still be tested and evaluated using similar empirical measures used to test other 
quantitative competence assessment instruments. For instance the interrater reliability, concurrent validity 
sensitivity, specificity, and test-retest reliability may all be appropriately used in order to evaluate the SRA 
conversational approach.  
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accuracy of competency assessments. It may indeed be noted that the minimum 
requirements of the four sub-abilities and thus cut-offs established in Chapter Four and 
used by the SRA conversational approach are not as clear as purely quantitative cut-offs 
would be with a competence assessment tool that numerically scored a subject’s 
performance. Thus a person utilizing such a qualitative approach may have more 
difficulty evaluating the competency of potential subjects than would be the case with a 
quantitative method. This though only reinforces the need for the SRA to be a particular 
type of expert in such matters. Furthermore, as already argued, the advantages of such an 
approach outweigh the numerical cleanliness and ease of purely quantitative 
approaches.
512
 
 
The SRA Conversational Approach Remedies the Criticisms of the MacCAT-CR 
 
 We may recall the 4 Sturman criticisms. These were i) the problem with 
repetition, ii) the difficulty of self-reporting, iii) the multi-factor hindrances to 
competence, and iv) the problem of patient/subject deception, respectively. Like the 
MacCAT-CR, the SRA conversational approach easily deals with the second and third 
criticisms in much the same manner as the MacCAT-CR.
513
 However, unlike the 
                                                 
512 In fact aside from what has already been argued, such a qualitative approach directly responds to one of 
Paul Appelbaum’s criticisms of cutoff scores in general. “As Appelbaum notes, ‘no single cutoff score 
yields both high sensitivity and high specificity’” (Epstein, 2008, p. 513). Though such an issue may never 
be fully rectified, it should be acknowledged that it applies more so to quantitative cut-offs which are 
problematically rigid such that they may either allow incompetent persons to qualify as competent, or 
competent persons to be deemed incompetent, that is false negatives and false positives respectively. 
However, such a dilemma is mitigated by the qualitative cut-offs offered here, which are flexible enough so 
as to allow the expert SRA to account for the unique factors of every case and make appropriate 
competency evaluations. 
513
 The difficulty of self-reporting issue relates to the fact that when a patient’s or subject’s reasoning is 
assessed by asking them to recollect the mental processes used in their decision-making process, the 
answers given are often inaccurate. However, similar to what was previously argued regarding the 
MacCAT-CR, the SRA conversational approach avoids this dilemma. The tactic employed by the 
MacCAT-CR, namely engaging in a series of questions, none of which directly ask the potential subject to 
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MacCAT-CR, the SRA conversational approach is also able to remedy the first and 
fourth criticisms as well. 
 The first criticism, namely the problem with repetition, involved the potential for 
a subject to be deemed competent while only possessing the ability to repeat information, 
without having an adequate understanding of that information. This issue of mere 
repetition without actual understanding has at times been overlooked. In fact in studies 
examining past competence assessment methods, it was found that the methods used 
“sometimes examined recall of information rather than true understanding,”514 making 
this issue one that was able to persist virtually undetected. However, the SRA 
conversational approach does not suffer this defect as did the MacCAT-CR. The very 
nature of this approach relies on an ability to converse, which itself will often require 
persons speaking on matters in their own words. The ability to vocalize concepts in one’s 
own words itself requires a certain amount of comprehension regarding those concepts. 
This approach would thus eliminate the potential for a prospective subject to merely 
                                                                                                                                                 
merely remember her reasoning, but rather which will have her engage in the reasoning process right there, 
in front of and with the interviewer, resolved this issue to a great extent. The SRA approach which utilizes 
a conversational method similarly, if not even more so, compels potential subjects to engage in the 
reasoning process right there with the SRA thus minimizing this self-reporting dilemma. The third Sturman 
criticism, specifically, the multi-factor hindrances to competence, is likewise avoided by the SRA 
conversational approach in much the same way as was previously discussed with the MacCAT-CR. This 
criticism suggested that given the many possible factors in a certain context that may hinder competence, 
one who fails to demonstrate an adequate level of any of the sub-abilities of competence is not necessarily a 
person who may generally lack that sub-ability, or competence overall, in life. However, just as was the 
case with the MacCAT-CR, the SRA conversational approach acknowledges this and is meant to assess 
competence only in the specific context for which its line of questioning is geared. It is not meant to 
provide blanket determinations of competence for a person. Refer back to Chapter Five for a more detailed 
discussion regarding these two criticisms and the MacCAT-CR. 
514
 Eyler and Jeste, 2006, p.561. Part of this problem may stem from inaccurate or incomplete definitions 
and accounts of understanding which may lead to “a confusing between understanding and recall” (Laura 
Dunn and Dilip Jeste. “Enhancing Informed Consent for Research and Treatment” 
Neuropsychopharmacology, Vol. 24(6), pp.595-607, 2001, p. 604). One may refer back to Chapter Four for 
some detail regarding an appropriate depiction of understanding. However presently we may briefly note 
that “to understand a treatment or research protocol, a patient must receive, encode, retain, and process the 
information. This necessarily involves sensory modalities, attention, memory, and cognition... Recall alone 
does not imply understanding [and] furthermore, long-term recall is not always necessary, for example, in 
immediate treatment decisions” (Dunn and Jeste, 2001, p. 596). 
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regurgitate information that was only memorized, but not adequately understood. In fact 
any attempt to merely repeat purely memorized information would likely become 
apparent within the context of a back and forth conversation, alerting the SRA to a 
possible deficiency in the person’s competence.515  
 Additionally, the built in waiting period after the disclosure conversation, but 
before the competence assessment conversation, greatly alleviates this issue in a way that 
the MacCAT-CR falls short. As already discussed the MacCAT-CR asks direct questions 
pertaining to a specific element of competence immediately following the disclosure of 
the information necessary for that element of competence. This increases the potential for 
a potential subject to simply repeat back the information he heard seconds before without 
any actual understanding. The waiting period thus not only accomplishes various goals 
explained beforehand,
516
 but now also aids in preventing this obstacle to competency 
evaluations as well. The SRA conversational approach thus does not fall prey to this first 
line of criticism.
517
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 Apart from testing for real understanding and not just memorization of information, an “assessment 
should also take into account an apparent lack of motivation, inattention, [or] mistrust” (Sturman, 2005, 
p.966), which can themselves lead to a subject processing information only cursorily, and perhaps may 
even cause a subject to not even attempt to do much more than just memorize information. The 
conversational format suggested here facilitates an exchange between the SRA and the potential subject 
that will enable the detection of these underlying issues as well, and thus better prevent dilemmas related to 
understanding than with previous competence assessment methods including the MacCAT-CR. 
516
 These included, enabling the prospective subject to digest and read any information that has been 
provided, reflect on the initial conversation she had with the SRA, discuss the situation with friends and 
family, as well as allow the SRA to better distinguish between time-limited and permanent impairments, 
which may be particularly necessary for prospective subjects who have only recently learned that they have 
a terminal illness and may be over stressed or overly anxious. 
517
 The idea of incorporating this type of waiting period before the final consent is one that has been 
corroborated by the National Institutes of Health, which has asserted that “it may be helpful to provide 
information incrementally and to build in a waiting period after the initial screening interview, before 
seeking the subject’s formal written consent. A two-step informed consent process would facilitate family 
conferencing and consultation, and allow more time to weigh the pros and cons of study participation” 
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Office of Extramural Research, National Institutes of 
Health, Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider. 
November 2009, <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm#_ftn26>). 
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 The fourth Sturman criticism, which the MacCAT-CR was unable to properly 
remedy, was the problem of patient/subject deception. This dilemma was concerned with 
patients or subjects being able to say what they think a competence assessor will want to 
hear, despite possessing beliefs to the contrary, thus enabling them to deceive the 
assessor affecting his ability to accurately judge competence. This may be especially 
problematic in research with terminally ill individuals who may be desperate to enter into 
a clinical trial. We may recall that the MacCAT-CR did not fare well against this line of 
criticism as was previously established with the anorexia example and the transparent 
style of questioning employed by the MacCAT-CR argument.
518
 It should be recognized 
that such a problem may never be fully prevented, for there will always be some persons 
clever and motivated enough so as to deceive even the most proficient competence 
assessors. However, the type of thorough conversation in which the SRA will engage the 
potential subject, will go a long way in preventing possible deception. Given that a 
conversation revolving around the appreciation component of competence will allow the 
SRA to delve a little into the personal circumstances surrounding a potential subject, that 
subject will be less likely able to deceive the evaluator by lying about his or her beliefs. 
In fact any purposeful deceit may become more apparent and obvious to the SRA due to 
the nature and length of the conversation.
519
 It may thus be concluded that the SRA 
conversational approach is able to rectify all four of the Sturman criticisms.     
                                                 
518
 Refer back to Chapter Five for a discussion of these arguments. 
519
 For instance, we may envision a potential subject who possesses overly hopeful and unrealistic beliefs 
regarding the therapeutic potential of a trial, but decides to hide these from the competence assessor. 
Hiding such information might be easy during the course of a verbal questionnaire. However, successfully 
accomplishing such a task may become more difficult during the course of an in depth back and forth 
conversation where one’s true beliefs are given various opportunities to surface, even if unintentionally. 
However, it should be noted that detecting deception is a highly difficult task. In fact “detecting deception 
often stumps the most experienced police officers, judges, customs officials and other forensic 
professionals. Research has shown that even agents from the FBI, CIA and Drug Enforcement Agency 
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 In addition to these issues though, we may also investigate how well the SRA 
conversational approach fares with some of the criticisms specific to the MacCAT-CR. 
We may recall that there were three such criticisms previously discussed. These were the 
MacCAT-CR’s failure to take voluntariness into account, its inability to provide cut-off 
scores or standards that would aid a competence assessor in her competency 
determination, and that a greater attempt at combating the therapeutic misconception was 
needed.    
 We may recall that the MacCAT-CR lacked an adequate assessment of one’s 
voluntariness in decision making, opting instead to only determine whether an individual 
is able to express a choice, but ignoring whether such a choice ought to be considered 
voluntary. Competence assessment tools, including the MacCAT-CR fail to account for 
this voluntariness element of competent decision making largely due to the fact that such 
tools are established on accounts of competence that fail to acknowledge this component 
of competence. Without rehashing the various arguments previously made, it was 
established that voluntariness is an essential component to competent decision making. 
Possessing adequate understanding, appreciation, and reasoning is ultimately meaningless 
if the final decision made does not stem from one’s understanding, appreciation and 
reasoning. Given that other accounts of competence fail to include this element, the SRA 
                                                                                                                                                 
don’t do much better than chance in telling liars from truth-tellers” (Rachel Adelson. “Detecting 
Deception” American Psychological Association Monitor on Psychology, Vol. 35(7), 2004, p.70). Thus, it 
is an unfortunate fact that even our SRA may be deceived by potential subjects clever and motivated 
enough to deceive. However, lying has been shown to have various verbal and bodily cues, such as 
pressing one’s lips together, taking longer to begin answering questions, attempting to talk only minimally, 
and providing stories that are implausible (Adelson, 2004, p. 70). Though not an exact science, these types 
of cues, as well as other possible abnormalities in communication, may become obvious to an SRA over the 
course of a lengthy and personal conversation, thus potentially tipping off the SRA to possible deception. 
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conversational approach is able to succeed in an area that most, if not all, other 
competence assessment instruments and literature on this topic has overlooked.
520
   
 We may also recall, that the MacCAT-CR had no cut-offs or standards for 
assessors to use in order to make determinations of competency or incompetence. This 
was largely due to adherence to the principle that no one competency cut-off or standard 
could be applicable in all cases. Indeed, others, such as Dunn et al. have also 
acknowledged that “the lack of a predetermined cutoff separating capacity and incapacity 
is less a limitation than an intended feature of the MacArthur instruments; … [Further 
adding that] in any case, factors unique to certain contexts or populations will make other 
instruments preferable in some situations.”521 It is this last sentiment that drives our 
current endeavour, since as has been argued, the research context with terminally ill 
subjects represents a particular context and population that can be better served with a 
more specific competence bolstering/assessment procedure and instrument geared toward 
accounting for the factors unique to such a context. Thus, though Appelbaum and Grisso 
are correct in their assertion that no single standard could apply to the broad range of 
possible cases, such an issue is not presently relevant since the cut-offs/standards created 
in Chapter Four and employed here are specific only to one particular context with one 
type of population, namely terminally ill subjects of research.
522
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 As previously discussed the nature of the conversation between the potential subject and the SRA will 
involve a discussion regarding the motivations and influences that may have been present in the decision-
making process. In addition to accounting for and examining these, the SRA must also look for possible 
mental states that may undermine voluntariness, including extreme insecurity, a lack of confidence, an 
overly emotional or anxious state as well as others. Ultimately the SRA will have to determine whether or 
not the final decision made follows from a potential subject’s own understanding, appreciation and 
reasoning. Refer back to earlier in this chapter for a more detailed account regarding the manner in which 
the SRA ought to analyze one’s voluntariness. 
521
 Dunn et al., 2006, p.1331. 
522
 It should be noted the part of the problem identified by Appelbaum and Grisso, as well as others 
regarding the inability for a cut-off to apply in all cases, applies more so to quantitative cut-offs or 
 247 
 
 The ability to use cut-offs/standards, even qualitative ones, will be useful to 
competence assessors in making determinations of competence and incompetence in an 
accurate and efficient manner.
523
 It will further enable them to make such determinations 
in a more uniform way, creating consistency between different research trials and 
between different jurisdictions.
524
 Thus the SRA conversational method again proves able 
to improve upon past competence assessment approaches/instruments. 
 The final criticism of the MacCAT-CR involved the recognition that it does not 
go far enough in combating the therapeutic misconception and improving potential 
subjects’ appreciation. However, it is here that the SRA conversational approach might 
best shine. Given the personal nature and structure of the conversation, the SRA should 
be able to facilitate a conversation that encourages the potential subject to engage with 
and consider how research participation may affect one’s life. This will include not only 
                                                                                                                                                 
standards and less to our qualitative standards. The reason being that quantitative cut-offs are rigid, whereas 
the qualitative standards employed here are more flexible and are more likely to accommodate the variety 
of unique factors or personal circumstances that different potential subjects may bring. 
523
 One may note that though the MacCAT-CR has a rating system, without anything close to a set of 
standards or cut-offs, such numerical ratings are not overly helpful for the competence assessor in making 
competence evaluations. Indeed, as Appelbaum admits in regards to the competence assessment of patients, 
evaluators using the MacCAT-T should “integrate the results with other data in order to reach a judgment 
about competence” (Paul Appelbaum. “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment” The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 357, pp.1834-1840, 2007, p.1837). However, “exactly what ‘other 
data’ should be collected and included in the assessment is not specified” (Jorie Epstein. “How Reliable is 
the Competency Assessment Process?” Virtual Mentor: American Medical Association Journal of Ethics, 
Vol. 10(8), pp. 511-515, 2008, p.513). This approach therefore, may further lead to inconsistent 
competency evaluations between research institutions and jurisdictions, thus demonstrating the need for 
some form of standards or cut-offs.  
524
 The issue of consistency has also been raised in regards to competency assessment in the treatment 
setting with patients. In a criticism of standardized competence assessment instruments, Jorie Epstein 
touches on the importance of having a uniform procedure for competence evaluations stating that “one can 
see that the tests, while potentially helpful, are plagued by limitations, not the least of which is how to 
administer them more consistently. In order to achieve greater uniformity, a physician must know how to 
execute the exams properly. But do physicians receive specialized training for the specific assessment they 
will give? If the test itself is standardized, what are the procedures for administering it? Appelbaum states 
that ‘there are currently no formal practice guidelines from professional societies for the assessment of a 
patient's capacity to consent to treatment’, forcing one to ask, how useful are these assessment tools?” 
(Epstein, 2008, p. 513). Though this is in regards to the treatment setting, similar concerns can be raised 
about competence assessment tools utilized in the research setting with potential subjects. However, 
developing a standardized approach that employs a specific type of trained expert and qualitative cut-offs, 
both of which the SRA conversational approach accomplishes, such concerns are largely resolved.  
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some disclosure and conversation regarding the various methods in research that deviate 
from standard best care practices that would be typical in the therapeutic setting, but also 
a discussion over the existence of the therapeutic misconception itself, as well as some of 
its contributing factors. Such a discussion will better enable a potential subject as well as 
the SRA to recognize whether or not such factors are currently present and hindering the 
potential subject’s competence. Additionally, as previously mentioned the conversation 
with the SRA will also force the subject to engage with the ways in which research 
participation may impact the various aspects of one’s life, including health (quality and 
longevity), career, hobbies, family, other goals, and one’s values, thus making this 
approach to enhancing and testing for appreciation more rigorous than other existing 
competence assessment instruments and methods.  
 It should be acknowledged that the SRA conversational approach may be 
lengthier than other competence assessment methods and instruments. This is largely due 
to two factors. First, there are two separate conversations built in to this approach, 
namely the disclosure/competence bolstering conversation, and the evaluation 
conversation. This alone increases the time it may take to enroll subjects in research 
trials. Additionally, the SRA conversational approach will likely involve discussions that 
are by their nature lengthier than what other instruments and methods require. This is as a 
result of the particular attention afforded to both appreciation and voluntariness, which 
due to their complexity and intricacies require uniquely personal conversations with 
potential subjects. It seems to be unfortunately the case that proper assessments of 
appreciation and voluntariness conflict with the simplicity and brevity of competence 
assessment methods. However, we cannot merely forget these two crucial pillars of 
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competence, but instead hope to strike the right balance between administrative 
practicality and the comprehensiveness of the competence evaluation procedure. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The preceding Chapters have provided a crucial first step in improving the 
ethicality of research conducted on terminally ill individuals. More specifically, Chapter 
One explained the connection between competence, autonomy, and informed consent, 
whereby competence was shown as a requirement necessary if informed consent is to be 
truly considered an expression of one’s autonomy. Put another way, incompetence 
precludes one from acting autonomously. Thus, it was concluded that respecting the 
autonomy of potential research subjects requires a serious focus on competence itself. 
Given this, a comprehensive depiction of competence was provided, where competence 
included four separate sub-abilities, including understanding, appreciation, reasoning and 
voluntariness. 
 Chapter Two examined a current common method for dealing with competence. 
This was the risk based sliding scale approach which dictated that the required 
competence for decision-making ought to vary with the riskiness of the decision. 
Therefore, as the risks of a decision increase so too should the required level of 
competence. Similarly, such an approach dictated that the less risky a decision, the lower 
the competency requirements ought to be. However, such a strategy to competency 
requirements was proven flawed for a myriad of reasons. More specifically, it was shown 
that the various underlying arguments in favour of the risk based sliding scale were 
fraught with fallacies, that competence assessments should not be affected by an 
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application of a best interest standard, that the risk based sliding scale would permit a 
disguised hard paternalism, that such a strategy conflicts with the vital precept that 
competency assessments should be process-oriented and not result-oriented, and also that 
it is dubious whether the risk based sliding scale is helpful in the medical research setting. 
Ultimately it was argued instead that the stringency of competency requirements should 
be related with the demands of the decisional task at hand. That is to state that as a 
decisional task is more complex, the greater the level of competence that ought to be 
required. 
 Given this, Chapter Three then demonstrated the need for a greater competency 
requirement in the research context with terminally ill subjects as compared to the 
medical practice context. Three significant differences between the two contexts were 
discussed and proved to cause decision making in the research context to be far more 
difficult than decision making in medical practice. These differences included the 
difference in the nature of the researcher/subject relationship as opposed to the 
physician/patient relationship, the higher potential for exploitation of the situation or 
mental state of terminally ill subjects, and the presence of the therapeutic misconception. 
Thus it was argued that the research context with terminally ill subjects represents a more 
difficult decision making context than the medical practice decision making context, and 
therefore such a context warrants greater competency requirements.  
 Chapter Four then provided such competency requirements. By establishing 
various possible levels within each sub-ability of competence, it became possible to note 
where it might be appropriate to set our standards for the research context with terminally 
ill individuals. The determination of such sub-ability requirements relied heavily on the 
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already previously established significant differences between the medical practice and 
medical research context. Ultimately, four separate standards, one for each sub-ability of 
competence, were generated, and the amalgamation of these was deemed to be the new 
competency requirement for the medical research context with terminally ill subjects.  
 However, since providing a competency requirement for the medical research 
context with terminally ill individuals requires more than merely establishing the 
requirement itself, Chapter Five began to lay the groundwork for the implementation of 
such requirements. More specifically, it remained to be determined how best to attempt to 
test for such a new competence requirement. Chapter Five thus examined some current 
competency assessment tools and methods, ultimately demonstrating their flaws. Most of 
the effort was directed towards examining the MacCAT-CR since it is often lauded as the 
superior competence assessment tool. However, it too proved to have some flaws, 
including its failure to take voluntariness into account, its inability to provide cut-offs or 
standards that would aid a competence assessor in her competency determination, that a 
greater attempt at combating the therapeutic misconception is needed specifically for 
terminally ill subjects, and that it does not attempt to correct for some common issues 
often levied against competence assessment tools such as the problem of repetition and 
the problem of subject deception. 
 Chapter Six was then tasked with providing a way forward to competence 
assessment that can attempt to correct for common criticisms often directed at 
competence assessment methods, as well as for the issues that plagued the MacCAT-CR, 
and be geared toward the medical research context with terminally ill subjects. Thus, the 
SRA conversational approach was provided. This approach involves the employment of a 
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subject rights advocate who is not related to the organization conducting the research, and 
who is charged with the task of both enhancing the competence of potential subjects, as 
well as ultimately testing for the necessary level of competence needed to consent to 
participate in the research trial. Both tasks are accomplished through a conversational 
method.  
 Though, as the final chapter demonstrated, such a strategy should correct for 
many of the past issues with competence assessments, as well as better serve to protect 
the autonomy of prospective subjects and hopefully diminish the potential for abuse and 
corruption, such a strategy too may have some limitations going forward. 
 It must, for example, be acknowledged that such an approach was designed 
specifically for use with terminally ill subjects. While some of the recommendations 
throughout this work may apply to other populations participating in research, many of 
the considerations applied in both the creation of the competence requirements, as well as 
the SRA conversational approach, would not pertain to other populations. For instance, 
the concern regarding the therapeutic misconception would not be as appropriate for 
healthy volunteer subjects of research.
525
  
 Additionally, the SRA conversational approach fell short of being a fully 
structured competence assessment tool. This was however in part by design. It was for 
instance argued that despite the ease of use with structured quantitative assessment tools, 
a qualitative approach will likely lead to more accurate results. As previously discussed, 
structured quantitative tools will render the competence assessment process as too ridged 
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 Despite this though, it should still be acknowledged that misconceptions are still common amongst 
healthy subjects as well. For example a healthy subject of research may not think of his participation as 
being akin to therapeutic treatment since he is not looking to have an ailment alleviated or cured, but he too 
may still be confused between the intent of researchers and research itself, as compared to that of typical 
medical practice.   
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to accommodate the various potential factors that may be present with prospective 
subjects of research.  Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that despite the underlying 
reasons for preferring a non-structured qualitative approach, the implementation of such 
an approach will be trickier and more time consuming. As a result, the integration of such 
a strategy into current research practices may prove to be a difficult and lengthy 
transition, but one that is nonetheless a necessary ethical step forward.     
 Finally, it ought to be acknowledged that some work still remains to be 
completed. The full implementation of a competence assessment method lay beyond the 
scope of this current project. As previously discussed, such a task would require testing 
and rating the SRA conversational approach for its internal consistency, interrater 
reliability, concurrent validity, sensitivity and specificity, and then making adjustments 
where necessary. Such tasks remain to be completed going forward. Additionally it still 
remains to be determined how best to structure the training and education for SRAs. 
Since the competence bolstering and assessment depends on the expertise of the SRAs, 
ensuring both that only qualified candidates are chosen, and second that the necessary 
training with the competency requirements is provided to those selected, similarly 
remains as the next steps essential to improve the ethicality of research conducted on 
terminally ill individuals.
526
 Nonetheless, despite some of the remaining work, a crucial 
first step has been taken here, as the framework for both the necessary competence 
                                                 
526
 The importance of qualified and properly trained SRAs cannot be understated. Since the competence 
assessment/enhancement approach proposed is of a qualitative variety, some of the decisions regarding 
how to conduct portions of the conversation with prospective subjects will at times be left to the subjective 
interpretations of the SRA and thus, ensuring that the SRA is well educated on the four elements of 
competence, the competence requirements for terminally ill research subjects, as well as the types of factors 
that may arise with this population that may pose a hindrance to adequate competence, is paramount.    
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requirements, and competence assessment/enhancement approach, have been established 
for medical research on the terminally ill.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach (2007) U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
 Columbia Circuit. N0.04-5350. 
Adelson R. “Detecting Deception” American Psychological Association Monitor on 
 Psychology 35(7): 70, (2004). 
Agrawal M., and Emanuel E. “Phase 1 Oncology Research” The Oxford Textbook of 
 Clinical Research Ethics. Eds. Emanuel, Grady, Crouch, Lie, Miller, and 
 Wendler. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 356-367. 
Alaska Statutes. Title 47, Welfare, Social Services and Institutions: Mental Health. Sec. 
 47.30.837(d)(1)(B). Alaska: 2011. 
American Medical Association. AMA's Code of Medical Ethics: section 2.07 — Clinical 
 Investigation. Issued prior to April 1977, Updated June 1994 and June 1998. Web. 
 <https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
 medical-ethics/opinion207.page?>. 
Angell M. The Truth About the Drug Companies. New York: Random House Inc., 2005. 
Annas G. “The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: Nuremberg, Helsinki, 
 and Beyond” Health Matrix  2: 119-140, (1992). 
Appelbaum P. “Missing the Boat: Competence and Consent in Psychiatric Research” The 
 American Journal of Psychiatry 155(11): 1486-1488, (1998). 
Appelbaum P. “Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment” The New 
 England Journal of Medicine 357: 1834-1840, (2007). 
 256 
 
Appelbaum P., and Grisso T. “The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental 
 Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment” Law and Human Behavior 
 19(2): 105-126, (1995). 
Appelbaum P., and Grisso T. “Capacities of Hospitalized, Medically Ill Patients to 
 Consent to Treatment” Psychosomatics 38(2): 119-125, (1997). 
Appelbaum P., and Grisso T. MacCAT-CR: MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for 
 Clinical Research. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Exchange, Inc., 2001. 
Appelbaum P., Grisso T., Frank E., O’Donnell S., and Kupfer D. “Competence of 
 Depressed Patients for Consent to Research” The American Journal of Psychiatry 
 156: 1380-1384, (1999). 
Appelbaum P., Lidz C., and Grisso T. “Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research: 
 Frequency and Risk Factors” IRB: Ethics and Human Research 26(2): 1-8, 
 (2004). 
Appelbaum P., Lidz C., and Klitzman R. “Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A 
 Conceptual Model” The Hastings Center Report 39(1): 30-39, (2009). 
Appelbaum P., Roth L., Lidz C., Benson P., and Winslade W. “False Hopes and Best 
 Data: Consent to Research and the Therapeutic Misconception” The Hastings 
 Center Report 17(2): 20-24, (Apr. 1987). 
Baker M., and Taub H. “Readability of Informed Consent Forms for Research in a 
 Veterans Administration Medical Center” Journal of the American Medical 
 Association 250(19): 2646-2648, (1983). 
Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1992). 
 257 
 
Baylis F., Downie J., Hoffmaster B., and Sherwin S., eds. Health Care Ethics in Canada. 
 2
nd
 ed. Toronto: Nelson Ltd., 2004. 
Beauchamp T., and Childress J. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 6
th
 ed. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Beecher H. “Ethics and Clinical Research” The New England Journal of Medicine 274: 
 1354- 1360, (1966). 
Berg J., Appelbaum P., and Grisso T. “Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards 
 of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions” Rutgers L. Rev 48: 345-396, 
 (1995-1996). 
Berg J., Appelbaum P., Lids C., and Parker L. Informed Consent: Legal Theory and 
 Clinical Practice. 2
nd
 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Berger O., Gronberg BH., Sand K., Kaasa S., and Loge JH. “The Length of Consent 
 Documents in Oncological Trials is Doubled in Twenty Years” Annals of 
 Oncology 20(2): 379-385, (2009). 
Berkwits M. “CAPTURE! SHOCK! EXCITE! Clinical Trial Acronyms and the 
 “Branding” of Clinical Research” Annals of Internal Medicine 133(9): 755-759, 
 (2000). 
Blackhall LJ., Murphy ST., Frank G., et al. “Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Patient 
 Autonomy” Journal of the American Medical Association 274: 820-825, (Sept. 
 1995). 
Bottrell M., Alpert H., Fischbach R., Emanuel L. “Hospital Informed Consent for 
 Procedure Forms: Facilitating Quality Patient-Physician Interaction” Journal of 
 the American Medical Association Surgery 135(1): 26-33, (2000). 
 258 
 
Boylan JF., Conlon NP., and Jaigirdar MJ. “Consent in Emergency Care Research” The 
 Lancet 378(9785): 25, (July 2011). 
Brandt AM. “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study” The 
 Hastings Center Report 8(6): 21-29, (1978). 
Brillon, Cordero, Richardson, Ganz et al. “Effects of Intensive Glucose Lowering in Type 
 2 Diabetes” The New England Journal of Medicine 358(24): 2545-2559, (2008). 
Brock D. “Decisionmaking Competence and Risk” Bioethics 5(2): 105-112, (1991). 
Buchanan A. “Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment” Journal 
 of the Royal Society of Medicine 97: 415-420, (2004). 
Buchanan A., and Brock D. “Deciding for Others” The Milbank Quarterly 
 64(Supplement 2): 17-94, (1986). 
Buchanan A., and Brock D. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision 
 Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Buller N., Campbell C., Denison D., Priestly K., and Valentine C. “Are Patient Consent 
 Forms for Research Protocols Easy to Read?” British Medical Journal 305: 1263–
 1264, (1992). 
Buller T. “Competence and Risk-Relativity” Bioethics 15(2): 93-109, (2001). 
Cale G. “Continuing the Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence” Bioethics 
 13(2): 131-148, (1999). 
Canada. Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering 
 Research Council of Canada, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
 Council of Canada. Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research 
 Involving Humans. Ottawa: 1998 (with 2000, 2002 and 2005 amendments). 
 259 
 
Canada. Health Canada. Guidance for Industry: General Considerations for Clinical 
 Trials ICH Topic E8. Ottawa, Ontario: 1997. 
Canadian Diabetes Association. Web. Last accessed: 2014. <http://www.diabetes.ca/ 
 diabetes-and-you/what/prevalence/>.  
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Cassileth BR., Zupkis RV., Sutton-Smith K., and March V. “Informed Consent — Why 
 Are Its Goals Imperfectly Realized?” New England Journal of Medicine 302: 
 896-900, (1980). 
CBC News. “Madi Vanstone, 12, Asks Ontario to Fund Pricey Drug” March 2014. Web. 
 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/madi-vanstone-12-asks-ontario-to-fund-
 pricey-drug-1.2557905>. 
Charland L. “Decision-Making Capacity” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. 
 Zalta EN., Fall 2008. Web. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ 
 decision-capacity/>. 
Christman J. “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
 of Philosophy, Ed. Zalta EN., Spring 2011. Web. <http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
 archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/>. 
Council for the International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in 
 Collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO). International Ethical 
 Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. Geneva: August, 
 2002. 
Crisp R. “Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy” Journal of 
 Law and Society 17(1): 77-89, (1990). 
 260 
 
Culver C., and Gert B. “The Inadequacy of Incompetence” The Milbank Quarterly 68(4): 
 619-643, (1990). 
Daugherty CK., Banik DM., Janish L., and Ratain MJ. “Quantitative Analysis of Ethical 
 Issues in Phase I Trials: A Survey Interview Study of 144 Advanced Cancer 
 Patients” IRB: Ethics and Human Research 22(3): 6-14, (2000). 
Daugherty C., Ratain MJ., Grochowski E., Stocking C., et al. “Perceptions of Cancer 
 Patients and Their Physicians Involved in Phase I Trials” Journal of Clinical 
 Oncology 13(5): 1062-72, (1995). 
Demarco J. “Competence and Paternalism” Bioethics 16(3): 231-245, (2002). 
DeRenzo EG., Conley RR., and Love R. “Assessment of Capacity to Give Consent to 
 Research Participation: State of the Art and Beyond” Journal of Health Care Law 
 and Policy 1: 66-87, (1998). 
Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 165 F.R.D.689 (M.D. Fl 1996). 
Downie J., Caulfield T., and Flood C. Canadian Health Law and Policy. 2
nd
 ed. Canada: 
 Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2002. 
Doyal L. “Journals Should Not Publish Research to Which Patients Have Not Given 
 Fully Informed Consent: With Three Exceptions” British Medical Journal 
 314(7087): 1107-1111, (April 1997). 
Drane J. “The Many Faces of Competency” The Hastings Center Report 15(2): 17-21, 
 (1985). 
Dresser R. “The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic Misconception” Social 
 Philosophy & Policy 19(2): 271-294, (2002). 
 261 
 
Dunn L., and Jeste D. “Enhancing Informed Consent for Research and Treatment” 
 Neuropsychopharmacology 24(6): 595-607, (2001). 
Dunn L., Nowrangi M., Palmer B., Jeste D., and Saks E. “Assessing Decisional Capacity 
 for Clinical Research or Treatment: A Review of Instruments” American Journal 
 of Psychiatry 163(8): 1323-1334, (2006). 
Dworkin G. “Paternalism” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. Zalta EN., 
 Summer 2009. Web. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ 
 paternalism/>. 
Eisenhauer EA., Twelves C.. and Buyse M. Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials: A Practical 
 Guide. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Emanuel EJ., Crouch RA., Arras JD., Moreno JD., and Grady C, Eds. Ethical and 
 Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
 University Press, 2003. 
Epstein J. “How Reliable is the Competency Assessment Process?” Virtual Mentor: 
 American Medical Association Journal of Ethics 10(8): 511-515, (2008). 
Epstein LC., and Lasagna L. “Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Substance” JAMA 
 Internal Medicine 123(6): 682-688, (1969). 
Epstein M., and Mark Wilson. “Consent in Emergency Care Research” The Lancet 
 378(9785): 26, (July 2011). 
Etchells E., Darzins P., Silberfeld M., et al. “Assessment of Patient Capacity to Consent 
 to Treatment” Journal of General Internal Medicine 14: 27-34, (1999). 
Eyler L., and Jeste D. “Enhancing the Informed Consent Process: A Conceptual 
 Overview” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 24: 553-568, (2006). 
 262 
 
Feinberg J. “Legal Paternalism” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1: 105-124, (1971). 
Flory J., and Emanuel E. “Interventions to Improve Research Participants’ Understanding 
 in Informed Consent for Research: A Systematic Review” Journal of the 
 American Medical Association 292(13): 1593-1601, (2004). 
Frankfurt HG. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” Journal of Philosophy 
 68(1): 5-20, (1971). 
Freedman B. “A Moral Theory of Informed Consent” The Hastings Center Report 5(4): 
 32-39, (1975). 
Freedman B. “Competence, Marginal and Otherwise: Concepts and Ethics” International 
 Journal of Law and Psychiatry 4(1-2): 53-72, (1981). 
Freedman B. “The Validity of Ignorant Consent to Medical Research” The Hastings 
 Center: Ethics and Human Research 4(2): 1-5, (1982). 
Freedman B. “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research” The New England Journal 
 of Medicine 317(3): 141-145, (1987). 
Freedman B. “Cohort-Specific Consent: An Honest Approach to Phase 1 Clinical Cancer 
 Studies” IRB: Ethics and Human Research 12(1): 5-7, (1990). 
Freedman B., Fuks A., and Weijer C. “Demarcating Research and Treatment: A 
 Systematic Approach for the Analysis of the Ethics of Clinical Research” Clin 
 Res 40: 653-660, (1992). 
Freedman B., and Weijer C. “Demarcating Research and Treatment Interventions: 
 A Case Illustration” IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research 14(4): 5-8, 
 (1992). 
 263 
 
Fries J., and Krishnan E. “Equipoise, Design Bias, and Randomized Controlled Trials: 
 The Elusive Ethics of New Drug Development” Arthritis Research & Therapy 
 6(3): R250–R255, (2004). 
Gaylin W. “The Competence of Children: No Longer All or None” The Hastings Center 
 Report 12(2): 33-38, (1982). 
Gert B. “The Definition of Morality” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. Zalta 
 EN., Fall 2012. Web.  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/ 
 morality-definition/>.   
Glannon W. “Phase I Oncology Trials: Why the Therapeutic Misconception Will Not Go 
 Away” Journal of Medical Ethics 32(5): 252-255, (2006). 
Griffin J. On Human Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Grisso T., and Appelbaum PS. Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide 
 for Physicians and Other Health Care Professionals. New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 1998. 
Grossman S., Piantadosi S., and Covahey C. “Are Informed Consent Forms that Describe 
 Clinical Oncology Research Protocols Readable by Most Patients and their 
 Families?” Journal of Clinical Oncology 12: 2211-2215, (1994). 
Guyatt G. “A Randomized Control Trial of Right Heart Catheterization in Critically Ill 
 Patients: Ontario Intensive Care Study Group” Journal of Intensive Care 
 Medicine 6(2): 91-95, (1991). 
Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, [1965], 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436. 
 264 
 
Hammerschmidt D., and Keane M. “Institutional Review Board (IRB) Review Lacks 
 Impact on the Readability of Consent Forms for Research” American Journal of 
 the Medical Sciences 304(6): 348-351, (1992). 
Hawkins J., and Emanuel E. “Clarifying Confusions about Coercion” The Hastings 
 Center Report 35(5): 16-19, (2005). 
Hellman S., and Hellman D. “Of Mice but Not Men: Problems of the Randomized 
 Clinical Trial” New England Journal of Medicine 324: 1585-1589, (1991). 
Heyd D. “Experimentation on Trial: Why Should One Take Part in Medical Research?” 
 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik [Annual Review of Law and Ethics] 4: 189-204, 
 (1996). 
Hochhauser M. “Therapeutic Misconception and Recruiting Doublespeak in the Informed 
 Consent Process” IRB: Ethics and Human Research 24(1): 11-12, (2002). 
Holland et al. “Protecting Human Research Participants: Reading vs Understanding the 
 Consent Form” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 105: 927-928, (2013). 
Horng S., Emanuel E., et al. “Descriptions of Benefits and Risks in Consent Forms for 
 Phase I Oncology Trials” The New England Journal of Medicine 347(26): 2134-
 2140, (2002). 
Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 248 N.Y.S.2d 2455 (1964). 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration 
 of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline- 
 Guideline for Good Clinical Practice. Geneva: 1996. 
 265 
 
Jeste DV., Palmer BW., et al. “A New Brief Instrument for Assessing Decisional 
 Capacity for Clinical Research” Archives of General Psychiatry 64(8): 966-974, 
 (2007). 
Jonas H. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects” Daedalus 
 98(2): 219-247, (1969). 
Kant I. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 1785. Ed. Ellington. Indianapolis: 
 Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993. 
Kass N., Sugarman J., Faden R., and Schoch-Spana M. “Trust: The Fragile Foundation of 
 Contemporary Biomedical Research” The Hastings Center Report 26(5): 25-29, 
 (1996). 
Kats J. Experimentation with Human Beings. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
 1972. 
Katz J. “Human Experimentation and Human Rights” St. Louis University Law Journal 
 38: 7-54, (1993). 
Kleinman I. “The Right to Refuse Treatment: Ethical Considerations for the Competent 
 Patient” Canadian Medical Association Journal 144(10): 1219-1222, (1991). 
Kolata and Eichenwald. “Stopgap Medicine: For the Uninsured, Experiments may 
 Provide the Only Treatment” New York Times, June 22, 1999. 
Koyfman et al. “Consent Form Heterogeneity in Cancer Trials: The Cooperative Group 
 and Institutional Review Gap” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 105: 947-
 953, (2013). 
Lane v. Candura, 376 NE 2d 1232 (Mass: Appeals Court) 1978. 
Lane v. Fiasconaro, WL 584522 (Mass: App. Div.) 1995. 
 266 
 
Lemmens T., and Miller P. “Avoiding a Jekyll-and-Hyde Approach to the Ethics of 
 Clinical Research and Practice” The American Journal of Bioethics 2(2): 14-17, 
 (2002). 
Levine RJ. “Clarifying the Concepts of Research Ethics” Hastings Center Report 9(3): 
 21-26, (1979). 
Levine RJ. Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research. 2
nd
 ed. Baltimore: Urban & 
 Schwarzenberg, Inc., 1986. 
Levine R. “The Nature and Definition of Informed Consent in Various Research 
 Settings” National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
 Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix to the Belmont Report, Vol. I. 
 U.S. Government Printing Office, DHEW publication no. (OS)78-0013, 
 Washington, D.C.: 3-1 to 3-91. 
Levine R. “Consent Issues in Human Research” Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of 
 Clinical Research. Eds. Emanuel, Crouch, Arras, Moreno, & Grady. Baltimore: 
 The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 
Lipsett MB. “On the Nature and Ethics of Phase I Clinical Trials of Cancer 
 Chemotherapies” JAMA 248: 941-942, (1982). 
Lundh A., Sismondo S., Lexchin J., Busuioc O., and Bero L. “Industry Sponsorship and 
 Research Outcome” Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 12, (Dec. 2012). 
Manduca-Barone A. “Including Appreciation and Voluntariness: The Other Two 
 Elements of Decision-Making Capacity” American Journal of Bioethics 
 Neuroscience 2(1): 43-45, (2011). 
 267 
 
Mappes T., and Degrazia D. Biomedical Ethics. 5
th
 ed. New York: The McGraw- Hill 
 Companies, Inc., 2001. 
Markson LJ., Kern DC., Annas GJ., and Glantz LH. “Physician Assessment of Patient 
 Competence” Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 42(10): 1074-1080, 
 (1994). 
Marson DC., McInturff B., Hawkins L., Bartolucci A., and Harrell LE. “Consistency of 
 Physician Judgments of Capacity to Consent in Mild Alzheimer's Disease” 
 Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 45(4): 453-457, (1997). 
Meropol N., Weinfurt K., Burnett C., et al. “Perceptions of Patients and Physicians 
 Regarding Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials: Implications for Physician-Patient 
 Communication” Journal of Clinical Oncology 21(13): 2589-2596, (2003). 
Mill JS. Utilitarianism 1863. Ed. Sher. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
 2001. 
Miller F., and Brody H. “What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials Unethical?” The 
 American Journal of Bioethics 2(2): 3-9, (2002). 
Miller F., and Brody H. “A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic Misconception 
 in the Ethics of Clinical Trials” The Hastings Report 33(3): 19-28, (2003). 
Miller R., and Wilner HS. “The Two-Part Consent Form: A Suggestion for Promoting 
 Free and Informed Consent” New England Journal of Medicine 290(17): 964-966, 
 (1974). 
Miller V., et al. “The Decision Making Control Instrument to Assess Voluntary Consent” 
 Medical Decision Making 31(5): 730-741, (2011). 
 268 
 
Morreim EH. Balancing Act: The New Medical Ethics of Medicine’s New Economics. 
 Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995. 
Moser D., Schultz S., Arndt S., et al. “Capacity to Provide Informed Consent for 
 Participation in Schizophrenia and HIV Research” American Journal of 
 Psychiatry 159: 1201-1207, (2002). 
Moye J., and Marson D. “Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older Adults: An 
 Emerging Area of Practice and Research” The Journal of Lifelong Learning in 
 Psychiatry 7(1), (2009). 
Nelson R., Beauchamp T., Miller V., Reynolds W., Ittenbach R., and Luce MF. “The 
 Concept of Voluntary Consent” The American Journal of Bioethics 11(8): 6-16, 
 (2011). 
Nelson R., and Merz J. “Voluntariness of Consent for Research: An Empirical and 
 Conceptual Review” Medical Care 40(9): V69-V80, (Sept. 2002). 
Olver N., Buchanan L., Laidlaw C., and Poulton G. “The Adequacy of Consent Forms for 
 Informing Patients Entering Oncological Clinical Trials” Annals of Oncology 6: 
 867-870, (1995). 
Ontraio, Canada. Health Care Consent Act, S.O. 1996, Chapter 2 Schedule A. Web. 
 <http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_96h02_ 
 e.htm>. 
Oregon Health Authority. The Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Oregon Revised Statutes. 
 1994. Web. <http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/ 
 EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/ors.aspx>. 
Pappworth M. Human Guinea Pigs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. 
 269 
 
Pinals DA., Tillbrook CE., and Mumley DL. “Practical Application of the MacArthur 
 Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) in a Public 
 Sector Forensic Setting” Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
 Law 34(2): 179-188, (June 2006). 
Rawls J. “Justice as Reciprocity” Collected Papers: John Rawls. Ed. Freeman. 
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Reibl v. Hughes, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 880. 
Resnick B., Gruber-Baldini AL., et al. “Reliability and Validity of the Evaluation to Sign 
 Consent Measure” The Gerontologist 47(1): 69-77, (2007). 
Re T, (1992) 4 All E.R. 649. 
Ridker P., and Torres J. “Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical Trials 
 Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 2000-2005” Journal of 
 the American Medical Association 295(19): 2270-2274, (2006). 
Roberts I., Prieto-Merino D., Shakur H., Chalmers I., Nichol J. “Effect of Consent Rituals 
 on Mortality in Emergency Care Research” The Lancet 377(9771): 1071-1072, 
 (March 2011). 
Roberts LW. “Informed Consent and the Capacity for Voluntarism” The American 
 Journal of Psychiatry 159(5): 705-712, (2002). 
Ross LF. “Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is it in their Best Interest?” Health 
 Care Ethics in Canada. Eds. Baylis, Downie, Hoffmaster, and Sherwin. Toronto: 
 Nelson Ltd., 2004. 
 270 
 
Rutman D., and Silberfeld M. “A Preliminary Report on the Discrepancy Between 
 Clinical and Test Evaluations of Competency” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 
 37(9): 634-639, (1992). 
Shamoo AE., and Resnik DB. Responsible Conduct of Research. 2
nd
 ed. New York: 
 Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Sharp M. “The Problem of Readability of Informed Consent Documents for Clinical 
 Trials of Investigational Drugs and Devices: United States Considerations” Drug 
 Information Journal 38(4): 353-359, (2004). 
Skene L. “Risk-Related Standard Inevitable in Assessing Competence” Bioethics 5(2): 
 113-117, (1991). 
Sreenivasan G. “Does Informed Consent to Research Require Comprehension?” The 
 Lancet 362: 2016-2018, (2003). 
Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 722. 
Sturman ED. “The Capacity to Consent to Treatment and Research: A Review of 
 Standardized Assessment Tools” Clinical Psychology Review 25: 954-974, 
 (2005). 
Tan J., Hope T., and Stewart A. “Competence to Refuse Treatment in Anorexia Nervosa” 
 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 26: 697-707, (2003). 
Tan J., Stewart A., Fitzpatrick R., and Hope RA. “Competence to Make Treatment 
 Decisions in Anorexia Nervosa: Thinking Processes and Values” Philosophy, 
 Psychiatry, & Psychology 13(4): 267-282, (2006). 
Tanzarella M., and  Mura SM. “Is the Assessed Capacity Increased with the Seriousness 
 of What is at Stake?” The Psychiatrist: Correspondence 34, (2010). 
 271 
 
Tarnowski K., Allen D., Mayhall C., and Kelly P. “Readability of Pediatric Biomedical 
 Research Informed Consent Forms” Pediatrics 85(1): 58-62, (1990). 
Taylor T. “Opening Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946” The Nazi Doctors 
 and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation. Eds. Annas 
 and Grodin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
The ALS Association. Washington, D.C. Last accessed: 2014. Web. <http://www. 
 alsa.org>. 
Thompson D. “Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest” The New England Journal 
 of Medicine 329(8): 573-576, (1993). 
Thompson J., Baird P., and Downie J. The Olivieri Report: The Complete Text of the 
 Report of the Independent Inquiry Commissioned by the Canadian Association of 
 University Teachers. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2001. 
Tishler C., and Bartholomae S. “The Recruitment of Normal Healthy Volunteers: A 
 Review of the Literature on the Use of Financial Incentives” The Journal of 
 Clinical Pharmacology 42: 365-375, (2002). 
Tobias JS. “BMJ’s Present Policy (sometimes approving research in which patients have 
 not given fully informed consent) is Wholly Correct” British Medical Journal 
 314: 1111, (1997). 
Tomlinson T. “Who Decides, and What?” Biomedical Ethics. 5th ed. Eds. Mappes and 
 Degrazia. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2001. 114-116. 
Tourneau CL., Lee JJ., and Siu LL. “Dose Escalation Methods in Phase I Cancer Clinical 
 Trials” J Natl Cancer Inst 101(10): 708-720, (2009). 
 272 
 
Truog R. “Randomized Controlled Trials: Lessons from ECMO” Clinical Research 40: 
 519-527, (1992). 
Tsuchiya T. “Imperial Japanese Medical Atrocities and Their Enduring Legacy in 
 Japanese Research Ethics” Contemporary Issues in Bioethics. Eds. Beauchamp, 
 Walters, Kahn, and Mastroianni. Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.: 2008. 56-64. 
United States. National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Ethical and Policy 
 Issues in International Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries Vol. I: 
 Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission. 
 Bethesda, Maryland: 2001. 
United States. National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Ethical and Policy 
 Issues in International Research: Clinical Trials in Developing Countries Vol. II: 
 Comparative Analysis of International Documents Addressing the Protection of 
 Research Participants (staff analysis). Bethesda, Maryland: 2001. 
United States. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
 and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Making Health Care Decisions: A 
 Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-
 Practitioner Relationship. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: 1982. 
United States. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
 Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and 
 Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. Washington, D.C.: 
 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1979. 
 273 
 
United States. The President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. 
 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments: 
 Chapter 16: Subject Interview Study. Washington, D.C.: 1995. 
United States. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. National Institutes of 
 Health: Office of Extramural  Research. Research Involving Individuals with 
 Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider. November 2009. Web.  
 <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm#_ftn26>. 
United States. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of 
 Health, and Office for Protection from Research Risks. Title 45 (Public Welfare), 
 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46 (Protection of Human Subjects). 
 Washington, D.C.: Revised January 15, 2009 (Effective July 14, 2009). 
United States. U.S. Department of Health And Human Services, U.S. Food and Drug 
 Administration. Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People. Last 
 Updated: June 2014. Web. <http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/ 
 Consumers/ucm143531.htm>. 
U.S.A. vs. Karl Brandt et al. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military 
 Tribunals Under Control Council Law 2(10), Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
 Government Printing Office, 1949. 
Veatch RM. “Three Theories of Informed Consent: Philosophical Foundations and Policy 
 Implications” The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
 Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Appendix to the Belmont Report, Vol. II. 
 Washington, D.C.: DHEW publication no. (OS) 78-0014. 
 274 
 
Verheggen F., Nieman F., and Jonkers R. “Determinants of Patient Participation in 
 Clinical Studies Requiring Informed Consent: Why Patients Enter a Clinical 
 Trial” Patient Education and Counseling 35: 111-125, (1998). 
Wear S. “Patient Autonomy, Paternalism, and the Conscientious Physician” Theoretical 
 Medicine 4: 253-274, (1983). 
Weiss v. Solomon, 1989, 48 C.C.L.T. 280 (Que. S.C.). 
Wen H., Gris D., et al. “Fatty Acid–Induced NLRP3-ASC Inflammasome Activation 
 Interferes with Insulin Signaling” Nature Immunology 12: 408–415, (2011). 
White L., Jones J., Felton C., and Pool L. “Informed Consent for Medical Research: 
 Common Discrepancies and Readability” Academic Emergency Medicine 3(8): 
 745-750, (1996). 
Wicclair M. “A Response to Brock and Skene” Bioethics 5(2): 118-122, (1991). 
Wicclair M. “Patient Decision-Making Capacity and Risk” Bioethics 5(2): 91-104, 
 (1991). 
Wicclair M. “The Continuing Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence” 
 Bioethics 13(2): 149-153, (1999). 
Wildeman S. “Case Description: Starson v. Swayze” Health Care Ethics in Canada. 2nd 
 ed. Eds. Baylis, Downie, Hoffmaster, and Sherwin. Toronto: Nelson Ltd., 2004. 
Wilks I. “Asymmetrical Competence” Bioethics 13(2): 154-159, (1999). 
Wilson RF. “The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of Money and 
 Prestige in Human Research” American Journal of Law & Medicine 36: 295-325, 
 (2010). 
 275 
 
World Medical Association. “Declaration of Helsinki:  Ethical Principles for Medical 
 Research Involving Human Subjects” The Journal of the American Medical 
 Association 310(20): 2191-2194, (2013). 
Wynia M. “Invoking Therapeutic Privilege” Virtual Mentor: American Medical 
 Association Journal of Ethics 6(2), (Feb. 2004). 
Zutlevics TL. “Consent in Emergency Care Research” The Lancet 378(9785): 25-26, 
 (July 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 276 
 
Appendix A: Case Studies 
 There will likely be many instances where, through the conversational assessment 
approach, an SRA will be able to easily detect issues with one’s competence. This may 
occur in cases where a potential subject consistently seems to confuse the research trial 
with his own personal therapy, even after the therapeutic misconception and its causative 
factors have been explained. This may also occur when it becomes clear to an SRA that 
the final decision made by a potential subject was not actually her own, but was 
controlled by another person, for instance a physician or family member. As previously 
argued, voluntariness may be affected in this manner when an individual is either too 
emotionally distraught or even insecure to reason through a decision on her own, and 
instead excessively relies on the opinions of others. Similar hindrances to voluntariness 
may also occur when a potential subject has been deceived or manipulated by another. 
 However, despite there being a body of possible cases where the SRA will be able 
to use the conversational approach as well as the standards for each element of 
competence established in Chapter Four to reach her competency determinations easily, 
the SRA will also encounter a handful of borderline cases where it may be more difficult 
to make a competency determination. Two such cases are presented below, with 
evaluations for each of the four separate sub-abilities of competence.  
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CASE 1: Colon Cancer Patient/ Phase I Trial 
 Case Details 
Posit the following scenario: 
 George, a 22 year old senior college basketball player at the University of 
Kentucky, is currently leading his team in an important tournament, and has been 
diagnosed with colon cancer. His physician has informed him that current possible 
treatment involves a potential mixture of a chemotherapy regimen over the course of 8 
weeks, surgery and radiation therapy. However, given the advanced stages of the illness, 
the likelihood of complete remission using standard therapy is only at best 50% and 
George is told that without complete remission, he may only have 2-4 years to live. He is 
further informed that such a process, especially during the chemotherapy regimen, may 
significantly impact his quality of life and at times render him so ill that he will be 
bedridden. Symptoms such as severe pains, increased chances of infections, nausea, 
extreme fatigue, and muscle weakness are most common, but there are many other 
possible adverse effects that may also occur.  
 However, the physician further informs him that he is the recruiter for a new 
clinical trial that is testing the efficacy of a new targeted cancer therapy that is designed 
to target specific molecular targets associated with the cancer as opposed to current 
standard chemotherapy regimens that affect all active bodily cells. Thus, George is 
further informed, such a potential therapy may come with far fewer and less severe side 
effects, and some studies in animals have shown that there is a chance that one may still 
be able to live a normal life while undergoing such a treatment. In its current stage of 
development, the non-validated drug has also shown the potential to be as effective as 
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current standard therapy in combating late stage cancers such as the one that currently 
afflicts George, though no accurate remission rates are currently known. The drug is 
currently about to commence testing in a Phase I study. More specifically, the study will 
escalate the dosages of the drug in various stages in an attempt to note its toxicity and 
determine a maximum tolerable dose (MTD). However, his physician further informs 
him that he thinks that for the majority of the trial, the side effects will be far fewer than 
with current standard chemotherapy treatment, and further adds that this is likely 
George’s best chance to combat the disease. The physician continues on to tell George 
that after the trial, George will still be able to access current standard therapies. The 
physician then provides him with a promotional brochure for the trial. 
 George, who is distraught at the news, becomes visibly terrified and seems very 
uncertain as to what decision he should make. He is afraid of death and wants the best 
chance to live as long as possible. He also considers how such news will affect his 
basketball career, and more specifically the tournament in which he is thought to be 
currently leading his team to a potential championship. He knows that he will be unable 
to play if he decides to go with standard chemotherapy treatment, but that there is a 
chance that he will be well enough to play if he opts instead to enter the clinical trial. 
Though he is indeed concerned about the risks to his quality of life regardless of which 
option he chooses, his main priority is to attempt to overcome the disease as best as 
possible and live as long as possible. George is incredibly unsure what to do and decides 
to speak with his basketball coach, his family, and his doctor again in order to determine 
the best course of action for him. After such consultations, George decides to enroll in the 
trial. After an initial informational disclosure with the SRA, George decides that he will 
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participate in the trial, but must first have one more evaluative conversation with the 
SRA. 
 SRA Conversation
527
 
 In this conversation, George explains that he understands the nature of his disease 
and that it is likely to kill him within 4 years if he is not responsive to current standard 
treatment or to the non-validated targeted treatment administered in the clinical study. He 
claims that he would attempt anything to avoid death including attempting experimental 
interventions and further states that he is hopeful that this clinical trial will cure him. He 
appears incredibly saddened at the idea of not living a long enough life.   
 With some prompting by the SRA, George explains that he understands that this 
research trial differs from standard treatment, and that he for instance will not be getting 
the kind of personalized attention that he would otherwise receive with ordinary 
treatment. He acknowledges that this is a toxicity study and seems to realize that that 
makes it differ from standardized treatment. He furthermore seems to recognize the 
existence of the therapeutic misconception and that it may sway people to participate in 
research, thinking that it is standard therapy. George further explains that such a 
misconception may be especially problematic with desperate terminally ill individuals 
who may be inappropriately swayed into thinking that the research will provide some 
miracle cure. 
 When asked how research participation will impact his life, he claims that it will 
likely have less adverse effects, particularly in the early and middle stages of the trial, 
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 The following should not be taken as a full depiction of the conversation with the SRA. Such a 
conversation is likely to be much lengthier in nature, and may require several different types of inquiry by 
the SRA. Instead, the following should only be taken as some of the fundamental takeaways from the 
conversation that are relevant to the SRA’s competency evaluation.  
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than standard chemotherapy, and that he may even possibly avoid the common side 
effects associated with current chemotherapy, and thus may have a chance to still play 
basketball this year and finish his tournament. It was for this reason that he claimed that 
his coach and team thought that this would be a good idea. He further voiced his 
contentment with the idea that he might be able to play in the tournament because it had 
been rumored that NBA scouts would be present. Potentially making it into the NBA was 
something that he and his parents had been working towards for his entire life. George 
claimed that this was one of the deciding factors that made his parents also agree that he 
should enroll in the trial. When further questioned about the role his coach, team, and 
parent’s played in the final decision, George claimed that they all seemed in agreement 
that the trial would be able to help him combat the disease at least as well as standard 
therapy, while at the same time minimizing severe side effects and thus possibly enabling 
him to play in the current tournament. He further added that since he was unsure as to 
what he should do, and everyone around him seemed in such agreement, the choice 
became obvious for him.  
 When questioned by the SRA as to what the most important factor for George was 
when considering his options, George claimed that it was to ensure the best chance to 
increase his longevity. Avoiding an early death was paramount to George. However, 
when asked which option made such an outcome more likely, George replied that current 
standard treatment might work best since it has been established to cause complete 
remission for cases like his 50% of the time. However, he added that he hoped that 
participation in this trial would give him at least as good a chance to extend his life, 
though remission rates for the non-validated intervention are not as well known. After 
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avoiding death, George claimed that playing basketball was the most important factor in 
the decision making process. 
 When prompted by the SRA to explain his final choice to participate instead of 
opting for current standard treatment, George asserted that his main goals were to live as 
long as possible and still be able to currently play basketball. He again admitted that 
current chemotherapies gave him a good chance to survive and go on to live a long life, 
and probably represented the option that gave a more realistic chance to cause the cancer 
to go into remission. However, after speaking with his coach, team and parents, they all 
thought that the trial might work better since it may also cause the cancer to go into 
remission while at the same time minimizing possible side effects. George further 
claimed that this was also the opinion of his physician, and that everyone he consulted 
seemed to agree, and so he opted to enroll in the trial. 
 
Considerations for the Final Competency Assessment 
George appeared to demonstrate an understanding of his disease, the purpose of 
the trial, and the presence of the therapeutic misconception. He understood the potential 
for his disease to be terminal within 4 years, as well as what current standardized 
treatment would offer. He further seemed to understand not only that research differed 
from standard treatment, or that the therapeutic misconception exists, but also how, citing 
that the clinical trial would not afford him the type of personalized attention thought 
quintessential of ordinary best care standards, and that misconceptions that research was 
actually treatment are possible among certain individuals who may be desperate and thus 
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easily swayed. Thus it appears that George satisfies the high level of understanding 
criterion for competence. 
George further seemed capable of appropriately appreciating the facts 
surrounding the clinical trial. He seemed to understand that it is a toxicity trial, and even 
alluded to the fact that with such a study the chance of success for him was unclear. He 
also seemed able to foresee how the possible side effects of both options might impact his 
life, specifically discussing how the potentially less severe side effects at least in the early 
stages of the trial would enable him to finish his tournament.  
Though it required some prompting, George further seemed able to appreciate the 
relative affect on longevity of each option, citing that current standard treatment might  
be most beneficial to his longevity since it was known to have a 50% complete remission 
rate. However, he also claimed that he hoped that the trial would be at least as helpful, 
though he acknowledged that no similar statistics were known with the non-validated 
intervention. It was not completely clear though, whether George was aware that the 
actual procedures employed in a Phase I trial would diminish his personal chance of 
success with the non-validated drug, and thus may make the 50% remission success rate 
of the current standard treatments more likely to contribute to his longevity. Nonetheless, 
when prompted he seemed to foresee that his longevity would be better served with 
current chemotherapy treatments. As a result of this, it seems that indeed George 
sufficiently satisfies the Imperfect, but Independent Appreciation standard. 
George furthermore, seemed capable of engaging in reasoning. He appears to 
have formulated a desired goal for himself, namely to live as long as possible, and 
secondly to play basketball. He further appears to be able to engage in appropriate 
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means/ends reasoning and seems to acknowledge that the current standard treatment 
option is more likely to achieve the former, while the clinical trial is more likely to 
accomplish the latter. Thus George seems to satisfy the Imperfect, but Largely 
Independent Reasoning standard. 
However, it did not appear that George’s final decision to participate in the 
clinical trial follows from his own understanding, appreciation, and reasoning. If his main 
goal is in fact to ensure his longevity, and he is able to understand and appreciate that the 
Phase I trial does not provide as good a chance at accomplishing a complete remission, 
then in conjunction with a reasoned analysis, the type of which George appears capable 
of, one may expect George to select current standard chemotherapy over the Phase I 
clinical trial. Instead, it appeared George was incredibly unsure what he should do, and 
relied excessively on his doctor’s opinion, who as a recruiter for the clinical trial may 
perhaps unknowingly be biased, on his parent’s opinions, which seemed to be based on a 
different main goal than George’s, namely to have George be seen by NBA scouts, and 
finally on his coach’s opinion, who also had a vested interest in having George play in 
the current tournament. Conversations with these three groups appeared to exert influence 
over George and excessively sway him towards participation, preventing him from 
voluntarily selecting the option which would follow from his own understanding, 
appreciation, and reasoning. George thus appears to have made his decision without an 
appropriate level of voluntariness.  
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SRA’s Assessment: Incompetent 
Though the prospective subject possesses a high level of understanding regarding 
the relevant trial related information, likely meets the appreciation criterion as well, and 
demonstrated an ability to reason with such understandings and insights, he ultimately 
appeared to fail to make a decision that stemmed from such understanding, appreciation, 
and reasoning. Instead it seemed clear that he did not make his choice with a sufficient 
level of voluntariness, but was instead swayed to select this option given the influences 
exerted upon him by varying other individuals.  
 
CASE 2: ALS Patient/ Phase II trial 
 Case Details 
Posit the following scenario:  
A 60 year old retiree, Audrey, has recently been diagnosed with Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). Her physician has informed her that though some ALS patients 
go on to live many years, she likely has between two and five years of life remaining. She 
is further told that this is a progressive neurodegenerative disease that will affect the cells 
in one’s brain and spinal cord. The progressive degeneration of the cells will lead to a 
loss of muscular control, and some in later stages of the disease become completely 
paralyzed.
528
 Though Audrey in not employed, she is a mother and grandmother of two 
and has a busy and rich family life, which will be greatly impacted by such a diagnosis. 
Audrey is further informed that there is currently no existing cure. However, her doctor 
provides her details of a Phase II trial that is currently testing a new drug that may 
mitigate the effects of ALS. This drug has shown some small chances of success in 
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animals, however previous Phase I trials have demonstrated that the drug has some 
adverse effects that may impact one’s quality of life. Some of these effects include 
inability to sleep, extreme muscle weakness and atrophy, small chances of possible 
hearing loss as well as the potential to reduce one’s longevity. Convinced that this might 
be her best chance to combat the disease, Audrey decides to look into the clinical trial. 
After consulting with her family, and having the initial informational disclosure 
conversation with the SRA, she decides to enroll, but is first informed that she will need 
to have a second evaluative conversation with the SRA.    
   
 SRA Conversation
529
 
In her conversation with the SRA, Audrey explains that she understands the 
nature of the disease, that it is a terminal degenerative disease that will likely cause her to 
lose motor function rendering her in a state of paralysis. She further states that she is 
aware of the side effects of the experimental drug administered in the trial. She also 
acknowledges that the trial is not the same as standard therapy and cites the use of 
randomized assignment and double blinding as examples. Additionally, given the initial 
conversation with the SRA, she is able to recognize the existence of the therapeutic 
misconception, and how it may affect especially desperate individuals in dire situations 
such as herself. She further states that she can see how easy it might be to confuse 
research and treatment given the primary investigator in the clinical trial is a physician 
and given the visual similarities in the settings in which treatment and research take 
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 Again, as previously mentioned, the following should not be taken as a full depiction of the conversation 
with the SRA. Such a conversation is likely to be much lengthier in nature, and may require several 
different types of inquiry by the SRA. Instead, the following should only be taken as some of the salient 
points from the conversation that are relevant to the SRA’s competency evaluation.  
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place. However, despite all of this, she claims that she is very hopeful that the drug will 
work for her and potentially be, if not a cure, then at least a way to postpone the more 
severe symptoms of ALS. She further states that her family and doctor shared similar 
opinions, and that given the lack of available treatments for ALS, this was likely the only 
chance she might have. 
Further in the conversation she states that a reduction in quality of life due to 
extreme paralysis would be an incredibly difficult life for her and her family. She claims 
that she can imagine such an existence and would do anything to attempt to avoid that 
outcome. Given her role in her family as well as the joy she receives from it, she further 
claimed that both she and the members of her family were desperate to try to avoid such 
an outcome. 
 When prompted to discuss how her life would be if she were in the trial, she 
claimed that she did not know for sure and that it would depend on how severe the side 
effects of the non-validated drug turned out to be, but that such side effects did not overly 
concern her. When further prompted to envision how such side effects and overall trial 
participation would impact her life, she claimed that while she acknowledges that some 
of the side effects of trial participation could severely impact some of her life’s greatest 
joys such as spending time with her family, that her disease would likely do that 
anyways. She again stated that she hoped that the Phase II trial would help improve her 
quality of life and that this was likely the only chance she would have to be able to spend 
more quality time with her family.  
When prompted to answer why she would want to take part in a study that may 
cause an earlier death than might have otherwise occurred with the disease alone, Audrey 
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responded that since her main motive is to spend as much quality time with her family, 
that even if the disease allowed her to live longer, but with paralyzing symptoms, that 
such an outcome would prevent her from doing what she loves anyways. Indeed she 
appeared to consider such an outcome as good as, if not worse than, death and that the 
clinical trial was her only good chance to live the way she would want. 
 
Considerations for the Final Competency Assessment 
The potential subject appeared to demonstrate a very good understanding of her 
ailment, medical research and of the trial procedures. She was able to grasp the likely 
symptoms associated with her disease, specifically mentioning paralysis throughout 
various points in the conversation. Though at times she seemed to downplay or at least 
not be overly concerned with some of the adverse effects of trial participation, she was 
able to acknowledge and understand such risks of the non-validated intervention. It thus 
seemed clear that she satisfies the high level of understanding standard since she 
additionally was able to not only state that research differs from treatment, and that the 
therapeutic misconception exists, but also how, citing specifically trial procedures such as 
randomization, as well as existing confusion between physicians and investigators, 
respectively. 
Audrey also appeared to appreciate the differences between research and 
treatment and seemed to engage somewhat in how both her disease and trial participation 
would affect her personally, specifically mentioning the effects of both on her ability to 
live a rich and fulfilling family life. However, though capable of engaging in these 
considerations, she generally seemed to be disinterested in the adverse effects of the non-
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validated drug and of trial participation overall. Instead this portion of the conversation 
seemed to involve a disproportionate amount of hopefulness and desperation. She seemed 
to consider this her last best chance despite there being a low chance of success and 
despite her having fully acknowledged both the adverse quality of life impacting side 
effects of the drug as well as the risks to her longevity.  
Nonetheless it seemed that this was as a result of her reasoning that given the 
nature of ALS, and the lack of available treatment alternatives, the likely effects of her 
disease would be just as impactful on her quality of life and specifically how it would 
affect her ability to spend time with her family. She seemed to reason that since there was 
no current available treatment, the clinical trial at least provided a chance for some 
improvement despite also having similarly high risks to her quality of life.  
When further prompted by the SRA to consider the impact of trial participation on 
her longevity, the prospective subject stated that she did not allow such a consideration to 
play a significant role in her decision making process because she viewed the symptoms 
of her disease, such as paralysis, as being a worse state of affairs than dying sooner, 
especially given the degree to which she desired to continue engaging in an active family 
life for her remaining days. 
Thus, it seemed that Audrey had indeed, though perhaps not explicitly, 
acknowledged the possible impact on her life of the trial, but had merely not deemed it 
worse than the impact that her disease would have. Thus, she appeared to satisfy both the 
Imperfect, but Independent Appreciation and Imperfect, but Largely Independent 
Reasoning standards.  
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The former appears satisfied by the fact that she had some insight into what her 
life would be like if she accepted or refused to participate in the trial. She considered both 
states of affairs in light of her particular circumstances of wishing to engage in an active 
family life. The latter appears satisfied by the fact that she used this insight in conjunction 
with what she has deemed to be her main goal, namely spending high quality time with 
her family regardless of her longevity. This demonstrated that Audrey was able to 
identify her own best ends, as well as engage in appropriate means/ends reasoning, and 
conduct her own risk/benefit analysis considering and comparing the utility she may 
receive from both trial participation, and refusing to participate. Thus, despite some 
hopeful and desperate comments, and despite what may appear to be a lack of concern 
over the clinical trial’s side effects, Audrey appears to be sufficiently capable of both 
appreciation and reasoning.  
 Finally, though she admitted to discussing the matter with her physician and 
family, neither seemed to control her decision in a way that would be relevant to 
voluntariness. In fact, her final decision flows logically from her understanding about the 
severity of her disease, information about the trial, as well as her appreciation and 
reasoning regarding her goals. Furthermore, it seems that her emphatic desire to attempt 
to maintain a high level of active family life was indeed her own, and that she has the 
confidence and emotional strength to make her own decisions in this tumultuous 
situation. Thus there was no reason to question whether she is capable of a high level of 
voluntariness. 
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SRA’s Assessment: Competent 
The prospective subject appears to satisfy all four criteria of competence at the 
required levels necessary in order to consent to participate in the clinical trial. 
